



























This thesis brings together two streams of research that have traditionally proceeded 
independently: metacognition and face processing. In the first experimental chapter, I assessed 
participants' insight into their own face perception abilities and those of other people. I found 
classic Dunning–Kruger Effects in matching tasks for unfamiliar identity, familiar identity, gaze 
direction, and emotional expression. Low performers overestimated themselves, and high 
performers underestimated themselves. Interestingly, participants' self-estimates were more 
stable across tasks than their actual performance. In addition, peer estimates revealed a 
consistent egocentric bias. High performers attributed higher accuracy to other people than did 
low performers. In the second experimental chapter, I focus on the other-race effect (ORE), the 
phenomenon whereby own-race faces are better remembered than other-race faces. Despite the 
high profile of ORE in the literature, previous studies have not put the magnitude of ORE in 
context. In two face recognition experiments, I show that the familiarity effect was several times 
larger than the race effect in all performance measures. However, participants expected race to 
have a larger effect on others than it actually did. Face recognition accuracy depends much more 
on whether you know the person’s face than whether you share the same race. In the final 
experimental chapter, I examined how much common ground exists in face-evoked thoughts, 
and how the observed overlap compares to viewers’ expectations. I show that participants 
exhibited strong egocentric bias and false consensus effects, greatly overestimating the extent 
to which other people’s thoughts resembled their own. The findings of this thesis have both 
theoretical and applied implications. Not only do they shed light on the range of ability in the 
general population, they also reveal a fundamental source of uncertainty in social interactions. 
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Chapter 1  General Introduction 
This introduction is broadly divided into two general themes. The first general theme is 
metacognition, including its definition, importance, measurements and two well-established 
phenomena—the Dunning–Kruger effect (concerning insight into one’s own thinking) and 
egocentric bias (concerning insight into other people’s thinking). The second broad theme is 
face perception, including its definition, importance, measurements and different aspects of face 
processing that are potentially connected to metacognition. The chapter ends with an overview 
of the experimental work contained in this thesis exploring metacognition and face perception. 
 
1.1 What is metacognition 
In 1995, a peculiar bank robbery was committed in Pittsburgh. The culprit, McArthur Wheeler, 
robbed two banks in broad daylight without any visible attempt at disguise. He could not 
understand how he had been arrested so quickly, because he had covered his face with lemon 
juice, believing that this precaution would make it difficult for the police to recognise him from 
the videotape (Fuocco, 1996). The Wheeler case vividly illustrates the fact that people are 
largely unaware of their own incompetence (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), and tend to surmise 
others’ behavior according to their own. 
 
1.1.1 Definition  
Negotiating everyday life requires accurate and appropriate insight into one’s own intellectual 
and social limitations. That leads to the focus of this project, which is “metacognition”, generally 
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defined as “cognition about cognition” or “thinking about thinking”. Metacognition has been 
defined in various ways (Kuhn, 1983), comprising ‘executive processes’ (Brown, 1977), 
‘cognitive monitoring’ (Flavell, 1979) and ‘self-communication’ (Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 
1979). The formal model of metacognition that has gathered a great deal of support and widely 
cited in recent years is the distinguishment between primary and secondary cognition (Nelson 
& Narens, 1990). Primary cognition is often called “object level” cognition, referring to the 
mental processes involved in gaining knowledge and comprehension. At the higher level is 
metacognition. A typical example to distinguish object level and the meta level is the well-
known tip-of-the-tongue situation (e.g., You can’t recall a person’s name but you are sure that 
you know the person and the name), which may happen more frequently as people grow older 
(Schwartz, 2002). Metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control are the two facets of 
metacognition that have been investigated most extensively, according to the framework of 
metacognition formalized by Nelson and Narens (1990). The definition and examples of the key 
concepts are presented in Table 1.1, (John & Janet, 2008). Metacognitive monitoring occurs 
when the object level (e.g., in this case, your thought is that “I know this person and the name” ) 
is being assessed by the meta level (“I’m sure I know the person’s name”).  Metacognitive 
control occurs when the meta level influences control over the object level (e.g., when the 
awkward tip-of-the-togue situation makes you spend more time to match the face and the name). 
Therefore, metacognitive control serves as a further process based on the results of 
metacognitive monitoring. Given the current work is the extension of metacognition research in 
a new field, the current work only considered the first process which is the metacognitive 
monitoring at this stage. 
 
 16 
Table 1.1  Definitions of Important Concepts Relevant to Metacognition 
Concept Definition Examples 
Cognition Symbolic mental activities 
and mental representations 
thinking, learning, memory, reasoning, 
problem-solving 
Metacognition Cognition about cognition See examples in text 
Metacognitive 
monitoring 
Assessing the current state of 
a cognitive activity 
Judging whether you are approaching the 
correct solution to a problem 
Assessing how well you understand what 
you are reading 
Metacognitive 
control 
Regulating some aspect of a 
cognitive activity  
Deciding to use a new tactic to solve a 
difficult problem 
Deciding to spend more time trying to 
remember the answer to a trivia question  
 
Metacognitive thoughts vary in a number of interesting dimensions, such as valence, number, 
target, origin, evaluation, and confidence (Petty et al., 2007).  This has to some extent explained 
why metacognition is such a complex concept to define. There is a long-standing historical 
controversy in metacognition definition between researchers who stressed that metacognition 
only contains the thinking about one’s own cognition (e.g.,  Flavell, 1979; Kuhn, 2000; Martinez, 
2006) versus those who conceived metacognition more broadly as thinking about their own and 
other people’s cognition (e.g.,  Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998; Wright, 2002). The prediction 
of other people’s performance—peer judgement—was also included as a part of metacognition 
in Tauber, Dunlosky, Rawson, Rhodes, and Sitzman (2013). Thus, this faculty can be further 
subcategorized into beliefs about intra-individual differences and inter-individual differences. 
In other words, metacognition refers to people’s insight into themselves and others (any thought 
about a thought). However, the ability to understand the thoughts of others and to use this 
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information to predict the behavior of others is known as mentalizing (also known as Theory of 
Mind; Frith & Frith, 1999; Frith, 2012). Theory of mind has been widely used in developmental 
research, because it focuses on the ability to distinguish between people’s own beliefs and those 
of others (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Importantly, self-assessment can often end up in a 
chicken-and-egg relationship with the assessment of others. Knowledge of oneself may serve as 
the first step towards understanding others (Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, & David Smith, 2009). 
On the other hand, we can better know ourselves by understanding others (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 
2014). In addition, brain studies also found that these two modes of assessment involve similar 
neural networks (Legrand & Ruby, 2009). In the present thesis, the definition of metacognition 
will be considered in a general way as the estimation of both one’s own performance and that 
of others. 
 
1.1.2 Theoretical and practical importance  
The presence and consequences of metacognition have significant implications for the theory of 
understanding human consciousness. Metacognition is a higher level of cognition that does not 
show superficial behavior but rather the mental states behind the behavior (Nelson, 1996; Koriat, 
2007). Understanding this kind of reflective knowledge is also important for a complete 
understanding of human behavior. According to Petty, et al. (2007), metacognitive performance 
can also influence cognitive behavior. Take the behavior of pursuing goals as an example, which 
is an important step associated with desirable outcomes. As noted by Achtziger, et al. (2011), 
metacognition influence future goal setting and goal striving. That is, the reflection and 
evaluation is relevant in determining a new goal and how much effort is required to reach the 
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goal. Besides helping understand ourselves, according to the other side of metacognition, it also 
contributes to the complete understanding of others. Couchman et al. (2009) argued that 
metacognition is a prior step towards understanding the thoughts of others and taking their 
perspective. The assessment of other people’s performance is a primary basis of social 
interaction (Fussell & Krauss, 1989; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Metacognition is not only a key 
component of humans’ reflective mind, cognitive functioning and interpersonal communication 
in theory, it has also broadened the understanding of learning by educational psychologists. Two 
people could have the same performance at the cognition level, but their performance at the 
meta level could be quite different. For example, suppose that two excellent students have 
already mastered an area of knowledge and both chose option A (the right answer) in a test 
question. One student had great self-assessment and didn’t doubt herself or himself. The other 
student did not have such well-calibrated judgment of her or his own performance. After some 
hesitation, the correct option A was unfortunately changed to the wrong option B. Thus, the 
study of metacognition can help to understand what differentiates successful students from their 
less successful peers in learning. 
 
Just as one’s knowledge of a goal state is likely to guide the specific strategy you will use to 
achieve your goal, the study of metacognition not only enriches theorietical understanding of 
human behavior, but also directly influences human behavior. Therefore, the topic of 
metacognition holds an important place from a practical perspective, especially in learning and 
social interactions. For example, research shows that metacognition is significantly correlated 
to academic monitoring (Sperling, et al. , 2004) and is also related to predictions of subsequent 
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learning (Tobias & Everson, 1996). That is, once people perceive that their degree of learning 
meets the required standard, they may not continue learn the current item. Those who have poor 
self-assessment never knew that they haven’t grasped the knowledge well, so they arrange little 
time in learning due to their overconfidence, leading to negative impacts on their study outcomes. 
Therefore, since the metacognitive ability can promote academic learning, educational 
psychologists are keen to explore strategies for improving metacognition performance. Many 
teachers who realize the importance of metacognition skills also explicitly teach learners 
metacognition strategies and cultivate them as a mental habit in order to improve in attainment 
(Martinez, 2006). Meanwhile, better assessment of other people’s behavior can help people 
understand others better in interpersonal communication, which may also help to reduce 
contradiction and conflict, and promote cooperation (Frith, 2012). In the field of social 
psychology, stereotype has become a major concern for social scientists. According to Banaji 
and Dasgupta (1998), metacognitive improvement can be an entry point to dispel stereotypes. 
For instance, if people are aware of the impact of their stereotypic biases, they could adjust the 
effect of the bias, or perhaps the bias would not exist in the first place. This is not an isolated 
case. For example, a skilled driver may think it easy to dodge a car rushing towards him, and 
may think it easy for the driver of the other car too. Yet the driver in the other car may be a 
novice. That kind of unawareness may increase the risk of a traffic accident. Hence, 
metacognition, the knowledge of knowledge, is as important as knowledge per se. 
 
1.2 Metacognition measurements 
1.2.1 Types of measurements  
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The measurements available to researchers in the previous metacognition studies vary in 
different ways. Here, I review the following typical behavioral methods based on different 
distinctions (see table 1.2, note that there are still more measurements based on other distinctions 
or other domains). The first distinction is timing, including whether measurements of 
metacognitive performance occur prior to the whole cognitive task (prospective, e.g., 
Schnitzspahn et al., 2011), follow each trial (concurrent, e.g., Mclntosh et al., 2019) or after task 
completion (retrospective, e.g., Mazancieux et al. 2018 ). 
 
Table 1.2   Summary of metacognitive measurements classified by timing and domain.  
 domain at cognitive level    
timing memory decision-making perception  learning 








concurrent feeling of knowing confidence confidence think-aloud 
retrospective confidence wager a separate scale assess action 
 
Metacognition has been widely explored in various domains, but measurement in one domain 
is difficult to transfer directly to another domain. Thus, another distinction of metacognition 
measurement is domain. In the memory domain, judgements of learning (JOL) mainly occur in 
the learning phase testing self-assessment of how successfully participants will recall a 
particular item in a subsequent test phase (Hu et al., 2016). Conversely, feeling of knowing 
(FOK) mainly occurs after the test phase when participants fail to recall an item, or to predict 
the probability that they might be able to recognize the answer from a list of alternatives (Hart, 
1965). FOK is closely related to the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon (Brown, 1991). 
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Metacognitive confidence refers to the estimation of the possibility that the answer could be 
correct usually along with clear criteria for accuracy. Asking for confidence-in-accuracy has 
been widely used in a variety of domains, including memory (Brewer & Sampaio, 2012), 
decision-making (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), and visual perception (Vickers, 2014). For 
example, Rausch and colleagues (2015) asked observers to rate their degree of confidence in a 
perceptual judgement using a two-alternative forced-choice (“unconfident” and “confident”). 
Researchers have also used other scales such as the four-point confidence scale in Peirce & 
Jastrow (1884). Estimating specific performance is another widely-used measure. For example, 
asking participants to guess how well other people would perform in a face-matching task after 
making the judgement by themselves (Ritchie et al., 2015). Decision-making researchers also 
used wagers as an intuitive measure of retrospective confidence, as introduced by Kunimoto et 
al., (2001). In the standard simple post-decision wagering, participants are asked to bet on 
whether their answer is correct or not. They will keep the wager amount if their decision is 
correct. Otherwise, they will lose it. Their confidence is reflected by the size of chosen gamble 
(e.g., Persaud, et al., 2007). 
 
In addition to the respective measurement methods in each field, researchers have also 
developed metacognitive scales to assess general metacognitive skills, such as the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI developed by Schraw & Dennison, 1994) and the 
Memory and Reasoning Competence Inventory (MARCI, Kleitman & Stankov, 2001). The 
MAI is a 52-item questionnaire testing people’s awareness of themselves in a non-specific 
learning context and assessing the awareness of general learning ability and strategies (using 
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such item as “I know how well I did once I finish a test”). Not as extensive as the MAI, the 
MARCI is used to assess knowledge about one’s own memory and reasoning ability (using 
items such  as “I can remember more material than the average person”). One of the most 
representative and typical measures in the domain of learning is the think-aloud method, in 
which records the learner’s ongoing metacognition behavior. Learners are asked to verbalize 
their thoughts while doing the task. This allows metacognitive behavior to be recorded directly 
and completely. However, transcribing and judging verbalized thoughts requires adequate time 
and proper experience of using the method, which limits its popularity (Azevedo et al., 2010; 
Schellings, 2011). Another proven effective method to get insight into students’ metacognition 
is to record and assess the actions that learners perform when working on the task. For example, 
Van Essen and Hamaker (1990) asked students to make a drawing when solving a word problem 
in order to reveal their strategies of analyzing and exploring a problem. This visualization 
method has frequently been used in metacognition of problem solving (Edens and Potter 2007; 
Hegarty and Kozhevnikov 1999; Van Garderen and Montague 2003). 
 
1.2.2 Approaches quantify the accuracy of metacognition 
Metacognition accuracy refers to how closely metacognitive judgements track ongoing task 
performance. A naive approach to metacognition accuracy might insist that we are in complete 
control of own cognitive behavior. On this view, the self is regarded as “epistemic authority” 
(Ellis & Kruglanski, 1992). However, Nelson, Kruglanski, and Jost (1998) present a very 
different view. In their analysis, multiple sources of information and ability influence how 
people assess knowledge of themselves and others, such as motivation, cultural beliefs and 
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interpreting capacity. Since people may not be natural metacognition experts, measuring 
metacognitive accuracy has become a major research interest.   
 
There are multiple ways to measure metacognitive accuracy, but the core of these is to compare 
metacognitive performance with cognitive performance directly. The specific analysis depends 
on the specific metacognitive measure in each domain. Van Garderen and Montague (2003) 
used Pearson correlation coefficients to examine relationships between visual-spatial 
representation (metacognitive skill) and mathematical problem-solving performance. The 
simple analysis of correlation is one of the most frequently used analysis. Those who used a 
separate metacognitive scale also use correlation to test whether results on the self-report scale 
predict the person’s performance in another cognitive task. For example, Shah et al., (2015) 
found strong correlation between the PI20 score (a 20-item prosopagnosia index, a standard self-
report instrument assessing the general face perception ability) and performance on face 
recognition task.  However, the drawback of this measure is that the results of a different scale 
could not reveal how people assess their performance in a particular task. Besides correlation, 
there is also a common analysis that compares differences in mean performance between the 
meta level and object level. For example, Kruger and Dunning (1999) used paired sample t-tests 
to compare participants’ estimated percentile ranking and the actual ranking in a logical 
reasoning task. The results revealed whether participants had overestimated or underestimated 
their own performance.  
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In addition to the above typical methods, there are still a variety ways of measuring and 
analyzing metacognition accuracy, such as the Goodman–Kruskall gamma coefficient, G 
(Goodman and Kruskal, 1954) which mainly suits the designs using a rating scale in confidence 
testing and Phi (φ) correlation which mainly suits dichotomous low/high confidence designs 
(see the comparison of each measurement in Fleming & Lau, 2014). Meta-d’ (Maniscalco and 
Lau, 2012) is a more recently developed approach that further quantifies the efficacy with which 
confidence ratings discriminate between correct and incorrect judgments in a signal detection 
theory (SDT) framework. However, this is built upon parametric assumptions that some 
metacognitive measures may not meet. In general,  the approach to analyzing metacognitive 
accuracy depends on the type of metacognition measurements in different domains.  
 
1.3  Metacognitive Illusions  
According to above review, people’s metacognition accuracy varies. Unfortunately, their 
unrealized false judgments cause some unexpected outcomes, which has been a focus of 
research in metacognition for both the insights into oneself (e.g. the Dunning-Kruger effect) and 
insights into others (e.g. egocentric bias). 
 
1.3.1 Dunning-Kruger Effect  
Early metacognition research mainly focused on the field of educational settings (Hacker, 
Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009), developmental psychology (Brown, 1977, 1978; Masters, 1981) 
and clinical psychology (Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979; Merluzzi, Rudy, & Glass, 1981). In 
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1999, the social psychologist Justin Kruger and David Dunning expanded metacognition 
research into social psychology and observed an intriguing metacognition illusion, now known 
as the Dunning–Kruger Effect (DKE). Since then, researchers have devoted significant attention 
to exploring this illusion in various domains. Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that people tend 
to overestimate their abilities due to the lack of metacognitive skill. They based their conclusions 
on studies of performance in tests of humor, logical reasoning, and English grammar, combined 
with participants’ self-assessment of their performance in these tests. They found that low 
performers (those in the lowest quartile) overestimated their percentile ranking (that is, their 
relative performance compared with other people) as well as their test scores (that is, their 
absolute performance, the accuracy in the task) by some 40 to 50 points (see Figure 1). These 
low-performing participants believed that they were outperforming the majority when, in fact, 
they were the ones being outperformed. Conversely, high performers (those in the highest 
quartile) were typically more conservative and underestimated their own performance. One 
important contribution of Kruger and Dunning’s analysis is that it explored metacognition 
performance from the perspective of individual differences. It is a typical finding of individual 
differences in metacognition showing the difference of metacognitive ability between high and 
low performers. Some people are more inclined to introspection than others (Stanovich, 2012; 
Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). Understanding what makes the difference from those people 
and those who are unskilled but unaware will contribute to improve the metacognitive ability 




Figure 1.1  The comparison of perceived ability and actual test score across Participant Group 
(bottom, 2nd, 3rd or top quartile) in humor recognition task (Kruger & Dunning, 1999. Study 
1). 
 
Dunning-Kruger’s unskilled-and-unaware effect was a landmark finding in how people look at 
themselves and has been replicated in many research areas. For example, reasoning (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017), information literacy skill 
(Mahmood, 2016) and has even been expanded to political psychology in recent years (Anson, 
2018; Motta, Callaghan, & Sylvester, 2018). Furthermore, Dunning, et al., (2003) suggested that 
it is worthwhile to explore metacognition in other different domains, so that we can determine 
whether there are any “special” domains in which people correctly intuit their deficits, and how 
those domains might differ from others. 
 
1.3.2 Egocentric bias  
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When asking people to see things from another person’s perspective, they tend to estimate it 
first from their own perspective. This is probably because we have privileged access to 
information about ourselves (e.g., private thoughts, emotions). We spend much more time 
paying attention to our own thoughts or feelings than to those of other people.  We do not have 
direct access to the thoughts of other people, so it is difficult to adjust from our original 
viewpoint to that of others. When people rely too much on their own opinions and fail to 
properly evaluate the feelings of others, this can lead to an egocentric bias. That is generally 
understood to mean that “individuals tend to perceive events largely from their own perspective” 
(Greenwald, 1980). Egocentric bias is usually conceived of as the primary mechanism behind 
several related cognitive biases, including the tendency to overestimate the degree to which 
other people notice and care about one’s own appearance and actions (the spotlight effect; 
Gilovich et al., 2000), the tendency to believe that their opinions and beliefs are more common 
in the population than they actually are (the false consensus effect; Ross et al., 1977), the 
tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information we are given about a topic 
(anchoring bias; Furnham & Boo, 2011) and the distinct  condition which showed the tendency 
to believe we are less biased than our peers (Blind Spot Bias; Pronin, 2007).  It also plays an 
important role in fairness perception in which people believe that situations that favor them are 
fair (Tanaka, 1993). Given the fact that egocentric bias can strongly influence the way we 
process information and make decisions, it has been widely explored in different areas of 
psychology (Hinds, 1999; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Dimaggio et al., 2008) and has been 
described as “ubiquitous” (Nickerson, 1998).  
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Thus, egocentric bias also occurs in the field of metacognition. One concept that is closely 
related to egocentric bias is theory of mind, the ability to understand other people’s mental states 
(Heyes, 1998). Egocentric bias occurs when people need to use their theory of mind. We tend 
to look at others in an egocentric way. For example, one study proposing an integrated model 
of narcissistic personality via clinical practice put this metacognitive deficit at the heart of the 
model. They found the narcissistic patients had limited ability to understand other people’s 
minds due to their own egocentric bias (Dimaggio, et al, 2002). However, egocentric bias is a 
cognitive bias which hasn’t been put forward explicitly in the field of metacognition. Only the 
same pattern of finding has been raised in metacognition research. For example, to our 
knowledge, the only demonstration of egocentric bias in metacognition of face identity is by 
Ritchie, et al (2015). They asked participants to carry out a paired matching task for facial 
identity, in which half of the pairs showed familiar faces, and half of the pairs showed unfamiliar 
faces. For each pair, they also asked participants to indicate how many other people would 
answer correctly. As expected, people matched images of familiar faces (faces of the staff 
members from their own university) more accurately than unfamiliar faces (faces of the staff 
members from another university). Critically, they also predicted that faces they themselves 
knew would be more accurately matched by others. Nevertheless, the researchers did not use 
the terms “egocentric bias” or “metacognition” in their face identity study. It is important to 
understand egocentric bias in metacognition systematically and explicitly in broad fields. Along 
with its widespread exploration in cognition field, it is plausible to believe that egocentric bias 




1.4  What is face perception 
1.4.1 Definition 
Face perception refers to the process of understanding and interpreting the face, particularly the 
human face, especially in relation to the associated information processing in the brain. Face 
perception is often thought to be ‘special’ in some respects due to its innateness, automaticity, 
and neural specificity (see, e.g., Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998, for discussion). Unlike 
other abilities that require background knowledge, wisdom or savvy, even newborns can 
perceive faces and prefer to track face-like stimuli than non-face ones (Johnson, et al., 1991). 
Just as people often see a face-like patterns in clouds, people detect human faces among other 
stimuli quite fast with minimum RT around 250-290 ms (Thorpe et al., 1996). Furthermore,  
personally familiar faces and famous face can be recognized in a few hundred milliseconds 
(Ramon et al. 2011; Barragan-Jason et al. 2012). 
 
The specificity of facial recognition is usually revealed by comparison to object recognition. 
For example, it is harder to recognize inverted faces than inverted objects of other categories 
(Yin, 1969). Unlike in object recognition, people can show a special holistic advantage in 
identifying individual face parts presented in the entire face than they were at identifying the 
same part presented in isolation (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Holistic processing has been proposed 
as a general mechanism that supports face detection (Taubert et al. 2011). Many behavior studies 
suggested that there are unique visual mechanisms for face perception (see McKone & Robbins, 
2011, for a review based on the evidence from fMRI, ERPs, TMS, and neuropsychology studies). 
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For example, neuropsychologists have demonstrated the fusiform face area (FFA) is a part of 
the human visual system that is specialized for facial recognition (Kanwisher et al. 1997), the 
Occipital Face Area (OFA) is responsible for identifying parts of faces, such as eyes, nose, and 
mouth (Pitcher et al. 2011) and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is a face-selected 
region processing the dynamic aspects of faces, such as facial expression and eye gaze (Allison 
et al., 2000). 
 
1.4.2 Theoretical and practical importance 
The study of face perception used to be a minority interest as a sub-branch of visual perception 
during the early years of cognitive psychology (Calder et al., 2011). Over the past few decades, 
face perception has become a prolific area of visual research, leading to substantial advances in 
our understanding at the behavioral, conceptual, neuroscience, developmental and 
computational levels (Oruc et al., 2019). The fundamental work from Bruce and Young (1986) 
developed a theoretical model for face recognition (see Figure 1.2). This framework also helped 
to understand the recognition of word and other objects by parallel comparison with facial 
recognition. Conceptually, the study of face perception has also contributed to the understanding 
of the voice, which can be considered as a kind of ‘auditory face’ (Young et al., 2020).  Indeed, 
many studies have examined face-voice integration in person perception (e.g., Campanella & 
Belin, 2007; Freeman & Ambady, 2011). Turning to the theoretical contribution at the 
neuroscience level, besides the finding of face-specific area in the brain, face-selective cells 
have been found in the temporal cortex of monkeys (Gross et al. 1972). Based on this, Desimone 
(1991) presented some possible reasons for the evolution of face neurons and suggested some 
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analogies with the development of language in humans. Face perception from a developmental 
perspective has received a great deal of attention (Dahl et al. 2013; Aylward et al., 2005; de 
Heering et al., 2012; Simion & Giorgio, 2015), including face perception in children with 
Autism and Asperger's Syndrome (Davies et al. 1994) or those with developmental 
prosopagnosia (Corrow et al., 2019; Dalrymple et al., 2014). With rapid advances in computer 
vision (e.g., Moon and Phillips 2001), research into automatic face perception has also become 
a burgeoning field (Blauch et al., 2020; Martinez, 2017; O’Toole, 2011; Bartlett & Whitehill, 
2010; Bonnen et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 1.2  A functional model for face recognition (Bruce & Young, 1986). 
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Given that the face is an important site for the identification of people and conveys significant 
social information, the practical importance of face perception extends to social interaction, 
clinical treatments and security and forensic procedures. Rapidly recognizing familiar people, 
learning new faces and observing others’ emotions and social signals from their faces is a core 
human ability, which is also crucial for interpersonal communication. The study of face 
perception has been a source of inspiration for social neuroscience (Haxby & Gobbini, 2007) 
and social psychology (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). Deficits in face perception make it hard 
to extract cues for appropriate social behaviors from others and are often associated with 
disorders of social cognition (Gage & Baars, 2018). Unfortunately, some people fail to develop 
normal face perception abilities (developmental prosopagnosia; Susilo & Duchaine, 2013) and 
deficits can also follow brain injury (acquired prosopagnosia; Damasio et al., 1982). Over the 
last 50 years, face perception researchers have demonstrated some effective treatment 
approaches for both kinds of prosopagnosia (see DeGutis et al., 2014, for the review). The face 
also serves as one of the major biometric source. The most important advantage of face over 
biometric modalities such as fingerprint and iris is that it can be captured at a distance (Wheeler 
et al. 2011) and in a covert manner without awareness (Haan et al., 1987), which make it key to 
many security and forensic procedures, such as surveillance applications (Wheeler et al. 2010). 
The extensive research on unfamiliar face matching has contributed much to ID checking in 
real-life scenarios. For example,  Wirth and Carbon (2017) explored how professional 
experience and time pressure impact on passport-matching performance according to a series of 
passport face matching studies. Increasing face memory research has showed great implications 
for eyewitness testimony. For example,  Grabman et al. (2019) found that recognition ability, 
decision-time, and justifications all cause high-confidence errors based on a lineup eyewitness 
 33 
memory task. So they suggested the justice system should consider both individual differences 
and confidence in determining whether an eyewitness’s decision is likely to be accurate. 
Findings of psychology of face perception have also been used by artificial intelligence to 
inform software design which provides for brain-machine interface for facial recognition 
(Njemanze, 2004). Also, a variety of tests were created by face researchers to help with the 
selection of super-recognizers (SRs)— professionals trained in unfamiliar face recognition for 
security-critical roles. For example, the UNSW Face Test is a screening tool for super-
recognizer designed by the researchers from UNSW (Dunn et al., 2020). 
 
1.5  Face perception measurements 
Faces convey rich information about the people around us. The details of what kind of 
information we derive from face will be introduced later in this chapter. Here I focus on ways 
to measure cognitive tasks involving faces – recognizing identity, recognizing emotion, 
interpreting gaze, remembering new faces, perceiving social characteristics and so on. 
 
1.5.1 Face recognition  
One of the most common measures of face identification is face matching. Bruce et al, (1999) 
created a line-up matching task that has been widely used in face matching studies. Participants 
were shown a target face image captured from a video, together with an array of 10 high-quality 
faces with similar physical appearance to the target. Half of the trials were target-absent arrays 
and half of the trials were target-present arrays (see Figure 1.3 for the examples of each 
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condition). Participants were asked to decide whether or not the target was present, and if so, 
which face it was. This kind of 1-in-10 matching is commonly encountered in the eyewitness 
identification. 
   
Figure 1.3  Two example trials from the line-up matching experiment of Bruce et al., 1999. Left 
panel shows a target-present condition with the target at the array number 3. Right panel shows 
a target-absent array. 
 
Getting 10 faces who look like one target sometimes seems hard. Also, all the faces were taken 
from one video filmed on the same day. However, faces are usually captured by different 
cameras encountered no matter in the security settings and ID checking. Burton, White and 
McNeill (2010) developed a new unfamiliar face-matching test, the Glasgow Face Matching 
Test (GFMT). It simplified the procedure to a paired matching task, in which viewers were 
presented with pairs of unfamiliar faces in similar frontal pose but taken with different cameras 
(see Figure 1.4 for examples). The task is simply to decide whether the two images showed a 
same person (matching pair) or two different people (mismatching pair). 
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Figure 1.4  Two example trials from the Glasgow Face Matching Test. Left panel shows a 
mismatching pair. Right panel shows a matching pair. 
 
Considering the wide range of variability in photos of the same person, Jenkins et al. (2011) 
described a face sorting measure in which participants were shown 40 different face photos (see 
Figure 1.5) and asked to group the photos of the same person together. Participants were free to 
create as many or as few groups as they wished. The correct solution is two groups (two 
identities). Participants who are familiar with the two identities performed perfectly but those 
who are not often create 7 or 8 different groups.  
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Figure 1.5  The 40 face photos (20 for each identity) from Jenkins et al.’s (2011). Solution: 
(Row 1) ABAAABABAB, (Row 2) AAAAABBBAB, (Row 3) BBBAAABBAA, (Row 4) 
BABAABBBBB. 
 
Ekman’s 60 Faces Test has proven to be a sensitive test for recognition of emotional expressions 
on faces (Young et al., 2002). Participants were shown 60 face images, consisting of 10 models 
(4 male, 6 female), each expressing six different facial expressions (Fear, Disgust, Anger, 
Happiness, Sadness or Surprise, see Figure 1.6). After looking at each image, participants were 
asked to choose which emotion is being displayed. The total score ranges from 0–60, with higher 
scores indicating higher ability to recognize the emotions in human faces. 
Figure 1.6  The 60 face photos (6 for each model) from Ekman and Friesen (1976) Pictures of 
Facial Affect used in FEEST. There are emotional expressions of anger (A), disgust (D), fear 
(F), happiness (H), sadness (S) and surprise (U) pose for 6 female and 4 male models. The labels 
used to identify each of the models locate them in the Ekman and Friesen series (F2 = second 
female model in the series, M1 = first male model, etc.). 
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Gaze direction is usually regarded to modulate or influence face identity, emotion recognition 
or face memory. Thus researchers often used the eye-tracking system (e.g., Ho, Foulsham & 
Kingstone, 2015; Laidlaw & Kingstone, 2017) created their own gaze images stimuli according 
to the specific research aims and apply the factor of gaze with the existed paradigm in other 
field (e.g., Smith et al., 2006; Calder et al., 2002; Ueda & Koyama, 2011). One typical measure 
is from Jenkins et al. (2006) who used an adaptation paradigm to investigate the functional 
organization of gaze perception. They created a set of 60 face images (12 models posing five 
different angles of gaze) with staring or deviated eyes (see Figure 1.7 for the examples). In their 
gaze acuity test, participants were shown a series of face images. For each task, they were asked 
to make the eye gaze judgement (left, straight or right).   
Figure 1.7  Example stimuli of the five gaze angles used for the gaze-acuity test from Jenkins 
et al., (2006). L10 = 10° left; L05 = 5° left; S00 = straight ahead; R05 = 5° right; R10 = 10° 
right. 
 
1.5.2 Face memory  
The main paradigm of the tradition face memory task is consisted with two phases: the learning 
phase and the testing phase. Participants were asked to learn some faces in the learning phase 
and then test whether they can recognize the old faces they learned in the learning phase from 
the new faces.  This old/new face memory paradigm has been widely applied (e.g. Zaki & 
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Johnson, 2013; Tüttenberg & Wiese, 2019; Hourihan et al. 2012; Hills, 2012) and some new 
tools building on this paradigm have also been developed. One of the most widely used tests is 
the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). In the learning 
phase of this test, participants are asked to learn six target faces, each in three views. The test 
phase contains three stages of 1-in-3 forced choice: three trials test the recognition of the 
identical image to the learning phase, five trials test the recognition of the same faces in different 
images (different viewpoint and/or lighting) and four trials test the recognition of the same faces 
in different images covered with heavy visual noise (see Figure 1.8). 
 
Figure 1.8  Examples of study images similar to test stimuli from the Cambridge Face Memory 
Test. None of these items was used in the test. Panel A shows the three views of a target face in 
the learning phase. Panel B displays a test trial from the same image stage (the rightmost image 
is the target). Panel C shows a test trial from the novel image stage (the leftmost image is the 
target). Panel D displays a test trial from the novel images with noise stage (the rightmost image 
is the target). 
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1.5.3 First impressions  
The accuracy of the trait inferences from facial appearance is usually tested via correlations with 
self-reports. For example, Penton-Voak et al. (2006) collected neutral pose photographs from 
294 volunteers who also completed a self-report personality questionnaire (Botwin, Buss, & 
Shackelford, 1997). The 294 photographs were then rated on the Big Five personality 
dimensions (Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Emotional Stability,  Openness) 
by 10 raters on a 1-7 scale. However, people always associated lots of traits not limited to the 
several traits the researcher listed. Sutherland et al. (2018) used an open question paradigm. 
Participants were shown a series of faces one at a time and were asked to type in anything that 
came to mind upon viewing the face. Afterwards, two colleagues were asked to categorize all 
the content participants gave to each face. The main categories were then used as the dimensions 
in a 1-7 personality rating scale. 
 
1.6  What can we derive from face?  
From looking at someone’s face we can recognize whether we know this person, we can infer 
their mood state, the direction they are looking at, their racial background, whether they look 
trustworthy or untrustworthy, attractive or unattractive, and so on. Besides, there are still lots of 
information face conveys, such as messages from facial movements (e.g., lipreading). In this 
section, I review the major categrories of information that we viewers derive from faces.   
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1.6.1 Face identity  
In daily life, we see many unfamiliar faces such as the strangers on the way home. We also 
recognize people we are already familiar with, such as friends , family, colleagues, as well as 
media representations of celebrities. It is now well established that familiar and unfamiliar face 
perception are largely different (see Hancock et al., 2000 for the review). Bruce and Young 
(1986) suggested that unfamiliar faces were principally processed by the use of pictorial codes 
while structural codes played an important on familiar faces processing. This has been revisited 
by Hanley, Pearson, and Young (1990), who suggested that familiar and unfamiliar faces were 
both processed based on pictorial memory but with separate systems. Based on the difference 
in processing, people performed differently in familiar and unfamiliar face identification. 
 
In recent years, it has become clear that our ability to identify unfamiliar faces is surprisingly 
poor on average. For example, participants were asked to pick out one out of 10 full-face 
photographs that they thought matched the single unfamiliar target face which had been taken 
from a video filmed on the same day (see Figure 1.3). Even though the photographs were all in 
high quality, their performance was still highly error prone, with a range from 30% to 39% error 
in each target pose condition (Bruce, et al., 1999). This was consistent with the results from the 
Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT), with around 20% error rate on average (Burton, White, 
& McNeill, 2010). The GFMT also revealed very large individual differences in performance, 
with 100% accuracy for high performers but only 62% for the low performers. This finding has 
been replicated in many other studies (e.g. White, et al., 2014). Together, these studies reveal a 
broad range of face recognition ability. At one extreme, developmental prosopagnosics show 
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profound impairments in face identification specifically (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). At the 
other extreme, ‘super-recognisers’ show exceptional ability that has clear operational value 
(Robertson, et al., 2016). The Dunning-Kruger effect was a typical finding of individual 
differences in metacognition showing the difference of metacognitive ability between high and 
low performers (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). However, very little is known about people’s insight 
into their own face perception abilities, or those of other people. If recognizers are “unskilled 
and unaware of it”, this could explain society’s enduring confidence in facial image comparison 
as method of identifying unfamiliar people, despite evidence of its unreliability.  
 
For familiar faces, the situation is very different. Familiar face recognition refers to the 
recognition of famous face such as celebrities or personally familiar people such as family and 
friends. In contrast to strangers’ faces, viewers are extremely good at identifying faces that they 
already know. For example, Burton et al. (1999) showed participants the video clips of 20 
members of the lecturing staff in a particular department. Half of the participants were students 
in the same department as the staff (familiar group) and the other half were students from a 
different department (unfamiliar group). They then presented 20 high-quality images, telling 
participants that half of these faces had been shown earlier, and asked participants to indicate 
their confidence that this person was in the video. The results showed that the familiar group 
performed much more accurately than the unfamiliar group. Even when the researchers used 
poor quality video footage, the familiar group kept performing well. It seems that familiar face 
recognition is an easier task than the unfamiliar face recognition. One open question is whether 
people’s metacognition performance is also better in the familiar face task, and whether the 
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Dunning-Kruger Effect will still exist even there is no big individual difference in their cognitive 
performance. 
 
1.6.2 Social signals 
Besides face identity, there are also other important social aspects of variant information that 
people can extract from the face, such as emotional expression and gaze direction. There are 
thought to be six basic or universal emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and 
surprise (Young, et al., 2002). Numerous studies have shown that happiness is better recognized, 
compared with other negative emotions, especially fear (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Ekman, 
Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). Interpreting people’s emotional expression correctly is vital when 
deciding how to respond to them. Correct assessment of others’ expressions can help to reduce 
the waste of time of guessing other people’s feelings and avoid embarrassment in social 
interaction. Based on different study designs and measurements of metacognitive ability, 
researchers have drawn different conclusions about individual differences in metacognition for 
emotional expression. For example, Ickes et al (1990) asked participants to revisit video footage 
of their interactions with another participant, then recognize the emotion exchanges and later 
fill in a self-report questionnaire of empathy. They found that people who reported high empathy 
did not show higher accuracy at emotion recognition. Conversely, Kelly & Metcalfe (2011) 
suggested that people who were good at recognizing emotional expression also had good 
metacognition knowledge by measuring the gamma correlation between metacognition and 
performance in the Mind in eye task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Gaze direction derived from 
faces can also serve as a social signal with multiple meanings. Another person’s eye gaze can 
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direct our spatial attention (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) or signal the referent of a remark (Hole 
& Bourne, 2010). Baron-Cohen (1997a, 1997b) noted that children’s ability to detect gaze 
direction is highly important in the development of Theory of Mind (i.e., one aspect of 
metacognition). Nevertheless, much less has been done in exploring metacognition in gaze 
direction recognition. 
 
Furthermore, there are some potential interactions among face identity, emotional expression 
and gaze direction. Although the initial model of face processing suggested that the processing 
of face identity and emotional expression are independent (Bruce & Young, 1986), the 
interdependent view has gathered some support in recent years. For example, Kaufmann and 
Schweinberger (2004) found that emotional expression influenced identification of familiar 
faces, with faster recognition for happy faces. Gaze direction has also been found to interact 
with emotional expression. For example, combining the fearful faces and averted gazes resulted 
in an adaptive fear response (gaze shifting) to danger (Hadjikhani et al., 2008). Since face 
identity, emotional expression and gaze direction may interact with each other in the cognition 
level, their relationship in the metacognition level should also be interesting to focus on. 
 
1.6.3  Social categorization  
Faces also convey information about social categories. At the basic level, they indicate species, 
which is important not only for humans but also in a wide range of animals (Leopold & Rhodes 
2010). Viewers also read cues to gender, age and race from faces. A number of studies have 
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found that people perform better at recognizing faces that are similar to their own (Minear & 
Park, 2004). The effect has been found for gender and age. For own-gender bias, researchers 
have found that females typically outperform males in face recognition tasks (Herlitz & Yonker, 
2002). Other studies have reported a significant interaction between gender of subject and 
gender of items, with both male and females identifying their own gender best (Mason, 1986). 
Own-age bias refers to the finding that viewers better recognize faces of their own age group 
than faces of another age group (e.g., Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012). Compared with gender and 
age, race effects in face memory are the best-known phenomenon. The Other-Race Effect (ORE; 
also known as the Cross-Race Effect, Own-Race Bias or Other-Race Deficit) is a robust 
phenomenon in face recognition (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for a review).   
 
To date, the explanations for the ORE have delivered somewhat contentious findings which can 
be summarized into two representative models (see Shriver et al., 2008 for a review). An early 
hypothesis is that people have greater expertise with own-race faces than other-race faces due 
to the lack of contact with other-race people (see MacLin & Malpass, 2001). This is known as 
the Perceptual Expertise Model. One implication of this model is that increase contact with 
outgroups can improve other-race face recognition. However, how much contact can be 
effective is hard to measure based on different situations and experiment settings. This model 
can be understood as supporting the view that familiarity plays an important role in face memory. 
An alternative view, the Social-Cognitive Model, claims that people encode outgroup faces 
categorically (e.g., race, gender, age) but encode ingroup faces individually (i.e., face features). 
That is, even if you are familiar with other-race people, you still encode their faces according to 
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their race rather than their face features, leading to poorer face memory. This model emphasizes 
categorization, rather than individual familiarity as a determinant of face memory.  
 
Even though familiarity is related to both of these theories, the potential role of familiarity has 
received little attention as a contributing factor to face memory. Much less has been done in 
comparing the effect of familiarity and race on face recognition. Because previous face 
recognition research has mainly focused on race rather than familiarity. For example, Zhou & 
Mondloch (2016) asked participants to sort photographs of two identities into as many piles as 
they thought which stand for the same person. The unfamiliar face sorting results showed 
significant ORE, with more piles sorted for other-race faces than own-race faces. While for 
familiar faces, participants made correct two piles for both own- and other-race faces. 
Neuropsychologist demonstrated the same conclusion that familiarity can eliminate the ORE. 
Phelps et al. (2000) experiment 1 and Hart et al., (2000) found that amygdala showed greater 
activation to black  than white faces when white participants performed an unfamiliar face 
matching task. To test the familiarity effect, Phelps et al. (2000) showed white participants 
familiar faces from both races in experiment 2 and found no ORE in amygdala activation. Barzut 
et al. (2013) appear to be the only researchers to have examined the two factors in the old/new 
face memory paradigm. They found the ORE did decrease after the introduction of familiar face, 
but it still existed. So they claimed that familiarity has been put too much weight on. However, 
this conclusion was obtained only from one race of participant. Also, all prior studies explored 
whether familiarity would reduce ORE but none has considered familiarity and race as two 
independent factors. Since people are better at recognizing own-race faces than other-race faces 
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and our memory of familiar faces is also highly accurate (Ge et al., 2003) compared with 
unfamiliar faces (Nakashima et al., 2012), it may be informative to establish which factor is 
more psychologically important at the level of memory performance.  
 
Also of interest is whether people realized their bias, that is how people think the two factors 
would influence the face memory performance of themselves and that of other people including 
the ingroup and outgroup peers. The metacognition aspect of face memory is of highly practical 
value in the context of the criminal justice system, especially the testimony of the eyewitness in 
verdict decisions (Benton et al., 2006). Eyewitnesses have some insight into their own 
performance in identifying own-race or other-race suspects, and their testimony is also valued 
by jurors, whose race might either be the same as or different from that of the eyewitness (Neil 
v. Biggers, 1972). The suspect could also be a familiar face to the eyewitness, such as a neighbor, 
friend, or colleague. Applied face recognition underscores the importance of understanding 
metacognition for face memory, and for examining race (own- or other-race faces) and 
familiarity (familiar or unfamiliar faces) conditions together. Previous research into 
metacognition for the ORE (e.g. Hourihan et al., 2012; Rhodes et al., 2013) found that white 
participants were more confident in their performance when identifying an own‐race suspect 
than an other-race suspect in a line-up (Smith et al. 2004). However, it is not known whether 
people will show this bias in familiar face memory or how they expect face race and face 





1.6.4 Subjective inference  
In addition to objective information, people also make subjective inferences from faces. For 
example, choosing people who look friendly when asking for directions on the street. Despite 
the fact that personality inferences from facial appearance have long been studied (Hollingworth, 
1922), there is little consensus as to whether people make accurate trait inferences from faces. 
Some studies have reported positive correlations between trait inferences and self-reports of 
approachability, warmth, power and extraversion (Berry, 1991; Berry & Brownlow, 1989; 
Penton-Voak et al., 2006). Other studies have failed to find such relationships for agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and suggestibility (Pound et al. 2007; Bachmann & Nurmoja 2006). 
According to Todorov et al. (2011), one important reason for these inconsistent results concerns 
the difficulty of ascertaining the representativeness of the face stimuli. One explanation for this 
inconsistency is that the accuracy depends on different trait dimensions. Oosterhof and Todorov 
(2008) introduced a two-dimensional model of social inferences based on trustworthiness and 
dominance (based on computer generated images). Recently, Sutherland et al. (2013) extended 
the model to three dimensions:  trustworthiness, dominance and attractiveness (based on real 
face photographs). In addition to the first impression of personality inferred from the unfamiliar 
faces, there are many other thoughts that come to mind, such as semantic associations and 





1.7 Overview of current work 
Face perception and metacognition are both key components of humans’ cognitive functioning 
in theory. They also play an important role in social interaction, but previous studies have rarely 
made the connection between them. This potentially indicates an interesting case to test whether 
the same metacognitive principles apply to face perception as to other aspects of cognition that 
have been studied. In addition, face perception is such a special domain that allows me to 
respond to the recent calls for exploring the Dunning-Kruger effect in a special domain by 
Dunning, et al., (2003). By modifying established measures of face perception and combining 
them with metacognition measures, the following experimental chapters in this thesis deal with 
different aspects of face perception from the point of view of metacognition.  
  
Chapter 2 begins with Experiment 1, which tests whether Dunning-Kruger effects and 
egocentric bias apply to face identification. Experiment 2 extends this approach to other face 
perception tasks. The same format of same/different matching tasks was used to test  familiar 
and unfamiliar face identity, emotional expression, and gaze perception. Cognitive measures 
were combined with metacognitive estimates of test score and percentile ranking measures. 
Chapter 3 examines familiarity effects and other-race effects in face memory at both cognitive 
and metacognitive levels. As noted in the historical review of Metcalfe & Dunlosky (2009), 
initial work on metacognition is rooted in the memory study. I combined the tradition old/new 
face memory paradigm with the prospective, concurrent and retrospective metacognition 
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judgements of oneself and others. Experiment 3 used the same images in the learning and test 
phase. Experiment 4 used different images at learning and test.  
 
Chapter 4 examined egocentric bias in face-evoked thoughts using a new face association task 
modified from the word association task and the trait association task of unfamiliar face from 
Sutherland et al. (2018). This approach is more widely applicable to both familiar and unfamiliar 
faces. Experiment 5 examined anything people think about when looking at a face. Experiment 
6 examined differences between familiar and unfamiliar faces. Experiment 7 focused on who 












Chapter 2   
Dunning–Kruger Effects in Face Perception 
Reference: 
Zhou, X., & Jenkins, R. (2020). Dunning–Kruger effects in face perception. Cognition, 203, 
104345. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104345  
Abstract 
The Dunning–Kruger Effect refers to a common failure of metacognitive insight in which people 
who are incompetent in a given domain are unaware of their incompetence. This effect has been 
found in a wide range of tasks, raising the question of whether there is any ‘special’ domain in 
which it is not found. One plausible candidate is face perception, which has sometimes been 
thought to be ‘special’. To test this possibility, we assessed participants’ insight into their own 
face perception abilities (self-estimates) and those of other people (peer estimates). We found 
classic Dunning–Kruger Effects in matching tasks for unfamiliar identity, familiar identity, gaze 
direction, and emotional expression. Low performers overestimated themselves, and high 
performers underestimated themselves. Interestingly, participants’ self-estimates were more 
stable across tasks than their actual performance. In addition, peer estimates revealed a 
consistent egocentric bias. High performers attributed higher accuracy to other people than did 
low performers. We conclude that metacognitive insight into face perception abilities is limited 
and subject to systematic biases. Our findings urge caution when interpreting self-report 
measures of face perception ability. They also reveal a fundamental source of uncertainty in 
social interactions. 
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2.1  Introduction 
Negotiating everyday life requires that our plans are commensurate with our abilities. This basic 
requirement underscores the importance of metacognition—insight into one’s own thinking and 
the thinking of others (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998; Tullis 
& Fraundorf, 2017). In fact, metacognitive insight is not only inaccurate, it is also subject to 
systematic biases. One influential example of such a bias is the Dunning–Kruger Effect, 
encapsulated in the title of its debut paper, “unskilled and unaware of it” (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999). The headline result is that poor performers in a given task drastically overestimate their 
ability, believing that they are outperforming the majority when, in fact, they are the ones being 
outperformed (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). Kruger & Dunning’s (1999) 
explanation of this effect is elegant, and points to a cruel trap in human psychology: The skills 
that grant competence in a particular domain are the very skills needed to evaluate competence 
in that domain. People who lack the former lack the latter. A secondary result concerns the top 
of the ability range. High performers often underestimate their standing, but for an entirely 
different reason. These individuals recognise that they perform well, they just assume that other 
people perform well too. 
 
Part of the appeal of the Dunning–Kruger Effect is its broad generality. The same basic pattern 
emerges in reasoning (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 
2017), humour (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), political knowledge (Anson, 2018; Motta, Callaghan, 
& Sylvester, 2018), and many other domains. Indeed, the apparent ubiquity of Dunning–Kruger 
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Effects has prompted some to wonder if there is any ‘special’ domain in which the standard 
pattern is not found (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). 
 
One plausible candidate for such a ‘special’ domain is face perception. Evidence that faces may 
be cognitively special comes from at least four sources (McKone & Robbins, 2011). First, 
developmental studies have suggested that newborns demonstrate some innate knowledge of 
facial structure (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Johnson, 2005). Second, face perception seems to 
be disproportionately affected by image manipulations such as inversion (Yin, 1969; Rossion, 
2008) and contrast reversal (Kemp, Pike, White, & Musselman, 1996; Farroni et al., 2005). 
Third, it has been proposed that face perception may be subserved by face-specific neural 
circuitry (Riddoch et al., 2008; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). More recently, genetic studies have 
shown that human face recognition ability is specific and heritable (Wilmer et al., 2010; Wilmer 
2017). This converging evidence from highly diverse studies has led some researchers to 
propose that face perception may involve specialised or face-specific cognitive processes. 
 
Despite the theoretical and applied interest in face processing, no previous studies have tested 
for Dunning–Kruger Effects in this domain. A few studies have found that individuals in the 
general population show minimal to moderate insight into their own face recognition abilities 
(e.g. Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 2014; Palermo et al., 2017; Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 
2019), echoing findings for other types of memory (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; but see 
Livingston & Shah, 2018; Arizpe et al., 2019 for more positive views). However, none of these 
studies was concerned with metacognition in the ‘expansive’ sense that includes insight into 
other people’s abilities (Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998). Their main interest was whether a 
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person’s self-report (e.g. agreement with questionnaire items such as, “My face recognition 
ability is worse than most people”; Shah et al., 2015) could predict the same person’s 
performance on standard face recognition tests. They did not compare estimated performance 
and actual performance for the same task. 
 
A few face perception studies have examined other aspects of metacognition. Sauerland et al 
(2016) adapted the choice blindness paradigm (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005) to 
investigate insight into identification judgements. Participants were asked to sort photographs 
of unfamiliar faces by identity (Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, & Burton, 2011). They were then 
confronted with one of their identity decisions and asked to justify it. On critical trials, the 
photographs were secretly switched, so that the decisions participants were asked to justify were 
opposite to the decisions that they actually made. Very few of these manipulations were detected. 
Indeed, participants readily reported their reasoning behind identity decisions that they had not 
reached. 
 
Such findings suggest that insight into one’s own face recognition performance is somewhat 
limited. Fewer studies have examined insight into other people’s face recognition performance. 
Ritchie et al. (2015) presented pairs of faces in a matching task for identity. As expected, 
participants performed better with familiar faces than with unfamiliar faces (Clutterbuck & 
Johnston, 2004; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019). However, participants also predicted that the 
faces they themselves knew would be easier for other people to match—even people who did 
not know those faces. These findings demonstrate an egocentric bias in identification 
performance (Greenwald, 1980), in that viewers estimated the cognition of others from their 
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own perspective (DiMaggio et al., 2008; Hinds, 1999; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). However, it 
remains unclear whether high-performing participants produced higher estimates than low-
performing participants. 
 
Given that face perception is often presented as a special case for cognition, we tested whether 
it is a special case for metacognition. Specifically, we asked whether standard Dunning–Kruger 
Effects and egocentric bias emerge in face perception tasks. We begin in Experiment 1 with 
identification tasks for familiar and unfamiliar faces. In Experiment 2, we expand our analysis 
to include other aspects of face perception, namely gaze direction, and emotional expression. 
 
2.2  Experiment 1   Identity matching for familiar and unfamiliar 
faces 
Our first experiment had two main aims. First, we sought to establish whether face perception 
follows the same metacognitive principles as other aspects of cognition. Specifically, we asked 
whether Dunning–Kruger Effects and egocentric bias are observed in face identification tasks. 
Second, we sought to compare these metacognitive patterns for familiar and unfamiliar faces. 
To address these questions, we adapted a standard perceptual matching task for facial identity 
(Burton, White, McNeill, 2010). In the standard task, participants are presented with pairs of 
face photos. For each pair, the task is to decide whether the two photos show the same person 
(50% of trials) or different people (50% of trials). Accuracy on this task is typically at ceiling 
for familiar faces (e.g. Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2004; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019), but is 
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generally much lower for unfamiliar faces (e.g. Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2004; Burton, White, 
McNeill, 2010; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019). 
 
This task has several characteristics that make it well suited to comparison of cognition and 
metacognition. First, each trial has a correct answer, so accuracy can be scored objectively. 
Second, the same/different response options mean that ceiling performance and chance 
performance are well defined (100% accuracy and 50% accuracy respectively). Third, there are 
large individual differences in performance (White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014), 
such that high- and low-scoring respondents tend to be clearly separated. Recording actual 
scores allows us to assign participants to performance quartiles, as per Dunning & Kruger (1999). 
Recording participants’ estimated scores allows us to test (i) whether ‘incompetent’ participants 
(lowest performance quartile) show the classic ‘unskilled and unaware’ pattern, and (ii) whether 
‘competent’ participants (highest performance quartile) underestimated their performance. 
 
Previous studies of metacognition have often relied on retrospective estimates of performance, 
collected after the whole task (e.g. Dunning & Kruger, 1999; Tenenberg & Murphy, 2005; 
Simons, 2013; Feld, Sauermann & de Grip, 2017; see Sarac & Karakelle, 2012; Gignac & 
Zajenkowski, 2020, for useful discussions of this issue). That approach has several drawbacks. 
One is that it imposes substantial demands on retrospective memory. Cognitive tasks often 
involve dozens of trials or items, and these will typically vary in subjective difficulty. The 
challenge is not only to recall the landscape of that experience, but also to encapsulate it in a 
single score. To complicate matters, the overall impression may be skewed by primacy and 
recency effects (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). To avoid these issues, we captured (i) actual 
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performance, (ii) self-estimates, and (iii) peer estimates on each trial. We also captured 
participants’ self-estimates of their own percentile ranking at the end of each task, for ‘backward 
compatibility’ with previous studies. 
 
In light of Dunning & Kruger’s (1999) findings, we predicted that low performers would 
overestimate their performance and that high performers would underestimate their performance. 
Since virtually everyone is a high performer for familiar face identification (Burton, Wilson, 
Cowan, & Bruce, 1999; Jenkins & Kerr, 2013), we expected this interaction to be compressed 
(near ceiling) for familiar faces. In light of the egocentric bias (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), 
we expected low performers to make low peer estimates, and high performers to make high peer 





Sixty-four UK students (44 female, 20 male; mean age 20 years; age range 18–26 years) from 
the University of York took part in exchange for a small payment or course credit. The 
experiments in this study were approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of York. All 
participants provided written informed consent. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus 
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Ambient images of 20 familiar faces (e.g. UK and US celebrities; 10 female, 10 male) and 20 
unfamiliar faces (e.g. celebrities from other countries; 10 female, 10 male) were downloaded 
from online sources. Each image was cropped and resized to 570 pixels high × 380 pixels wide 
for onscreen presentation. For Different Person trials, we paired faces that resembled each other 
and matched the same basic verbal description (e.g. young woman with red hair). To avoid 
image repetition, we collected four photos of each face—two for use in Same Person trials, and 
two for use in Different Person trials. Each face appeared in Same and Different trials equally 
often, and each participant saw each image exactly once. To ensure that all participants received 
identical tasks, all participants received identical image pairings. Experiments were run using a 
21.5-inch iMac with i5 processor. Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by 
PsychoPy2 v1.82.00 (Peirce, 2007, 2008). 
 
Design  
All participants completed both the Familiar and the Unfamiliar face matching task in separate 
blocks. Block order was counterbalanced so that half of the participants encountered the 
Familiar condition first, and half of them encountered the Unfamiliar condition first. Within 
each block, the 40 trials (20 Same person, 20 Different person) were presented in a random order. 
All participants contributed the same measures in both tasks—actual performance, self-
estimates, and peer estimates. 
 
We defined actual performance as actual test score, that is, the proportion of correct responses 
in the matching task. Participants’ actual test scores were used to determine their actual 
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percentile ranking (0–100%), and to define performance quartiles for the Dunning–Kruger 
analyses. 
 
Self-estimates comprised two metrics. Estimated test score was an estimate of absolute 
performance, captured trial-by-trial. Following each identity decision (Same or Different), 
participants indicated whether they were sure or unsure of their decision. Estimated test score 
was defined as the number of ‘sure’ responses plus half of the number of ‘unsure’ responses. 
That is, we assumed that participants guessed on unsure trials and answered half of them 
correctly by chance. Estimated percentile ranking (0–100%) was an estimate of relative 
performance, reported by each participant at the end of each task. 
 
Peer estimates were also captured trial-by-trial. For each image pair, participants estimated the 
proportion of respondents who would answer correctly (0–20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, 
81–100%). To provide context for these estimates, participants were informed that all 
respondents were UK students. We note that estimated percentile ranking, reported at the end 




Each display consisted of a pair of face photographs alongside a set of response options as shown 
in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1  Example identity matching display from Experiment 1. In this example, the two 
photos show the same unfamiliar face. Participants respond to questions 1–5 for each image pair. 
 
For each pair, participants indicated (i) whether the two photos showed the Same person or 
Different people, (ii) whether they were Sure or Unsure of their decision, (iii) the proportion of 
participants they thought would give the correct answer, and (iv) whether or not they knew the 
face in each image. Participants were reminded that they did not need to know the person’s 
name to know that person’s face. Each display remained on screen until the final response, 
which immediately initiated the next trial. The experimenter explained the task at the beginning 
of the session using a printed example display, which showed a face that was not presented in 
the main experiment. Following this example trial, each participant underwent two blocks of 40 
trials each (one Familiar block and one Unfamiliar block). At the end of each block, participants 
estimated their own performance relative to all participants (percentile ranking) by dragging an 
onscreen slider (0%, “I think I performed worse than other participants” to 100%, “I think I 
(1) Same person or different people? 
9 = Same person   0 = Different people 
(3)  What proportion of participants 
do you think will get this right? 
1= 0% - 20% 
2= 21% - 40% 
3= 41% - 60% 
4= 61% - 80% 
5= 81% - 100% 
(4) Do you know the person on the left? 
A = Know   S = Don’t know 
(2) Are you sure about your answer? 
J = Sure   K = not sure 
(5) Do you know the person on the right? 
D = Know   F = Don’t know 
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performed better than other participants”). Participants were able to rest between blocks and 
initiated the next block by pressing the space bar. The entire test session took approximately 30 
minutes to complete. 
 
2.2.2 Results and discussion 
Faces in the Familiar condition were familiar to more participants (M = 55, SE = 1.05) than 
faces in the Unfamiliar condition (M = 5, SE = .43) [t (158) = 44.51, p < .001, d = 7.04], 
confirming that our familiarity manipulation was successful. 
 
In comparing cognition and metacognition, we first examined participants’ insight into their 
own absolute performance (test score) and relative performance (percentile ranking), by 
combining actual attainment with self-estimates in the same analyses. Our main focus is the 
Dunning–Kruger analysis based on performance quartiles. We then examined participants’ 
insight into other people’s performance, focusing specifically on egocentric bias.  
 
Insight into one’s own performance 
Dunning and colleagues (Dunning et al., 2003) established the convention of analysing 
metacognition data by performance quartiles. In this approach, participants are divided into 
quartiles according to their actual performance. Estimated performance can then be compared 
to actual performance in each quartile. Figure 2.2 summarizes this analysis for test score and 




Familiar face matching 
Participants’ test scores were submitted to a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects 
factor of Measure (Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects factor of Quartile 
(Lowest, Second, Third, Highest). This analysis revealed a main effect of Measure, with 
Estimated scores (M = 96.61, SE = .49) exceeding Actual scores (M= 95.43, SE = .35) overall 
[F (1,60) = 5.62, p < .05, ηp2 = .09]. Unsurprisingly, there was also a main effect of Quartile, 
with scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 37.76, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .65]. In keeping with the standard Dunning–Kruger pattern, these main effects were 
qualified by a significant Measure × Quartile interaction [F (3,60) = 9.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .32]. 
Simple main effects showed that Estimated score exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile 
[F (1,60) = 26.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .31], but not in the 2nd [F (1,60) = 1.81, p = .18], 3rd [F (1,60) 
= .09, p = .76] or Highest quartiles [F (1,60) = 3.28, p = .08]. The simple main effect of Quartile 
was significant for both Actual scores [F (3,60) = 68.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .77] and Estimated 
scores [F (3,60) = 7.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .28]. 
 
Unfamiliar face matching 
Test scores for the unfamiliar face matching task were analysed in the same way. For unfamiliar 
faces, there was no difference between Estimated scores (M = 79.99, SE = 1.28) and Actual 
scores (M = 82.05, SE = .39) overall [F (1,60) = 2.83, p = .10]. Again, there was a main effect 
of Quartile, with scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 
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15.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .44]. There was also a significant crossover interaction between these 
factors [F (3,60) = 8.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .30]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated score 
exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 5.28, p < .05, ηp2 = .08] but not the 
2nd quartile [F (1,60) = .78, p = .38]. The effect then reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 13.02, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .18] and highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 9.73, p < .01, ηp2 = .14], such that Actual 
score exceeded Estimated score. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant for Actual 
scores [F (3, 60) = 133.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .87], but not for Estimated scores [F (3,60) = 1.53, p 
= .22]. 
Figure 2.2 Dunning–Kruger analysis of the face matching tasks in Experiment 1. The top row 
shows test scores for (A) Familiar faces and (B) Unfamiliar faces. Actual scores (black) and 
Estimated scores (grey) are plotted separately for each performance quartile. Chance 
performance is 50%. The bottom row shows percentile rankings for (C) Familiar faces and (D) 
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Unfamiliar faces. Actual ranks (black) and Estimated ranks (grey) are plotted separately for each 
performance quartile. Error bars show SE. 
 
Percentile ranking 
Familiar face matching 
As with the test scores, percentile rankings were entered into a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factor of Measure (Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects 
factor of Quartile (Lowest, Second, Third, Highest). This analysis revealed a main effect of 
Measure, with Estimated rank (M = 60.15, SE = 2.46) exceeding Actual rank (M= 54.81, SE 
= .66) overall [F (1, 60) = 4.65, p < .05, ηp2 = .07], and the expected main effect of Quartile [F 
(3, 60) = 91.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .82]. There was also a significant crossover interaction between 
Measure and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 62.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .76]. Simple main effects showed that 
Estimated rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 82.47, p < .001, ηp2 
= .58] and the 2nd quartile [F (1, 60) = 14.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .20]. However, this effect was 
reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 8.22, p < .01, ηp2 = .12] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 84.46, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .59], in which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main effect of 
Quartile was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 1137.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .98], but not for 
Estimated rank [F (3,60) = 1.35, p = .27]. 
 
Unfamiliar face matching 
Percentile ranks for the unfamiliar face task were analysed in the same way. This analysis 
revealed a significant effect of Measure, with Actual rank (M = 55.31, SE = 1.11) exceeding 
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Estimated rank (M= 46.65, SE = 1.75) [F (1, 60) = 17.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .22], and the expected 
main effect of Quartile, with ranks increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F 
(3, 60) = 82.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .81]. As with the familiar face task, there was a significant 
crossover interaction between Measure and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 46.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .70]. 
Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile 
[F (1, 60) = 37.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .38] but not the 2nd quartile [F (1,60) = .68, p = .41]. This 
effect was reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 50.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .46] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 
60) = 68.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .54], with Actual rank exceeding Estimated rank. The simple main 
effect of Quartile was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 219.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .92], but 
not for Estimated rank [F (3,60) = 2.06, p = .12]. 
 
Insight into other people’s performance 
To assess egocentric bias in each task, we compared peer estimates (attributions of other 
people’s performance) generated by the highest and lowest performing participants. Egocentric 
bias predicts that peer estimates from the Highest quartile will be higher than peer estimates 
from the Lowest quartile. Figure 2.3 summarises this analysis separately for the familiar and 
unfamiliar face matching tasks. 
 
Familiar face matching 
For each familiar face, we calculated the mean peer estimate from Lowest quartile and Highest 
quartile participants. Peer estimates were on a scale of 1–5, where 1 means “0–20% of 
participants will answer correctly”, and 5 means “81–100% of participants will answer correctly” 
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(see Figure 1). An independent t-test confirmed that peer estimates from Highest quartile 
participants (M = 4.67, SE = .03) were significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile 
participants (M = 4.37, SE = .06) [t (78) = 4.72, p < .001, d = 1.06]. 
 
Unfamiliar face matching 
Peer estimates in the unfamiliar face matching task were analysed in the same way. An 
independent t-test showed that peer estimates were higher for the Highest quartile (M = 3.81, 
SE = .05) than for the Lowest quartile (M = 3.56, SE = .05) [t (78) = 3.70, p < .001, d = .83]. 
Figure 2.3 Egocentric bias in peer estimates from the face matching tasks in Experiment 1. (A) 
Familiar faces. (B) Unfamiliar faces. In both tasks, High performers attributed higher 
performance to others; Low performers attributed lower performance to others. Error bars show 
SE.  
 
The Dunning–Kruger analysis of test scores (Figure 2.2) showed that self-estimates were higher 
for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. Combining this observation with egocentric bias 
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implies that peer estimates should also be higher for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. A 
within-subjects t-test confirmed that this difference was significant (Familiar M = 4.59, SE = .04; 
Unfamiliar M = 3.69, SE = .04) [t (63) = 19.27, p < .001, d = 2.41].  
 
The cognitive aspects of these results were as expected from previous research. When matching 
faces for identity, accuracy was at ceiling for familiar faces (95% correct overall), and was 
significantly lower for unfamiliar faces (82% correct overall). We also obtained the expected 
individual differences in performance. Although unfamiliar face matching was generally poor, 
some people were much better at it than others (range 60–97.5%). This wide range in 
performance lends itself to a Dunning–Kruger type of analysis. 
 
Claims of face being ‘special’ notwithstanding, we found absolutely standard Dunning–Kruger 
effects in face identification. Low performers overestimated their performance, and high 
performers underestimate their performance. This pattern emerged in test score (an absolute 
measure, captured trial by trial), and in percentile rank (a relative measure, captured 
retrospectively). It also occurred in both Familiar and Unfamiliar identity conditions, though 
test scores in the Familiar condition were somewhat compressed against ceiling. 
 
We also saw a clear evidence of egocentric bias. High performers made higher peer estimates 




All of these findings concern matters of identification. Given that other aspects of face 
perception (such as gaze direction and emotional expression) are known to dissociate from 
identification, we next examined metacognition for these other tasks. 
 
2.3 Experiment 2  Identity, gaze, and expression matching 
The purpose of our second experiment was to establish whether the metacognitive pattern seen 
for identification in Experiment 1 extends to other face tasks. Specifically, we asked whether 
Dunning–Kruger Effects and egocentric bias extend to perception of gaze direction and 
emotional expression. These tasks are especially interesting from a metacognition perspective. 
First, gaze direction and emotional expression are dissociable from face identification (Andrews 
& Ewbank, 2004; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Winston, Henson, Fine-Goulden, & Dolan, 2004). 
This dissociation allows us to test the generalizability of metacognitive patterns across 
cognitively unrelated tasks. Second, unlike perception of facial identity, perception of gaze 
direction and emotional expression have both been associated with cognitive insight, in the 
specific sense of inferring other people’s mental states from their behaviour (Calder et al., 2002; 
Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Simpson & Crandall, 1972). Given that the ability to infer mental 
states seems related to metacognition, it is possible that individuals who perform especially well 
in these tasks will also demonstrate especially high metacognitive insight (and vice versa). 
 
To extend our analysis to ‘cognitive insight’ signals from the face, we adapted the identity 
matching task from Experiment 1 to assess perception of gaze direction and emotional 
expression. To allow replication of key findings, and to facilitate comparison across diverse 
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tasks, we also repeated the unfamiliar face matching task from Experiment 1. The task format 
(Same/Different judgements to paired images) and task measures (Actual versus Estimated test 
scores and percentile ranks) were the same in all three tasks. This homology ensured that data 
from all three tasks could be analysed in the same way. 
 
Based on previous studies, we expected actual performance on the identity, gaze, and expression 
tasks to be either uncorrelated (identity versus gaze; identity versus expression) or weakly 
correlated (gaze versus expression). Our main interest was whether similar metacognitive 
patterns emerged in all three tasks. If our gaze and expression tasks require metacognitive 
insight, then people with the greatest insight should perform best, and people with the least 
insight should perform worst. In that case, the Dunning–Kruger Effect and the egocentric bias 
should break down. On the other hand, if metacognitive biases generalize even across tasks that 
are not correlated at the cognitive level, then the Dunning–Kruger Effect and the egocentric bias 




Sixty-four UK students (56 female, 8 male; mean age = 20 years; age range 18–26 years) from 
the University of York took part in exchange for a small payment or course credit. None of these 




Face identity task 
Stimuli for the identity matching task were the same as for the unfamiliar face matching task in 
Experiment 1 (See Figure 1 and Figure 4). As all of the faces were now unfamiliar, we omitted 
the image-by-image familiarity check (Questions 4 & 5 in Figure 1). 
 
Gaze direction task 
Stimuli for the gaze matching task were drawn from Jenkins, Beaver, and Calder (2006). We 
selected eight models (4 female, 4 male), each posing five gaze directions (10° left [L10], 5° 
left [L05], straight ahead [S00], 5° right [R05], 10° right [R10]; 40 images in total). Each face 
was presented in an elliptical mask measuring 230 pixels high × 205 pixels wide. Stimulus pairs 
always combined two identities of the same sex. For each combination, we created a Same 
Direction pair (two faces looking in the same direction: L10, L05, S00, R05, or R10) and a 
Different Direction pair (two faces looking in different directions). To ensure a range of 
difficulty, Different Direction pairs differed by 5° (S00 vs R05; S00 vs R05), 10° (L05 vs R05), 
or 20° (L10 vs R10; R10 vs L10). To make deviations from the midline easier to discern, the 
two faces in each pair were arranged vertically rather than horizontally (see Figure 2.4). Each 
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face appeared once at the top and once at the bottom in both a Same Direction and a Different 
Direction trial, resulting in a total of 80 trials.  
Figure 2.4  Example face matching stimuli from Experiment 2. (A) Identity matching. (B) Gaze 
matching. (C) Expression matching. 
 
Expression task 
Stimuli for the expression matching task were drawn from the Facial Expressions of 
Emotion: Stimuli and Tests (FEEST) dataset (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 
2002). Given that facial expressions of happiness are reliably recognized (Ekman, Friesen, & 
Ellsworth, 1972; Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008), we excluded happiness images to avoid ceiling 
effects. We selected five female models, each posing five facial expressions of emotion (anger, 
disgust, fear, surprise, and sadness; 25 images in total). Each face image measured 362 pixels 
high × 241 pixels wide. Stimulus pairs always combined two identities. Each image was 
combined with each identity in a Same Emotion pair (two faces expressing the same emotion) 
and a Different Emotion pair (two faces expressing different emotions), resulting in a total of 
100 trials. The two images in each pair were arranged horizontally (see Figure 4). Each identity 
and each emotion appeared equally often on the left and on the right. 




All participants completed the Identity, Gaze, and Expression matching tasks in separate blocks. 
Block order was counterbalanced with respect to participants so that each task could be 
encountered first, second, or third. Within each block, trials were presented in a random order. 
All participants contributed the same measures in all three tasks—actual performance, self-
estimates, and peer estimates. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except for the following changes. Participants 
now completed three matching tasks (Identity, Gaze Direction, Emotional Expression), making 
Same/Different judgements according to the task. As before, participants indicated whether they 
were Sure or Unsure of each decision, and estimated the proportion of participants (UK students) 
they thought would give the correct answer. The entire test session took approximately 40 
minutes to complete. 
 
2.3.2 Results and discussion 
Before proceeding to the metacognitive analyses, we first examined performance on each of the 
three face matching tasks. At the group level, actual scores were very similar for the three tasks 
(Identity M= 78.91, SE = .39; Gaze M= 80.54, SE = .41; Expression M= 82.21, SE = .30), 
indicating similar levels of overall difficulty. Importantly however, there was no significant 
correlation between actual scores in the Identity and Gaze tasks [r (62) = .13, p = .31], or 
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between the Identity and Expression tasks [r (62) = .15, p = .25]. There was a moderate 
correlation between actual scores in the Gaze and Expression tasks [r (62) = .30, p < .05]. For 
actual rankings, there were no significant correlations between any of the tasks [Identity and 
Gaze r (62) = .15, p = .25; Identity and Expression r (62) = .20, p = .12; Gaze and Expression 
r (62) = .17, p = .17]. In sum, the pattern of performance is as expected based on previous work. 
Invariant and changeable aspects of faces cleave together to some extent, but correlations 
between different face tasks are otherwise low. 
 
Our metacognitive analysis follows the same plan as Experiment 1. We first examine 
participants’ insight into their own absolute performance (test score) and relative performance 
(percentile ranking), by combining actual attainment with self-estimates in a Dunning–Kruger 
analysis for each task. We then examine participants’ insight into other people’s performance, 
focusing specifically on egocentric bias. Finally, we consider the stability of cognition and 
metacognition across different face tasks. 
 
Insight into one’s own performance 
As in Experiment 1, participants were divided into quartiles according to actual performance. 
Estimated performance was then compared to actual performance in each quartile. Figure 2.5 
summarises this analysis for test score and percentile ranking, separately for the Identity, Gaze, 





Test scores were submitted to a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of Measure 
(Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects factor of Quartile (Lowest, Second, 
Third, Highest). This analysis revealed a main effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 
83.03, SE = 1.04) exceeding Actual scores (M= 78.91, SE = .39) overall [F (1, 60) = 14.25, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .19]. There was also a main effect of Quartile, with scores increasing from the 
lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 29.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .59]. These main effects 
were qualified by a significant Measure × Quartile interaction [F (3, 60) = 19.46, p < .001, ηp2 
= .49]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated score exceeded Actual score in the Lowest 
quartile [F (1,60) = 59.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .50] and the 2nd quartile [F (1,60) = 6.73, p < .05, ηp2 
= .10], but not for the 3rd quartile [F (1,60) = .12, p = .73]. The effect then reversed in the Highest 
quartiles [F (1,60) = 8.14, p < .01, ηp2 = .12]. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant 
for Actual scores [F (3,60) = 192.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .91] but not for Estimated scores [F (3,60) 
= .61, p = .61]. 
 
Gaze matching 
Test scores for the gaze matching task were analysed in the same way. Again, there was a main 
effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 91.59, SE = .76) exceeding Actual scores (M= 
80.54, SE = .41) overall [F (1, 60) = 166.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .74] and a main effect of Quartile, 
with scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 20.03, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .50]. These main effects were also qualified by a significant Measure × Quartile interaction 
[F (3, 60) = 17.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .47]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated score 
exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1,60) = 145.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .71], the 2nd 
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quartile [F (1,60) = 64.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .52] and the 3rd quartile [F (1,60) = 20.64, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .26], but not for the Highest quartiles [F (1,60) = 3.21, p = .08]. The simple main effect of 
Quartile was significant for Actual scores [F (3,60) = 83.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .81] but not for 
Estimated scores [F (3,60) = .56, p = .65]. 
 
Expression matching 
For the Expression task, there was a main effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 89.69, 
SE = .83) exceeding Actual scores (M= 82.21, SE = .30) overall [F (1,60) = 75.33, p < .001, ηp2 
= .56] and a main effect of Quartile, with scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest 
quartile [F (3,60) = 9.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .33]. These main effects were qualified by a significant 
Measure × Quartile interaction [F (3, 60) = 16.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .46]. Simple main effects 
showed that Estimated score exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1,60) = 94.51, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .61] and the 2nd quartile [F (1,60) = 37.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .38], but not for the 3rd 
quartile [F (1,60) = 2.62, p = .11] or the Highest quartiles [F (1,60) = .17, p = .68]. The simple 
main effect of Quartile was significant for Actual scores [F (3,60) = 112.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .85] 
but not for Estimated scores [F (3,60) = .50, p = .69]. 
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Figure 2.5 Dunning–Kruger analysis of the face matching tasks in Experiment 2. The top row 
shows test scores for (A) Identity, (B) Gaze, and (C) Expression. Actual scores (black) and 
Estimated scores (grey) are plotted separately for each performance quartile. Chance 
performance is 50%. The bottom row shows percentile rankings for (D) Identity, (E) Gaze, and 
(F) Expression. Actual ranks (black) and Estimated ranks (grey) are plotted separately for each 




As with the test scores, percentile rankings were entered into a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factor of Measure (Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects 
factor of Quartile (Lowest, Second, Third, Highest). On this occasion, the overall difference 
between Estimated rank (M = 51.19, SE = 2.01) and Actual rank (M = 55.29, SE = .91) was not 
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significant [F (1, 60) = 3.58, p = .06]. There was the expected main effect of Quartile [F (3, 60) 
= 67.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .77] and a significant crossover interaction between Measure and 
Quartile [F (3, 60) = 49.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .71]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank 
exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 46.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .44] and the 2nd 
quartile [F (1, 60) = 8.44, p < .01, ηp2 = .12]. However, this effect was reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 
60) = 22.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .27] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 73.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .55], 
in which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main effect of Quartile was 
significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 334.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .94], but not for Estimated rank 
[F (3,60) = 1.33, p = .27]. 
 
Gaze matching 
Again, there was no overall difference between Estimated rank (M = 54.88, SE = 1.44) and 
Actual rank (M = 55.05, SE = .85) [F (1, 60) = .01, p = .91]. There was a main effect of Quartile 
[F (3, 60) = 85.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .81] and a significant crossover interaction between Measure 
and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 109.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .85]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated 
rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 179.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .75] and 
the 2nd quartile [F (1, 60) = 11.34, p < .01, ηp2 = .16]. However, this effect was reversed in the 
3rd [F (1, 60) = 26.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .30] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 113.40, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .65], in which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main effect of Quartile 
was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 364.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .95], but not for Estimated 




As with the other tasks, there was no overall difference between Estimated rank (M = 52.52, SE 
= 1.78) and Actual rank (M = 54.62, SE = .92) [F (1, 60) = 1.19, p = .28]. Again, the results 
showed the expected main effect of Quartile [F (3, 60) = 57.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .74] and a 
significant crossover interaction between Measure and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 82.56, p < .001, ηp2 
= .81]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest 
quartile [F (1, 60) = 133.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .69] but not for the 2nd quartile [F (1, 60) = .75, p 
= .39]. This effect was reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 16.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .22] and Highest 
quartiles [F (1, 60) = 97.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .62], in which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. 
The simple main effect of Quartile was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 322.44, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .94], but not for Estimated rank [F (3,60) = 1.88, p = .14]. 
 
Insight into other people’s performance 
Peer estimates in the three tasks were analysed in the same way as in Experiment 1. Figure 2.6 
summarises the results of this analysis. 
 
Identity matching 
Despite the numerical difference, peer estimates from Highest quartile participants (M = 4.13, 
SE = .05) were not significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile participants (M = 4.03, 




As expected, peer estimates from Highest quartile participants (M = 4.45, SE = .04) were 
significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile participants (M = 4.23, SE = .03) [t (158) 
= 4.42, p < .001, d = .70]. 
 
Expression matching 
Here too, peer estimates from Highest quartile participants (M = 4.46, SE = .03) were 
significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile participants (M = 4.28, SE = .02) [t (198) 
= 5.00, p < .001, d = .71]. 
Figure 2.6  Egocentric bias in peer estimates from the (A) Identity, (B) Gaze, and (C) 
Expression matching tasks in Experiment 2. High performers attributed higher performance to 
others; Low performers attributed lower performance to others. Error bars show SE.  
 
One interesting aspect of these findings concerns the Dunning–Kruger analysis of test scores 
(Figure 2.5). For high performers in the Gaze and Expression tasks, Actual Scores and Estimated 
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scores converged, but did not cross over. On its own, this pattern may appear to support the idea 
that gaze and expression perception and metacognition have some shared basis: those who 
performed best on these matching tasks also showed the most accurate insight into their 
performance. However, two observations caution against this interpretation. First, high 
performers did not show accurate insight in the relative measure (percentile ranking; Figure 2.5), 
or when estimating the performance of others (Figure 2.6). Second, estimated scores in the Gaze 
and Expression tasks were high for all performance quartiles. Why should people think they are 
so good at these particular tasks? One possibility is poor calibration. Everyday life might provide 
less useful feedback on errors of gaze and expression (which can vary continuously) compared 
with errors of identity (which varies discretely). If that is the case, then people should have less 
insight into their fallibility in gaze and expression tasks. One way to test this possibility is 
through feedback training. If people receive feedback on their gaze and expression perception, 
their self-estimates should fall accordingly. 
 
Stability of cognition and metacognition across face tasks 
The preceding analyses show that Dunning–Kruger effects arise in a range of different face tasks. 
In all of these tasks, low performers overestimated their performance. For high performers, this 
tendency was reversed or eliminated. Multiple measures of performance give us the opportunity 
to examine the stability of Dunning–Kruger effects across tasks. Do people who overestimate 
themselves in one task also overestimate themselves in the other tasks? Or is assessment of 
one’s own performance (like performance itself) task dependent? Figure 2.7 shows the stability 




Figure 2.7  Stability of performance across the three face matching tasks in Experiment 2. 
Actual scores are shown on the left. Estimated scores are shown on the right. Grey and white 
regions in each panel are performance quartiles. Heavy lines indicate participants who stayed 
within the same performance quartile across all three tasks. Light lines indicate participants who 
switched between performance quartiles.   
 
For Actual Scores, only 4 participants stayed within the same performance quartile across all 
three tasks. For Estimated Scores, 15 participants stayed within the same quartile. In other words, 
self-assessment was more stable than ability [c2 (1) = 5.26, p < .05; OR = 3.75, 95% CI 1.24–
11.30]. This pattern suggests that the tendency to overestimate or underestimate one’s own 
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performance is not strictly task dependent. We return to this issue in the General Discussion 
section. 
 
2.4  General Discussion 
Unusually for studies of face perception, the experiments reported here concern (i) the cognitive 
level, (ii) the metacognitive level, and (iii) the relation between these two levels. We first 
summarize the findings for each of these areas in the context of previous research, before 
moving on to theoretical and applied implications. 
 
At the cognitive level, performance on the individual face tasks was as expected from previous 
findings. In the identity matching task, overall accuracy was lower for unfamiliar faces (82% in 
Experiment 1; 79% in Experiment 2) than for familiar faces (96%), demonstrating the standard 
familiarity advantage (e.g. Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019). 
Paired matching has not been widely used to assess gaze perception or processing of emotional 
expression, but the present findings demonstrate the applicability of this method to both tasks. 
Overall accuracy rates were similar across unfamiliar identity, gaze direction, and emotional 
expression tasks (~80%), and within each task, the range of scores (~55–95%) allowed 
meaningful analysis of individual differences. Critically, this analysis revealed little or no 
correlation among scores on the three tasks. That is, a person’s score on one task tells us very 
little about their scores on the other two tasks, even though all three tasks concern face 
perception. The observed dissociations among these scores are consistent with previous 
behavioural and neural evidence for independence among face perception abilities (e.g. Young, 
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Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993; Duchaine, Jenkins, Germine, & Calder, 2009). 
However, previous studies have used different tasks, different measures, and different groups to 
gauge face perception abilities. This is the first time that three such abilities have been assessed 
in a within-subjects design, using the common task of paired matching. One advantage of this 
approach is that it imposed the same level for chance performance in all three tasks (50%). This 
uniformity facilitates comparisons across tasks. It also provides a stable baseline against which 
to compare metacognitive judgements of one’s own and other people’s ability. 
 
At the metacognitive level, our findings concern to two processes—self-estimates (insight into 
one’s own cognition) and peer estimates (insight into other people’s cognition). Our self-
estimate measures extend Kruger & Dunning’s (1999) ‘unskilled and unaware’ effect into the 
novel domain of face perception. In identity matching for both familiar faces (Experiment 1) 
and unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2), low performers overestimated their own absolute 
accuracy (percent correct score), and high performers underestimated their own absolute 
accuracy, giving rise to a classic crossover interaction between estimated test score and actual 
test score. In matching for gaze direction and for emotional expression (Experiment 2), 
estimated accuracy levels were higher overall than for the identity tasks. Thus, while low 
performers again overestimated their own accuracy, for high performers this tendency was 
merely eliminated rather than being reversed as it was in the identity tasks. For relative accuracy 
(rank), the picture was clear cut. In all four matching tasks (Experiments 1 and 2), low 
performers overestimated their rank, and high performers underestimated their rank. These 
measures are consistent in showing that participants had rather little insight into their own 
ability—neither their absolute accuracy level, nor their standing in relation to other people. 
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Our peer estimate measures also showed a consistent pattern. In identity matching for familiar 
faces (Experiment 1) and unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2), high performers attributed 
higher accuracy to other people than did low performers. Similar performance-contingent 
estimates emerged in the gaze direction and emotional expression tasks (Experiment 2). One 
possible interpretation of these performance-contingent effects is that participants estimated 
other people’s ability from their own perspective—that is, with an egocentric bias (Ritchie et 
al., 2015). On this account, high performers presumed that others can do what they themselves 
can do, while low performers presumed that others cannot do what they themselves cannot do. 
The metacognitive picture can be summed up as follows. People estimated their own face 
perception performance with an “unskilled and unaware” bias, and estimated other people’s 
performance with an egocentric bias. 
 
One interesting aspect of our findings is the consistency of Estimated performance across tasks, 
relative to Actual performance across tasks. This pattern suggests that self-estimates are not 
driven solely by insight into one’s own performance, but also involve some determinant that is 
more stable across tasks. Although the current data do not allow us to single out specific 
determinants, individual differences in general intelligence or personality could play a role. On 
a personality account, some participants tend to imagine that they are doing rather well, 
irrespective of the task, while others tend to imagine that they are doing rather poorly, 
irrespective of the task. Several previous studies have reported effects of personality traits on 
self-estimates in other cognitive domains outside of face perception (e.g. narcissism, Ames & 
Kammrath, 2004; Big Five, Soh & Jacobs, 2013). Combining personality measures with face 
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perception tasks could help to explain the stability of self-assessments seen here. One interesting 
question is whether the same personality traits predict self-estimates across domains, or whether 
any domain-specificity emerges. For example, narcissism might inflate self-assessments 
generally, whereas extroversion might disproportionately inflate self-assessment of socially 
relevant abilities, such as face perception. Combined testing should distinguish these 
possibilities. 
 
As well as their theoretical interest, our findings have implications for face perception in clinical 
and forensic settings. Several clinical disorders are characterised by specific face perception 
deficits. In this context, unreliability of self-estimates could influence engagement with clinical 
services. People with developmental prosopagnosia often have little insight into their own 
impaired facial identification (Fine, 2012). People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may 
not be aware that they have trouble reading social signals from faces (see Bishop & Seltzer, 
2012; Schriber, Robins, & Solomon, 2014, for discussions of self-insight in ASD). If people do 
not realise that their ability is outside the normal range, they may not seek appropriate help 
(Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). 
 
Unreliability of peer estimates also has practical implications. There is some evidence that 
people attribute above-average face recognition ability to individuals with professional training 
and experience. For example, participants in Ritchie et al.’s (2015) study predicted that passport 
officers would outperform students at unfamiliar face matching. In fact, training and experience 
have no appreciable impact on face recognition ability (Towler et al., 2019; White, Kemp, 
Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014). Specialists are generally indistinguishable from university 
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students in terms of task performance (Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999; White, Kemp, 
Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014). A dissociation between estimated and actual performance 
of specialists could help to explain the enduring popularity of photo-ID as a means of identifying 
people, despite evidence of its unreliability (Ritchie et al., 2015).  
 
In future work, it would be interesting to compare estimated and actual performance of 
automatic face recognition systems on face perception tasks. Although there is a huge literature 
on automatic face recognition (Ranjan et al., 2018; Phillips et al., 2018), very little is known 
about human understanding of its accuracy. For now, we show that Dunning–Kruger effects and 
egocentric bias both arise in face perception. Our findings urge caution when interpreting self-
report measures of face perception ability. They also reveal a fundamental source of uncertainty 











Chapter 3  Familiarity matters more than race in 
face recognition memory 
Reference: 
Zhou, X., A.M. Burton & Jenkins, R. (2020). Familiarity matters more than race in face 
recognition memory. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
 
Abstract 
Concerns about face recognition often focus on the other-race effect (ORE), the phenomenon 
whereby own-race faces are better remembered than other-race faces. Despite this focus, 
previous studies have not put the magnitude of ORE in context. Here we compared the effects 
of (i) a race manipulation (own-race/other-race face) and (ii) a familiarity manipulation 
(familiar/unfamiliar face) in a 2 × 2 factorial design. We found that the familiarity effect was 
several times larger than the race effect in all performance measures. However, participants 
expected race to have a larger effect on others than it actually did. Face recognition accuracy 
depends much more on whether you know the person’s face than whether you share the same 
race. The focus on the other-race effect, in the scientific literature and beyond, is out of 
proportion with its cognitive importance. 
  
 87 
3.1  Introduction 
What makes a face hard to recognise? There is a common understanding among scientists, 
policy makers, and the general public that other-race faces are harder to recognise than own-
race faces—a phenomenon known as the other-race effect (ORE) (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
However, the importance of another critical factor, the viewer’s familiarity with a face (Burton, 
Jenkins, & Schweinberger, 2011; Natu & O’Toole, 2011), has not had such broad impact (Table 
3.1). From a performance standpoint, the relative attention these effects have received is 
surprising, as it seems to invert their relative potency. Effects of familiarity on face recognition 
are generally large (Bruce, 1982; Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999), whereas effects of 
race on face recognition are generally small (e.g. Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004; Sangrigoli 
et al., 2005).  
 
One possible explanation for this inversion relates to the social importance of racial equality. 
This could raise the salience of experimental findings that are modulated by race, and perhaps 
increase the expectation that such effects will be large. The accuracy of metacognitive insight 
into performance is key here (Zhou & Jenkins, 2020). However, previous studies have rarely 
examined ORE and face familiarity in the same experiment or incorporated metacognitive 






Table 3.1  Prominence of race and familiarity effects. Google search results (number of hits) 
for race-related and familiarity-related face recognition searches in general and specific sources. 
For all searches, race hits outnumber familiarity hits. Similar comparisons yield similar results. 
Searches conducted June 2020. 
 
Here, we manipulated race and familiarity simultaneously in the same Old/New recognition 
memory experiments (Bower & Karlin, 1974; O’Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, & Abdi, 1994). 
To gauge metacognitive insight into the effects of these factors, we asked participants to 
estimate their own performance on this task (self-estimates), and to estimate the performance of 
other participants (peer-estimates). We expected that familiarity would be a stronger 
determinant of face recognition memory than race. We also expected that participants would 
overestimate effects of race relative to familiarity. 
 
3.2  Results 
The results of Experiment 3 (N = 60; figure 3.1a–c, figure 3.2) show that recognition 
performance (d') was affected by Race [F (1, 59) = 26.55, p < .001, η2 = .03], but was much 
more strongly affected by Familiarity [F (1, 59) = 128.57, p < .001, η2 = .33]. This disparity 
was present in signal detection analysis, overall accuracy, and statistical effect size, and was not 
explained by differences in encoding effort during the learning phase (figure 3.2l). In 
Search term Google Google Scholar 
Google Scholar 
all in title 
race face recognition 136,000,000 2,670,000 197 
familiarity face recognition 26,400,000 488,000 67 
race face recognition -familiarity 98,600,000 2,460,000 196 
familiarity face recognition -race 6,820,000 326,000 66 
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Experiment 4 (N = 60), a different photo of each face was used at learning and test, hence 
eliminating image specific memory and requiring person memory (Bruce, 1982; Jenkins, White, 
Van Montfort, & Burton, 2011). This alteration increased the dominance of Familiarity [F (1, 
59) = 343.08, p < .001, η2 = .60] over Race [F (1, 59) = 35.51, p < .001, η2 = .02] (figure 3.1d–
f, figure 3.3), demonstrating that the results in Experiment 3 were not due to image repetition. 
 
Self-estimates showed that participants were aware that familiarity affected their own 
performance more than race (figure 3.2d–k, figure 3.3d–k). In both experiments, trial-by-trial 
confidence ratings from the learning phase and the test phase tracked actual performance, as did 
retrospective estimates at debrief. Peer estimates underestimated other people’s performance in 
every condition, consistent with previous work (Alicke et al., 1995). Critically however, they 
overestimated ORE, giving as much weight to race effects as to familiarity effects (figure 3.2m–
o, figure 3.3m–o). 
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Figure 3.1 Summary methods and results. (a) In Experiment 3, each identity was represented 
by a single image, which was repeated in the learning phase and the test phase (figure 3.2a,d). 
This standard method is used in most previous studies, but is known to conflate face recognition 
with image recognition. (b) Mean recognition memory performance (d') in each condition, and 
(c), statistical effect sizes (η2) for Race and Familiarity in Experiment 3. (d) In Experiment 4, 
each identity was represented by different images in the learning phase and the test phase (figure 
3.3a,d). This stronger test minimizes any influence of image recognition, and more closely 
captures face recognition in the real world. (e) Mean recognition memory performance (d') in 
each condition, and (f), statistical effect sizes (η2) for Race and Familiarity in Experiment 4. 




3.3  Discussion 
Directly comparing ORE and familiarity effects puts their relative magnitudes in context. All of 
our analyses revealed at least a three-fold dominance of familiarity over race in determining 
recognition performance. This outcome does not diminish the practical importance of ORE for 
situations where familiarity is constrained (White et al., 2014; Jenkins, Dowsett, & Burton, 
2018). However, in many security and forensic settings (e.g. eyewitness testimony; Lindsay et 
al., 2011), familiarity can vary dramatically. In that situation, reliability of memory is 
determined more strongly by knowing the person’s face than by sharing the person’s race. 
Although observers were attuned to the impact of both factors on their own performance, they 
expected ORE to affect other people more than it did. Over-attribution of ORE, together with 
the visual salience of race (Valentine, 1991) could help to explain the endurance of ORE as a 
research topic. It could also explain the recent focus on racial bias in face recognition algorithms 
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(Cavazos, Phillips, Castillo, & O’Toole, 2019). While familiarity is more important than race in 
human face recognition, it does not have a clear analogue in machine systems (Jenkins & Burton, 
2008). We conclude that the relative prominence of other-race effects and familiarity effects 
inverts their cognitive importance. Widespread awareness of race effects may detract from 
scientific focus on more fundamental processes. 
 
3.4  Methods and analysis 
3.4.1  Experiment 3 (Same image at learning and test) 
Participants 
Sixty-four UK students (32 black, 32 white; 48 female, 16 male; mean age 26 years; age range 
18–61 years) from the University of York took part in the experiment in exchange for a small 
payment or course credit. The experiments in this study were approved by the Ethics Committee 
at the University of York. All participants provided written informed consent. 
 
Stimuli and Design 
Full colour face photographs of 32 black celebrities, 32 white celebrities, 32 black non-
celebrities, and 32 white non-celebrities were downloaded from online sources (128 faces in 
total). Each of these categories contained 16 females and 16 males. The names of the celebrities 
are listed at  Appendix A. For each celebrity, we sought a non-celebrity whose face matched the 
same basic description. Each image was cropped and resized to 570 pixels high × 380 pixels 
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wide for onscreen presentation. Experiments were run using a 21.5-inch iMac with i5 processor. 
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by PsychoPy2 (Peirce et al., 2019). 
 
To compare effects of race and familiarity directly, we constructed an Old/New recognition test 
in which the within-subjects factors of Race (own, other) and Familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar) 
were manipulated in a fully counterbalanced 2 × 2 factorial design. The experiment consisted 
of two main phases—a learning phase and a test phase. In the learning phase, participants 
viewed a series of 64 faces (16 black celebrities, 16 white celebrities, 16 black non-celebrities, 
16 white non-celebrities) presented one at a time in a random order. In the subsequent test phase, 
participants viewed a longer series of 128 faces (32 black celebrities, 32 white celebrities, 32 
black non-celebrities, 32 white non-celebrities) presented one at a time in a random order. Half 
of the faces in the test phase were Old faces that participants had seen in the learning phase. The 
other half were New faces that had not been presented before. Two complementary versions of 
the learning phase were counterbalanced across participants so that, when pooling over the 
whole experiment, each face appeared as an Old face and a New face an equal number of times. 
 
We defined recognition performance as the proportion of correct responses in the memory test. 
To gauge metacognitive insight into the effects of each factor, we also recorded self-estimates 
and peer estimates. Self-estimates comprised three metrics. Prospective self-estimates were 
captured trial-by-trial in the learning phase. For each face, participants estimated the probability 
that they would recognise that face in the subsequent memory test (percentage response). 
Concurrent self-estimates were captured trial-by-trial in the test phase. For each face, 
participants rated their confidence that their own answer was correct (percentage response). 
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Retrospective self-estimates were captured at debrief. The 64 faces from the learning phase were 
presented in a single array, grouped according to the 2 × 2 factorial design (16 black celebrities, 
16 white celebrities, 16 black non-celebrities, 16 white non-celebrities; cell positions 
counterbalanced). Participants were asked to reflect on the task as a whole, and to circle the two 
groups of faces they thought they remembered best. Choosing two of four options yields six 
possible combinations: 1–2, 1–3, 1–4, 2–3, 2–4, and 3–4. 
 
Peer estimates were also captured trial-by-trial in the test phase. For each face, participants 
estimated (i) how many participants of the same race as the onscreen face would answer 
correctly, and (ii) how many participants of different race to the onscreen face would answer 
correctly (both estimates out of 30). 
 
Procedure 
The experiment began with the learning phase, in which participants made prospective self-
estimates for each of the 64 faces using a percentile scale (figure 3.2d). Following the learning 
phase, participants completed a short filler task (number search) before proceeding to the test 
phase. For each of the 128 faces in the test phase, participants made four separate responses in 
a fixed order: (i) whether the face was Old or New (recognition response; figure 3.2d), (ii) their 
confidence that their own recognition response was correct (concurrent self-estimate; figure 
3.2g), (iii) the number of Same-race participants they thought would give the correct recognition 
response (peer estimate; figure 3.2m), and (iv) the number of Different-race participants they 
thought would give the correct recognition response (peer estimate; figure 3.2m). After 
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completing the test phase, participants viewed all 128 faces again, indicating whether or not 
they already knew each face before the experiment (participants did not have to know the 
person’s name to know the person’s face). These familiarity responses were used to define 
familiar and unfamiliar faces for each participant. The familiarity check was followed by the 
retrospective self-estimate (figure 3.2j). Finally, participants were asked to write down their own 
ethnic group (free response; figure 3.2j). These ethnicity responses were used to define own-
race and other-race faces for each participant. The experimenter provided task instructions at 
the beginning of each task. No time limit was imposed for any of the tasks. Each display 
remained on screen until the participant’s response, which immediately initiated the next trial. 
The entire test session took approximately 50 minutes to complete. 
 
Recognition performance 
We undertook three complementary analyses of recognition performance, based on signal 
detection measures, recognition accuracy (percentage of correct responses), and the percentage 
of participants who answered each item correctly. We also examined study time in the learning 
phase as a measure of encoding effort. Data from four participants (2 black and 2 white), whose 
accuracy fell 3 SD below the group mean, were excluded from analysis. In all four analyses, 
effects of familiarity were much stronger than effects of race. 
 
Signal detection analysis. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA of d' values revealed a significant 
main effect of Familiarity, with higher d' values for familiar faces (M = 3.00, SE = .07) than for 
unfamiliar faces (M = 2.06, SE = .09) [F (1, 59) = 128.57, p < .001, η2 = .33]. The main effect 
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of Race was also significant, with higher d' for own-race faces (M = 2.66, SE = .07) than for 
other-race faces (M = 2.40, SE = .07) [F (1, 59) = 26.55, p < .001, η2 = .03]. 
 
Table 3.2  Signal detection analysis for Experiment 3. Mean hit rates, false alarms, computed 
d' values, and Criterion C values in each condition. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 








There was no significant interaction between these two factors [F (1, 59) = .01, p = .93, η2 < .01]. 
A similar 2 × 2 ANOVA for Criterion C values also revealed a significant main effect of 
Familiarity, with a less strict criterion for familiar faces (M = .10, SE = .03) than for unfamiliar 
faces (M = .53, SE = .05) [F (1, 59) = 70.62, p < .001, η2 = .26]. Participants were more likely 
to classify unfamiliar faces as New and familiar faces as Old. There was no significant main 
effect of Race [F (1, 59) =.09, p =.77, η2 < .01], and no interaction between the two factors [F 
(1, 59) =.40, p =.53, η2 < .01]. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 Own-race face  Other-race face 
Hits   
Familiar face .91(.01) .89(.01) 
Unfamiliar face .68(.03) .63(.03) 
False alarms     
Familiar face .05(.01) .09(.01) 
Unfamiliar face .06(.01) .09(.01) 
d'     
Familiar face 3.13(.07) 2.87(.09) 
Unfamiliar face 2.19(.09) 1.92(.09) 
C     
Familiar face .10(.03) .09(.04) 
Unfamiliar face .51(.05) .54(.06) 
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Accuracy. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of Race (own, other) and 
Familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar) also revealed a significant main effect of Familiarity, with 
higher accuracy for familiar faces (M = 93.92, SE = .71) than for unfamiliar faces (M = 80.35, 
SE = 1.24) [F (1, 59) = 131.04, p < .001, η2 = .37]. The main effect of Race was also significant, 
with higher accuracy for own-race faces (M = 88.64, SE = .85) than for other-race faces (M = 
85.62, SE = .95) [F (1, 59) = 17.12, p < .001, η2 = .02]. There was no significant interaction 
between these the two factors [F (1, 59) = 3.26, p = .08, η2 < .01] (figure 3.2b,c). 
 
Proportion of participants who answered correctly. All proportions are expressed as 
percentages. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Familiarity, with more participants giving correct responses to familiar faces (M = 91.18, SE 
= .12) than to unfamiliar faces (M = 81.70, SE = .17) [F (1, 59) = 4976.61, p < .001, η2 = .80], 
and a significant main effect of Race, with more participants giving correct responses to same-
race faces (M = 88.46, SE = .11) than to different-race faces (M = 84.43, SE = .15) [F (1, 59) = 
8249.72, p < .001, η2 = .14]. The interaction between Familiarity and Race was also significant 
[F (1, 59) = 80.10, p < .001, η2 < .01]. Analysis of simple main effects showed that the effect of 
Familiarity was significant for both same-race faces [F (1, 59) = 2677.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .98], 
and different-race faces [F (1, 59) = 5098.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .99]. The simple main effect of 
Race was significant for both familiar faces [F (1, 59) = 854.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .94] and 




Figure 3.2  Summary methods and results for Experiment 3. Shaded regions show actual 
recognition performance (blue), self-estimates (yellow), and peer estimates (green). Example 
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displays are shown on the left, with summary data on the right. Percentages are rounded to the 
nearest integer. Performance metrics show group means with standard error (SE). Statistical 
effect sizes show the proportion of the total variance attributable to each effect (η2). (a) Actual 
recognition performance was assessed via Old/New judgements to Old and New faces [photo 
by Gage Skidmore CC BY-SA 3.0 
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Will_Smith_by_Gage_ Skidmore.jpg)]. (b) Percentage 
accuracy rates for each condition, and (c), statistical effect sizes for Race and Familiarity in the 
Old/New recognition memory test. (d) Prospective estimates of own recognition performance 
were assessed via confidence judgements for each face during the learning phase. (e) Percentage 
confidence ratings for each condition, and (f), statistical effect sizes for each factor in 
prospective estimates of own performance. (g) Concurrent estimates of own performance were 
assessed via confidence judgements for each face during the test phase. (h) Percentage 
confidence ratings for each condition, and (i), statistical effect sizes for each factor in concurrent 
estimates of own performance. (j) Retrospective estimates of own performance for each face 
type were captured after the recognition test. In the experimental display, all 64 faces from the 
learning phase were presented again, grouped as shown. Self-report ethnicity was used to define 
own-race and other-race faces for each participant in the analysis. (k) Combination plot showing 
the six possible ways to select two of the four face types in the retrospective self-estimate. Line 
thickness indicates frequency. (l) Mean study time per item for faces in each condition of the 
learning phase. (m) Concurrent estimates of peer performance for each face in the recognition 
test. Participants provided separate estimates for peers who shared the depicted race (Same) and 
peers who did not (Different). (n) Estimated and actual peer performance for each condition, 
and (o) statistical effect sizes for each factor, shown separately for estimated and actual peer 
performance. 
 
Study time in learning phase. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of Familiarity, with shorter study times for familiar faces (M = 4.51, SE = .20) than for 
unfamiliar faces (M = 5.71, SE = .32) [F (1, 59) = 26.25, p < .001, η2 = .07]. There was no 
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significant main effect of Race [F (1, 59) < .01, p = .99, η2 < .01], and no interaction between 
the two factors [F (1, 59) = .15, p = .70, η2 < .01] (figure 3.2l). 
 
Self-estimates 
We conducted three separate analyses of self-estimates, based on prospective estimates (trial-
by-trial confidence ratings in the learning phase), concurrent estimates (trial-by-trial confidence 
ratings in the test phase), and retrospective estimates (overall assessments at debrief). In all three 
analyses, effects of familiarity were much stronger than effects of race. 
 
Prospective self-estimates. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of Race (own, 
other) and Familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar) revealed a significant main effect of Familiarity, 
with higher confidence for familiar faces (M = 90.71, SE = .79) than for unfamiliar faces (M = 
65.97, SE = 1.10) [F (1, 59) = 555.49, p < .001, η2 = .72]. The main effect of Race was also 
significant, with higher confidence for own-race faces (M = 79.54, SE = .87) than for other-race 
faces (M = 77.15, SE = .80) [F (1, 59) = 27.33, p < .001, η2 = .01]. There was no significant 
interaction between the two factors [F (1, 59) =.06, p =.81, η2 < .01] (figure 3.2e,f). 
 
Concurrent self-estimates. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of Familiarity, with higher confidence for familiar faces (M = 94.58, SE = .63) than for 
unfamiliar faces (M = 83.76, SE = 1.05) [F (1, 59) = 139.14, p < .001, η2 = .35]. There was also 
a significant main effect of Race, with higher confidence for own-race faces (M = 90.04, SE 
= .78) than for other-race faces (M = 88.30, SE = .79) [F (1, 59) = 10.20, p < .01, η2 = .01]. 
 100 
Again, there was no significant interaction between the two factors [F (1, 59) = 2.03, p =.16, η2 
<.01] (figure 3.2h,i). 
 
Retrospective self-estimates. Participants overwhelmingly chose familiar, own-race with 
familiar, other-race, indicating insight into the dominant effect of familiarity on their own 
performance. In contrast, the combination of familiar, own-race with unfamiliar, own-race was 
rarely chosen. A chi-square test confirmed that the frequencies for the six possible combinations 
were significantly different [χ2 (5, N = 60) = 109.73, p < .001] (figure 3.2k). 
 
Peer estimates 
All proportions are expressed as percentages. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Familiarity, with higher estimates for familiar faces (M = 80.65, SE = 
1.23) than for unfamiliar faces (M = 62.97, SE = 1.31) [F (1, 59) = 253.24, p < .001, η2 = .30]. 
There was also a significant main effect of Race, with higher estimates for same-race (M = 
78.80, SE = 1.24) than for different-race (M = 64.82, SE = 1.45) [F (1, 59) = 95.63, p < .001, η2 
= .19]. The interaction between Familiarity and Race was also a significant [F (1, 59) = 47.70, 
p < .001, η2 = .01]. Analysis of simple main effects showed that the effect of Familiarity was 
significant for both same-race faces [F (1, 59) = 186.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .76], and different-race 
faces [F (1, 59) = 257.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .81]. The simple main effect of Race was significant 
for both familiar faces [F (1, 59) = 69.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .54], and unfamiliar faces [F (1, 59) = 
107.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .65] (figure 3.2n,o). In all our analyses of actual performance and self-
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estimates, Race had a small effect compared with Familiarity. For peer estimates, the two effects 
were of similar magnitude. 
 
3.4.2 Experiment 4 (Different images at learning and test) 
Participants 
Sixty-two UK students (32 black, 30 white; 44 female, 18 male; mean age 22 years; age range 
18–33 years) from the University of York took part in the experiment in exchange for a small 
payment or course credit. All participants provided written informed consent. None had 
participated in Experiment 3. 
 
Stimuli and Design 
The stimuli and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 3, except that we now presented a 
different image of each face in the learning phase and the test phase (figure 3.3d,a). The design 
and procedure were also the same as in Experiment 3, except that participants were now 




As with Experiment 3, we undertook three complementary analyses of recognition performance, 
using signal detection measures, recognition accuracy (percentage of correct responses), and the 
percentage of participants who answered each item correctly. We also examined study time in 
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the learning phase as a measure of encoding effort. Data from two participants (both black), 
whose accuracy fell 3 SD below the group mean, were excluded from analysis. Once again, 
effects of familiarity were much stronger than effects of race in all four analyses. 
 
Signal detection analysis. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA of d' values revealed a significant 
main effect of Familiarity, with higher d' values for familiar faces (M = 2.41, SE = .10) than for 
unfamiliar faces (M = .62, SE = .07) [F (1, 59) = 343.08, p < .001, η2 = .60]. The main effect of 
Race was also significant, with higher d' for own-race faces (M = 1.69, SE = .07) than for other-
race faces (M = 1.34, SE = .07) [F (1, 59) = 35.51, p < .001, η2 = .02].  
 
Table 3.3  Signal detection analysis for Experiment 4. Mean hit rates, false alarms, computed 
d' values, and Criterion C values in each condition. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 








There was no significant interaction between these two factors [F (1, 59) = 1.29, p = .26, η2 
< .01]. A similar 2 × 2 ANOVA for Criterion C values also revealed a significant main effect of 
 Own-race face  Other-race face 
Hits   
Familiar face .87(.01) .81(.02) 
Unfamiliar face .40(.03) .38(.02) 
False alarms   
Familiar face .10(.01) .16(.02) 
Unfamiliar face .18(.02) .23(.02) 
d'   
Familiar face 2.62(.10) 2.20(.12) 
Unfamiliar face .76(.08) .48(.07) 
C   
Familiar face .08(.04) .08(.05) 
Unfamiliar face .70(.07) .59(.06) 
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Familiarity, with a less strict criterion for familiar faces (M = .08, SE = .04) than for unfamiliar 
faces (M = .65, SE = .06) [F (1, 59) = 110.88, p < .001, η2 = .31]. Participants were more likely 
to classify unfamiliar faces as New and familiar faces as Old. There was no significant main 
effect of Race [F (1, 59) = 2.15, p = .15, η2 < .01], and no interaction between the two factors 
[F (1, 59) = 2.67, p = .11, η2 < .01]. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Accuracy. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of Race (own, other) and 
Familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar) also revealed a significant main effect of Familiarity, with 
higher accuracy for familiar faces (M = 86.84, SE = 1.12) than for unfamiliar faces (M = 59.61, 
SE = .98) [F (1, 59) = 489.16, p < .001, η2 = .68]. The main effect of Race was also significant, 
with higher accuracy for own-race faces (M = 75.33, SE = .93) than for other-race faces (M = 
71.12, SE = .95) [F (1, 59) = 29.28, p < .001, η2 = .02]. There was no significant interaction 
between these the two factors [F (1, 59) = .54, p = .46, η2 < .01] (figure 3.3b,c). 
 
Proportion of participants who answered correctly. All proportions are expressed as 
percentages. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Familiarity, with more participants giving correct responses to familiar faces (M = 83.46, SE 
= .31) than to unfamiliar faces (M = 62.21, SE = .30) [F (1, 59) = 3737.02, p < .001, η2 = .88], 
and a significant main effect of Race, with more participants giving correct responses to same-
race faces (M = 75.87, SE = .25) than to different-race faces (M = 69.80, SE = .26) [F (1, 59) = 
22101.59, p < .001, η2 = .08]. The interaction between Familiarity and Race was also significant 
[F (1, 59) = 96.61, p < .001, η2 < .01]. Analysis of simple main effects showed that the effect of 
Familiarity was significant for both same-race faces [F (1, 59) = 4216.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .99], 
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and different-race faces [F (1, 59) = 2783.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .98]. The simple main effect of 
Race was significant for both familiar faces [F (1, 59) = 2952.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .98] and 
unfamiliar faces [F (1, 59) = 2811.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .98] (figure 3.3n,o). 
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Figure 3.3  Summary methods and results for Experiment 4. (a) Actual recognition 
performance was assessed via Old/New judgements to Old and New faces. (b) Percentage 
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accuracy rates for each condition, and (c) statistical effect sizes for Race and Familiarity in the 
Old/New recognition memory test. (d) Prospective estimates of own recognition performance 
were assessed via confidence judgements for each face during the learning phase [photo by Gage 
Skidmore CC BY-SA 3.0 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Will_Smith_by_Gage_Skidmore_2.jpg]. (e) 
Percentage confidence ratings for each condition, and (f) statistical effect sizes for each factor 
in prospective estimates of own performance. (g) Concurrent estimates of own performance 
were assessed via confidence judgements for each face during the test phase. (h) Percentage 
confidence ratings for each condition, and (i) statistical effect sizes for each factor in concurrent 
estimates of own performance. (j) Retrospective estimates of own performance for each face 
type were captured after the recognition test. In the experimental display, all 64 faces from the 
learning phase were presented again, grouped as shown. Self-report ethnicity was used to define 
own-race and other-race faces for each participant in the analysis. (k) Combination plot showing 
the six possible ways to select two of the four face types in the retrospective self-estimate. Line 
thickness indicates frequency. (l) Mean study time per item for faces in each condition of the 
learning phase. (m) Concurrent estimates of peer performance for each face in the recognition 
test. Participants provided separate estimates for peers who shared the depicted race (Same) and 
peers who did not (Different). (n) Estimated and actual peer performance for each condition, 
and (o) statistical effect sizes for each factor, shown separately for estimated and actual peer 
performance. 
 
Study time in learning phase. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of Familiarity, with shorter study times for familiar faces (M = 5.07, SE = .35) than for 
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unfamiliar faces (M = 6.22, SE = .48) [F (1, 59) = 15.29, p < .001, η2 = .03], and a significant 
main effect of Race, with shorter study times for other-race faces (M = 5.48, SE = .37) than for 
own-race faces (M = 5.81, SE = .44) [F (1, 59) = 4.58, p < .05, η2 < .01]. There was no interaction 
between the two factors [F (1, 59) = .01, p = .92, η2 < .01] (figure 3.3l). 
 
Self-estimates 
As for Experiment 3, we conducted three separate analyses of self-estimates, based on 
prospective estimates (trial-by-trial confidence ratings in the learning phase), concurrent 
estimates (trial-by-trial confidence ratings in the test phase), and retrospective estimates (overall 
assessments at debrief). In all three analyses, effects of familiarity were much stronger than 
effects of race. 
 
Prospective self-estimates. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of Race (own, 
other) and Familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar) revealed a significant main effect of Familiarity, 
with higher confidence for familiar faces (M = 89.33, SE = .97) than for unfamiliar faces (M = 
65.07, SE = .99) [F (1, 59) = 445.71, p < .001, η2 = .70]. The main effect of Race was also 
significant, with higher confidence for own-race faces (M = 78.12, SE = .90) than for other-race 
faces (M = 76.28, SE = .86) [F (1, 59) = 15.48, p < .001, η2 < .01]. The interaction between 
Familiarity and Race was also significant [F (1, 59) = 4.16, p < .05, η2 < .01]. Analysis of simple 
main effects showed that the effect of Familiarity was significant for both own-race faces [F (1, 
59) = 420.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .88], and other-race faces [F (1, 59) = 340.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .85]. 
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The simple main effect of Race was significant for familiar faces [F (1, 59) = 16.62, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .22], but not for unfamiliar faces [F (1, 59) = 1.73, p = .19, ηp2 = .03] (figure 3.3e,f). 
 
Concurrent self-estimates. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of Familiarity, with higher confidence for familiar faces (M = 91.15, SE = .84) than for 
unfamiliar faces (M = 75.68, SE = 1.21) [F (1, 59) = 204.58, p < .001, η2 = .46]. There was also 
a significant main effect of Race, with higher confidence for own-race faces (M = 84.32, SE 
= .88) than for other-race faces (M = 82.51, SE = .96) [F (1, 59) = 17.16, p < .001, η2 = .01]. 
There was no significant interaction between the two factors [F (1, 59) = 1.59, p =.21, η2 < .01] 
(figure 3.3h,i). 
 
Retrospective self-estimates. Participants overwhelmingly chose familiar, own-race with 
familiar, other-race, indicating insight into the dominant effect of familiarity on their own 
performance. In contrast, the combination of familiar, own-race with unfamiliar, own-race was 
rarely chosen. A chi-square test confirmed that the frequencies for the six possible combinations 
were significantly different [χ2 (1, N = 60) = 56.07, p < .001] (figure 3.3k). 
 
Peer estimates 
All proportions are expressed as percentages. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Familiarity, with higher estimates for familiar faces (M = 77.76, SE = 
1.63) than for unfamiliar faces (M = 58.69, SE = 1.58) [F (1, 59) = 227.38, p < .001, η2 = .30]. 
There was also a significant main effect of Race, with higher estimates for same-race (M = 
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73.91, SE = 1.50) than for different-race (M = 62.53, SE = 1.68) [F (1, 59) = 88.99, p < .001, η2 
= .11]. The interaction between Familiarity and Race was also a significant [F (1, 59) = 34.57, 
p < .001, η2 = .01]. Analysis of simple main effects showed that the effect of Familiarity was 
significant for both same-race faces [F (1, 59) = 225.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .79], and different-race 
faces [F (1, 59) = 194.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .77]. The simple main effect of Race was significant 
for both familiar faces [F (1, 59) = 62.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .52], and unfamiliar faces [F (1, 59) = 
92.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .61] (figure 3.3n,o). In all our analyses of actual performance and self-
estimates, Race had a small effect compared with Familiarity. For peer estimates, the two effects 














Chapter 4  Face-evoked thoughts 
Reference: 
Zhou, X., & Jenkins, R. (2020). Face-evoked thoughts. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
 
Abstract 
The thoughts that come to mind when viewing a face depend partly on the face and partly on 
the viewer. This basic interaction raises the question of how much common ground there is in 
face-evoked thoughts, and how this compares to viewers’ expectations. Previous analyses have 
focused on early perceptual stages of face processing. Here we take a more expansive approach 
that encompasses later associative stages. In Experiment 5 (free association), participants 
exhibited strong egocentric bias, greatly overestimating the extent to which other people’s 
thoughts resembled their own. In Experiment 6, we show that viewers’ familiarity with a face 
can be decoded from their face-evoked thoughts. In Experiment 7 (person association), 
participants reported who came to mind when viewing a face—a task that emphasises 
connections rather than nodes in a social network. Here again, viewers’ estimates of common 
ground exceeded actual common ground by a large margin. We assume that a face elicits much 
the same thoughts in other people as it does in us, but that is a mistake. In this respect, we are 
more isolated than we think. 
 
4.1  Introduction 
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What comes to mind when you see a face? To some extent, it depends on the face—not only its 
physical appearance, but also the person whose face it is, and everything that goes along with 
that person. However, it also depends on the viewer. This is partly because different faces are 
known to different viewers. Some people know who Arnold Schwarzenegger is, and other 
people do not. But even among those who do, experiences and preferences can differ widely. A 
politician might think of Arnold first and foremost as the Governor of California, whereas a 
cinema-goer might think of him primarily as The Terminator (and both incarnations divide 
opinion for different reasons). This interplay between face and viewer raises the question of how 
much common ground there is in face-evoked thoughts. A face is a natural entry point to a social 
network, but if the same node can lead different viewers in different directions, it is not clear 
how much of the network is really shared. 
 
Depth of processing becomes important here. For superficial aspects of face processing, such as 
deciding whether a person is female or male, observers’ responses are highly consistent (Bruce 
et al., 1993; Burton, Bruce & Dench, 1993). Yet even the seemingly objective task of 
characterising face shape reveals wide discrepancies between viewers (Towler, White, & Kemp, 
2014). Judgements of photographic likeness are similarly idiosyncratic (Hay, Young, & Ellis, 
1991). There is not much consensus among viewers as to which photo best captures a person’s 
appearance (White, Burton, & Kemp, 2016; Ritchie, Kramer, & Burton, 2018). All of these face 
processing tasks are superficial in the sense that observers need only consider the face as a 
physical surface. As cognition proceeds beyond physical cues to the inferences we draw from 
them, opportunities for divergence multiply. In an influential analysis of facial attractiveness, 
Hönekopp (2006) showed that private preferences are roughly as powerful as shared preferences 
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in determining judgements. This finding came as something of a surprise, as it overturned the 
prevailing view at the time that agreement on such judgements among observers was high. But 
subsequent analyses have also concluded that private preferences, shaped by personal 
experience, are often the major determinant of attractiveness judgements (Germine et al., 2015; 
Hehman et al., 2017; Sutherland et al., 2020) and other trait inferences from faces—notably the 
cardinal dimensions of trustworthiness and dominance (Sutherland, Rhodes, Burton, & Young, 
2020; Sutherland et al., 2020). 
 
The preceding studies share some important features. All of them concern early stages of face 
processing. Converging evidence from ERP measures (e.g. Mouchetant-Rostaing et al., 2000) 
and saccadic reaction times (e.g. Ramon, Sokhn, & Calder, 2019) indicate that female and male 
faces can be differentiated within 150 ms of stimulus onset. Impressions of trustworthiness, 
dominance, and attractiveness based on facial appearance also emerge quickly—as early as 100 
ms post-stimulus (Willis & Todorov, 2006; Olivola & Todorov, 2010). But the cascade of 
cognition that a face sets in motion lasts much longer. This is especially true for familiar faces. 
Interaction with semantic and emotional processes appears to peak around 400 ms and remains 
clear until at least 600 ms post-stimulus (Wiese et al., 2019). As stimulus associations are often 
idiosyncratic and often chain together (at least in the word domain; Shapiro, 1966, De Deyne et 
al., 2019), it is precisely in these later processes that one would most expect individual viewers 
to diverge. The resulting heterogeneity of responses can make analyses unwieldy. Perhaps for 
that reason—and undoubtedly because of applied interest in early stages of face processing 
(Brewer & Wells, 2011; Schultz, 2012; Phillips et al., 2018)—later stages of face processing 
have received less attention in cognitive research. 
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This brings us to a second commonality among previous studies. Responses are typically 
constrained to a small set of options—for example, whether a face is female or male, whether 
or not faces match on some dimension, or a numerical rating of a particular attribute. A 
participant’s first thought when seeing a face might be, “She looks like my primary teacher!”, 
but that reaction will not be captured as part of the data. There are some exceptions where 
researchers have gathered free associations to face images (e.g. Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; 
Sutherland et al., 2018). However, in those cases, free associations were not the main interest. 
Instead, they were used to compute dimensions of variation for first impressions from faces. 
Experimental participants then rated faces on those dimensions using Likert scales. 
 
Constraining responses in this way makes sense when the focus is a specific psychological 
mechanism. Our focus here is rather different, as our questions concern networks of social 
cognition. When it comes to face-evoked thoughts, little is known about the extent of overlap 
among viewers. But without direct insight into the minds of others, our sense of common ground 
can not reflect the actual extent of overlap. It can only reflect our impression of overlap, and 
that depends on certain metacognitive assumptions. What occurs to other people when they see 
a particular face? How does that compare with one’s own experience? These questions have not 
been addressed experimentally, although other areas of psychology offer some important clues. 
 
Across a wide range of situations, we are inclined to assume that others think as we do, sharing 
our tastes, preferences, and understanding (false consensus effects; Ross, Greene, & House, 
1977; Krueger & Clement, 1994), and generally seeing the world from our own perspective. For 
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example, we tend to overestimate the extent to which others know the things that we know 
(Hinds, 1999; Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000) and make the choices that we make (Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977; Wolfson, 2000). These failures of metacognitive insight are examples 
of egocentric bias—the tendency to understand others from our own perspective (Krueger & 
Clement, 1994). Recently, egocentric biases have been demonstrated in face perception. In one 
example, participants in an identity matching task predicted that the faces they themselves knew 
would be easy for other people to match (Ritchie et al, 2015). Zhou & Jenkins (2020) showed 
that, in matching tasks for identity, emotional expression, and gaze direction, high performing 
participants attributed higher performance to other people, and low performing participants 
attributed lower performance to other people. 
 
These findings demonstrate egocentric bias in early stages of face processing. Our scope here is 
deliberately more broad. Instead of focusing on early perceptual processes and fixed response 
options, we seek to capture whatever comes to mind when viewing the face. Importantly, this is 
not the same as establishing what the viewer knows about the seen person. At any moment, what 
comes to mind is only a subset of one’s relevant knowledge. This is a critical distinction. It is 
what comes to mind, not what stays behind, that constitutes a train of thought. The current study 
addresses two related aspects of face-evoked thoughts—first, the degree of overlap among 
viewers, and second, how this overlap compares to viewers’ expectations. Given the evidence 
of egocentric bias elsewhere in cognition, we predicted that viewers would overestimate the 
extent to which other people’s thoughts resemble their own (a false consensus effect). We begin 
in Experiment 5 by asking viewers what comes to mind when they see a particular face. By 
focusing on the seen person, this question emphasises individual nodes in a social network. In 
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Experiment 6, we test whether face-evoked thoughts differ for familiar and unfamiliar faces. 
Finally, in Experiment 7, we ask who comes to mind when they see a particular face. By focusing 
on related people, this question emphasises connections between nodes. 
 
4.2  Experiment 5 
The purpose of this experiment was twofold. First, we sought to quantify overlap among 
observers in face-evoked thoughts. Second, we sought to compare the extent of this overlap to 
observers’ expectations. To this end, we devised a face association task comprising cognitive 
and metacognitive components. Participants were asked to write down whatever thoughts came 
to mind when they viewed a series of faces (cognitive component). Analysing these responses 
allowed us to quantify actual overlap among observers. We then asked the same participants to 
estimate how other participants’ responses would compare to their own (metacognitive 
component). Analysing these peer estimates allowed us to quantify expected overlap. 
 
Our predictions concerned the numerosity, content, and order of face-evoked thoughts. At the 
cognitive level, we tested the following assumptions: (i) participants would differ in the number 
of thoughts they recorded, (ii) familiar faces would elicit more responses than unfamiliar faces, 
(iii) some responses to a particular face would be made by more than one participant, and (iv) 
salient associations would come to mind earlier than obscure associations. At the metacognitive 
level, we predicted the following signs of egocentric bias: (i) participants who produced a high 
number of responses would expect others to produce a high number of responses (and vice 
versa), (ii) participants would expect others to produce more responses for faces that they 
themselves knew, (iii) participants would overestimate the number of viewers who had the same 
 116 
thoughts that they themselves had, and (iv), this tendency to overestimate common ground 




Thirty UK students (25 female, 5 male; mean age: 19 years; age range 18–23 years) from the 
University of York took part in exchange for a small payment and task-related bonus. The 
experiments in this study were approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of York. All 
participants provided written informed consent. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus 
Ambient images of 8 familiar celebrities (4 female; 4 male) and 8 unfamiliar celebrities (public 
figures from outside of the UK, 4 female; 4 male) were downloaded from the internet. The 
names of these celebrities are listed in Appendix B. Each photo captured the whole face with no 
occlusions from a roughly frontal aspect. In pilot testing, 64 UK students, who did not participate 
in the main experiment, indicated whether or not they were familiar with each face. An 
independent t-test confirmed that the familiar celebrities were known to more respondents (M = 
89%) than the unfamiliar celebrities (M = 10%) [t(14) = 14.99, p < .0001]. 
 
All photos were cropped to 570 pixels high × 380 pixels and colour printed at 72 dpi onto A4 
sheets, which were collated into booklets. Pagination was randomised, so that familiar and 
unfamiliar faces were intermixed. To counteract possible order effects, page order was reversed 




Each participant completed three separate tasks—a face association test, a metacognitive review, 
and a face familiarity check. In the face association test, the participant’s task was to capture 
whatever came to mind (their ‘points’) as they viewed each face. Participants transcribed their 
thoughts into a personalised Microsoft Excel workbook, using a separate worksheet for each 
face. Each worksheet was headed with the prompt, “Points (Can you tell us any more?)”, 
followed by a series of enumerated rows to accommodate separate points of information (see 
Figure 4.1). This was a self-paced task, and participants were encouraged to be as exhaustive as 
possible in recording their thoughts. To motivate participants to generate as many points as 
possible, we introduced a cash incentive of 1p per point in addition to standard participant 
payments. For example, generating an average of 13 points for each of the 16 faces would result 
in an additional £2.08 payment. 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Example stimulus (left) and response sheet (right) from the free association task in 
Experiment 5. For each face, participants wrote down whatever came to mind. Example 
response sheet shows genuine responses from different participants for illustrative purposes. 
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In the metacognitive review, participants revisited their own responses from the completed face 
association test. First, for each point they had made, participants were asked to estimate how 
many other participants (out of 30) would make the same point. Participants were instructed that 
the point didn’t have to be expressed in exactly the same words, but should express the same 
idea. Second, for each face they had seen, participants estimated how many points other 
participants would generate on average. These data allowed us to compare participants’ actual 
performance against their estimates of peers’ performance on the same association task. 
 
The face familiarity check was a computer-based task that was used to define familiar and 
unfamiliar faces for each participant. Participants were presented with the 16 stimulus faces one 
at a time in a random order. For each face, the participant’s task was to indicate whether or not 
the face was familiar (Yes/No response). Each face remained on screen until the participant’s 
keypress response, which initiated the next trial. Stimulus presentation and data collection were 
controlled by PsychoPy2 v1.82 (Peirce et al, 2019). 
 
These three tasks gave rise to four types of data: (i) face associations—the thoughts that occurred 
to the participant upon seeing the face. These associations have numerosity, content, and 
sequential order; (ii) estimated overlap—for each point, the participant’s estimate of how many 
other participants will make the same point; (iii) estimated numerosity—for each face, the 
participant’s guess at how many points participants will generate on average; (iv) the 




All participants completed the face association test, then the metacognitive review, then the face 
familiarity check in the same fixed order. All three tasks were self-paced, and participants could 
take breaks at any time. The entire test session took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
 
4.2.2 Results and discussion 
Numerosity 
Numerosity refers to the number of points participants generated in the face association task. To 
test for egocentric bias in estimates of other people’s performance, we divided participants into 
three equal-sized performance groups (Low, Middle, High) according to their overall numerosity 
scores. We then compared peer estimates for these groups, separately for Familiar and 
Unfamiliar faces. Summary data for each condition are shown in Figure 4.2A. 
 
Figure 4.2  Egocentric bias and false consensus effects in the free association task in Experiment 
5. (A) Peer estimates (condition means) from participants who themselves generated a low, 
middle, or high number of points, shown separately for familiar and unfamiliar faces. Peer 
estimates tracked participants’ own performance. (B) Actual and estimated number of 
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participants (condition means) who made the same point to the same face, shown separately for 
familiar and unfamiliar faces. Estimated overlap exceeded actual overlap by a factor of 3. 
Asterisks indicate p < .001. Error bars show SE. 
 
Participants’ estimates were submitted to a 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects factor 
of Familiarity (Familiar, Unfamiliar) and the between-subjects factor of Group (Low, Middle, 
High). This analysis revealed a main effect of Familiarity, with higher estimates for Familiar 
faces (M = 13.66, SE = .68) than for Unfamiliar faces (M = 11.00, SE = .55) overall [F (1,27) = 
30.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .53]. There was also a main effect of Group, with estimates increasing 
from the Low group (M = 7.61, SE = .99) through the Middle group (M = 12.18, SE = .99) to the 
High group (M = 17.20, SE = .99) [F (2,27) = 23.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .64]. There was no 
significant interaction between these factors [F (1,27) = .06, p = .95, ηp2 < .01]. Participants 
expected others to generate more points for faces that they themselves knew, and fewer points 
for faces that they themselves did not know. Moreover, high scoring participants produced high 
peer estimates, and low scoring participants produced low peer estimates. Both of these findings 
point to egocentric bias in sizing up the face-evoked thoughts of other people. 
 
Content 
To quantify overlap among participants, we recruited two volunteer coders who categorised the 
face associations by content. We first grouped the data by face, pooling over participants, to 
create sixteen sets of associations (i.e. one set for each face). Each coder received all sixteen 
sets in a random order and independently worked through each set twice. On the first pass, 
coders classified each point as either physical (relating to appearance; e.g. “red hair”) or non-
physical (other information; e.g. “famous actor”). This classification gives us an indicator of 
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abstraction from the visual domain. On the second pass, coders grouped together points that 
they judged to convey the same meaning (e.g. “famous actor”, “Hollywood star”), and assigned 
the size of the group to each point within the group. This procedure gives us the number of 
participants who made the same point to the same face, that is, the overlap among participants’ 
associations. Coders’ judgments were highly correlated [r (6297) = .71, p <.001]. Any point on 
which the coders differed was assigned the mean of the two group sizes. 
 
Overlap refers to the number of participants who made the same point to the same face. 
Summary data for each condition are shown in Figure 4.2B. The overlap analysis was similar to 
the numerosity analysis. Overlap scores were submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
with the within-subjects factors of Familiarity (Familiar, Unfamiliar) and Measure (Estimated, 
Actual). This analysis revealed a main effect of Familiarity, with higher scores for Familiar 
faces (M = 10.88, SE = .32) than for Unfamiliar faces (M = 10.30, SE = .32) overall [F (1, 29) 
= 5.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .17]. There was also a significant main effect of Measure, with Estimated 
scores (M = 15.86, SE = .58) exceeding Actual scores (M = 5.32, SE = .16) overall [F (1, 29) = 
310.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .92]. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
between Familiarity and Measure [F (1, 29) = 5.18, p < .05, ηp2 = .15]. Simple main effects 
confirmed that Estimated overlap exceeded Actual overlap in both the Familiar condition [F (1, 
29) = 295.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .91] and the Unfamiliar condition [F (1, 29) = 244.18, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .98]. The simple main effect of Familiarity was significant for Estimated score [F (1, 29) 
= 6.39, p < .05, ηp2 = .18], but not for Actual score [F (1, 29) = .10, p = .76, ηp2 < .01]. The 
main message from this analysis is that participants overestimated the degree of overlap between 
their own face associations and those of other people—a false consensus effect. Participants 
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imagined that other viewers would have the same thoughts that they themselves had upon seeing 
a particular face. Such convergences did occur, but less often than participants expected. 
 
Order 
Associations come to mind sequentially. For this analysis, we assumed that order of occurrence 
is a proxy for association strength: strong associations come to mind early, weak associations 
come to mind later. The list format of participants’ responses conserves this ordinal information. 
To ensure that our analysis remained representative of the participant group as a whole (N = 30), 
we excluded data beyond list position 21, where the total number of associations across 
participants fell below 30 (that is, below one association per participant). Figure 4.3A 
summarises the ordinal data. Spearman’s correlations confirmed that early associations were 
more widely held than late associations, for Familiar faces [r (19) = -.94, p < .001] and 




Figure 4.3  Ordinal analysis of consensus effects for the free association task in Experiment 5. 
(A) Actual and estimated (Estd) number of participants (condition means) who made the same 
point to the same face, plotted separately for familiar (Fam) and unfamiliar (Unfam) faces as a 
function of list position. Consensus was higher for earlier items than for later items. (B) 
Proportion of points that contained mainly physical information, plotted separately for familiar 
and unfamiliar faces as a function of list position. 
 
Moreover, in keeping with egocentric bias, participants were more likely to attribute to others 
associations that came to mind early, and less likely to attribute to others associations that came 
to mind late (Familiar faces [r (19) = -.78, p < .001]; Unfamiliar faces [r (19) = -.84, p < .001]). 
 
To test for qualitative differences in thoughts evoked by familiar versus unfamiliar faces, we 
next analysed participants’ associations using the coders’ classifications of content. Figure 4.3B 
shows the proportion of physical and non-physical associations as a function of list position, 
separately for Familiar and Unfamiliar faces. 
 
To simplify the statistical analysis, we collapsed across list positions to form an Order factor 
with three levels—Early (positions 1–7), Middle (positions 8–14), and Late (positions 15–21). 
The proportion of points relating to physical information (facial appearance), as opposed to non-
physical information (other associations), was analysed using a within-subjects ANOVA with 
the factors of Familiarity (Familiar, Unfamiliar) and Order (Early, Middle, Late). This analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of Familiarity [F (1, 6) = .77, p = .41, ηp2 = .11]. However, 
there was a significant main effect of Order, with the highest proportion of physical points in 
Early responses (M = 54.80, SE = 1.42) followed by Middle responses (M = 48.55, SE = 1.43), 
and the lowest proportion in Late responses (M = 37.78, SE = 3.12) [F (1, 6) = 21.12, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .78]. More importantly, there was a significant interaction between Familiarity and Order 
[F (1, 6) = 12.66, p < .01, ηp2 = .68]. Simple main effects revealed a significant effect of Order 
for both Familiar faces [F (2, 24) = 7.16, p < .01, ηp2 = .37] and Unfamiliar faces [F (2, 24) = 
31.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .73]. The simple main effect of Familiarity was significant for Early 
responses [F (1, 18) = 15.06, p < .01, ηp2 = .46] and for Late responses (where the effect was 
reversed) [F (1, 18) = 4.83, p < .01, ηp2 = .21], but not for Middle responses [F (1, 18) = .04, p 
= .89, ηp2 < .01]. The content of face-evoked thoughts depends on the viewer’s familiarity with 
the face. Physical information was more forthcoming for Unfamiliar faces than for Familiar 
faces. Conversely, non-physical information was more forthcoming for Familiar faces than for 
Unfamiliar faces. 
 
One feature of participants’ responses that we did not anticipate was spontaneous mention of 
other people’s names. Evidently, a presented face often brought to mind another specific 
individual. This occurred occasionally for Unfamiliar faces (10.0% of responses), but 
significantly more often for Familiar faces (30.4% of responses) [t(29) = 3.07, p < .01]. This 
observation suggests that person associations could be among the most salient associations 
evoked by faces. We return to this finding in Experiment 7. 
 
4.3  Experiment 6 
Experiment 5 revealed a qualitative difference between thoughts evoked by familiar and 
unfamiliar faces. Thoughts concerning physical appearance came to mind more readily for 
unfamiliar faces than for familiar faces. Thoughts concerning non-physical attributes came to 
mind more readily for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. To follow up this finding, we 
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investigated regularities between face familiarity and face associations in an independent test. 
We reasoned that if familiarity affects the content of face associations, it should be possible to 
judge (from associations alone) whether the person who made the associations was looking at a 
familiar face or an unfamiliar face. Moreover, if the balance of physical content is the basis for 
such judgements, then sorting associations by physical content should be equivalent to sorting 
them by familiarity, such that the two sorting tasks give rise to similar outcomes. 
 
To test this possibility, we administered two separate categorisation tasks in which sorters 
reviewed participants’ response sheets from Experiment 5. In one task, sorters judged whether 
each sheet contained mainly Physical information or mainly Non-Physical information (focus 
sort). In the other task, sorters judged whether the viewer was looking at a Familiar or 
Unfamiliar face (familiarity sort). We expected that response sheets that were categorised as 
Physical in the focus sort would be categorised as Unfamiliar in the familiarity sort. Conversely, 
response sheets that were categorised as Non-Physical in the focus sort should be categorised as 




Eighteen UK students (14 female, 4 male; mean age: 19 years; age range 18–25 years) from the 
University of York took part in exchange for course credit. None had participated in Experiment 
1. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus 
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The stimuli in this experiment were participants’ response sheets from Experiment 5. Each of 
the 30 participants in Experiment 5 viewed 16 faces, resulting in a total of 480 response sheets. 
Screenshots of these response sheets were used as stimuli in the computer-based sorting tasks. 
Each image captured all of the associations that a single participant had made for a single face 
(see Figure 4.1). The same set of 480 images was used in the familiarity sorting task and the 
focus sorting task. 
 
Design 
To avoid carry-over effects, we randomly assigned the participants to one of two sorting tasks. 
Nine sorters categorised the response sheets by familiarity, and nine categorised them by focus. 
In the familiarity sort, their task was to judge, from the written associations on each sheet, 
whether the respondent was viewing a Familiar face or an Unfamiliar face. In the focus sort, 
their task was to judge whether the associations contained mainly Physical information or 
mainly Non-Physical information. These tasks allowed us to assign to each sheet two 
independent scores: (i) the number of times (out of nine) it was categorised as Unfamiliar (vs 
Familiar), and (ii) the number of times (out of nine) it was categorised as Physical (vs Non-
Physical). Each participant saw all 480 response sheets in a random order. 
 
Procedure 
Participants received instructions for either the familiarity sort or the focus sort before 
completing the prescribed task. Each trial consisted of a single response sheet presented at the 
centre of the screen until response. Participants categorised each sheet via keypress (Q or P), 
which immediately triggered the next trial. The categorisation task was self-paced, and 
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participants could take breaks at any time. The entire test session took approximately 30 minutes 
to complete. 
 
4.3.2 Results and discussion 
For each item in the categorisation tasks (i.e. each response sheet), we recorded the number of 
times it was categorised as Unfamiliar (familiarity score 0–9) and the number of times it was 
categorised as Physical (focus score 0–9). Figure 4.4 shows how many items received each 
combination of scores. As can be seen from the figure, familiarity scores and focus scores were 
strongly correlated [r (478) = .74, p < .001]. Specifically, Unfamiliar judgements cleaved with 
Physical judgements, and Familiar judgements cleaved with Non-Physical judgements. These 





Figure 4.4 Analysis of face-evoked thoughts in Experiment 6. Responses that were deemed to 
be physical in content were deemed to refer to an unfamiliar face; responses that were deemed 
to be non-physical in content were deemed to refer to a familiar face. Colours indicate frequency. 
 
To gauge the accuracy of these inferences, we next compared sorters’ categorisations of 
familiarity (based on their reading the response sheets), to participants’ actual familiarity with 
the faces concerned (familiarity checks in Experiment 5). The overall accuracy rate was 62%, 
significantly higher than chance performance of 50% [z = 16.02, p < .001]. With moderate 
accuracy, we can decode a person’s familiarity with a face by reading what occurred to them 
when they saw it. In the final experiment, we focus on person associations evoked by faces, that 
is, connections between nodes in social networks. 
 
4.4  Experiment 7 
In Experiment 5, common ground among participants was smaller than participants expected. 
In some respects, the lack of common ground may not be surprising. After all, the face 
association task was entirely unconstrained, and we would expect some thoughts, such as 
episodic memories, or one’s like or dislike of the depicted individual, to be idiosyncratic. 
However, not all face-evoked thoughts are idiosyncratic in this sense. One interesting aspect of 
Experiment 5 was participants’ inclusion of personal names as associations with the seen face. 
Rather often, looking at the face led the viewer to think of someone else. This observation 
suggests that social associations are among the most salient thoughts that come to mind when 
viewing a face. 
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Semantic priming effects attest to the strength of such social associations. Viewers are typically 
faster to identify a known face when it is immediately preceded by a related person than when 
it is preceded by an unrelated person (Young et al., 1994). This phenomenon indicates that 
people who co-occur or share semantic information become closely associated in memory, such 
that activating the representation of one person activates the representation of related people 
(Burton et al., 1990; Wiese & Schweinberger, 2015). We suggest that this rings true when 
reflecting on everyday social encounters. Utterances such as, “Have you seen Mary?” or “How 
are the kids?” are common in conversation. 
 
For present purposes, the key distinction is that social networks of co-occurrence and shared 
semantics are not idiosyncratic; they are objective features of the world. Although participants, 
by definition, do not share the same idiosyncratic associations, they do inhabit the same external 
world, albeit a particular corner of that world. This basic contrast raises the question of whether 
the pattern seen in Experiment 5 (overestimation of common ground) persists even when the 
association task is constrained to external connections between individuals. 
 
If the observed pattern does persist, it would imply a more thoroughgoing egocentric bias: 
viewers wrongly assume that facts about social networks that occur to them also occur to others. 
Recognising that one’s own perspective on the world is limited requires a leap of metacognitive 
insight. Recognising that another person’s perspective will be different requires a further leap; 
and the process can fail at either stage. If the pattern is eliminated, this would imply a more 
limited egocentric bias: participants wrongly assume that face-evoked opinions that occur to 
them also occur to others, but they do not make the same mistake about face-evoked facts. Such 
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a finding would suggest that a common frame of reference (the external world) allows better 
calibration of peer estimates. 
 
To distinguish between these possibilities, we ran a modified version of the face association test 
in which associations were constrained to social relations, that is, connections between nodes in 
social networks. Instead of asking what comes to mind when viewing a face, we asked who 




Thirty UK students (28 female, 2 male; mean age: 19 years; age range 18–21 years) from the 
University of York took part in exchange for a small payment and task-related bonus. None had 
participated in the preceding experiments. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus 
The stimuli and response booklets were the same as in Experiment 5, except that the instructions 
were modified to reflect the change in task. 
 
Design 
The study design was the same as in Experiment 5, except for the following changes. The face 
association test now called for associated people specifically, rather than any thoughts that came 
to mind. Accordingly, the header on each worksheet was modified to read, “Names (Can you 
tell us any more?)” (see Figure 4.5). Participants were instructed not to write the name of the 
person whose face was presented. Given that names can be difficult to recall, we accepted 
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individuating semantic descriptions (e.g. “he played Harry Potter’s friend”) in cases where the 
name could not be retrieved or was never known. For simplicity, we include such entries as 
names in the rest of this paper. To discourage spurious responses, participants were also asked 
to supply a reason that the named individual was associated with the presented face. 
 
Figure 4.5  Example stimulus (left) and response sheet (right) from the person association task 
in Experiment 7. For each face, participants wrote down whoever came to mind. Example 
response sheet shows genuine responses from different participants for illustrative purposes. 
 
 
In the metacognitive review, participants were now asked to estimate, for each name, how many 
other participants (out of 30) would mention the same person, and for each face, how many 
names other participants would generate on average. These data allowed us to compare 





The procedure was the same as in Experiment 5. All participants completed the face association 
test, the metacognitive review, and the face familiarity check in that order. 
 
4.4.2 Results and discussion 
Numerosity 
To test for egocentric bias, we again divided participants into three performance groups (Low, 
Medium, High) according to their overall numerosity scores. We then compared peer estimates 
for these groups, separately for Familiar and Unfamiliar faces. Summary data for each condition 
are shown in Figure 4.6A. 
 
Figure 4.6 Egocentric bias and false consensus effects in the person association task in 
Experiment 7. (A) Peer estimates (condition means) from participants who themselves 
generated a low, middle, or high number of names, shown separately for familiar and unfamiliar 
faces. Peer estimates tracked participants’ own performance. (B) Actual and estimated number 
of participants (condition means) who mentioned the same name to the same face, shown 
separately for familiar and unfamiliar faces. Estimated overlap exceeded actual overlap by at 
least a factor of 2. Asterisks indicate p < .001. Error bars show SE. 
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The analysis took the same form as before. Participants’ estimates were submitted to a 2 × 3 
mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects factors of Familiarity (Familiar, Unfamiliar) and the 
between-subjects factor of Group (Low, Middle, High). This analysis revealed a main effect of 
Familiarity, with higher estimates for Familiar faces (M = 6.47, SE = .48) than for Unfamiliar 
faces (M= 3.89, SE = .37) overall [F (1,27) = 35.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .57]. There was also a main 
effect of Group, with estimates increasing from the Low group (M = 3.11, SE = .65) through the 
Middle group (M = 4.44, SE = .65) to the High group (M = 7.99, SE = .65) [F (2,27) = 15.28, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .53]. These main effects were qualified by a significant Familiarity × Group 
interaction [F (2,27) = 10.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .44]. Simple main effects showed that Familiar 
estimates exceeded Unfamiliar estimates in the Middle group [F (1,27) = 15.66, p < .001, ηp2 
= .37] and the High group [F (1,27) = 40.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .60], but not in the Low group [F 
(1,27) < .01, p = 1.00, ηp2 < .001]. The simple main effect of Group was significant for both 
Familiar faces [F (2,27) = 19.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .59] and Unfamiliar faces [F (2,27) = 5.38, p 
< .05, ηp2 = .29]. Overall, participants expected others to generate more names for faces that 
they themselves knew, and fewer names for faces that they themselves did not know. In addition, 
high scoring participants produced high peer estimates, and low scoring participants produced 
low peer estimates. The overall pattern is again indicative of egocentric bias, this time in 
estimating how many people will occur to other viewers when they see a particular face. 
 
Content 
In this analysis of content, overlap refers to the number of participants who mentioned the same 
name to the same face. Given that names are so constrained, matching responses were 
unambiguous. As such, the coding step in Experiment 5 was not necessary here. Summary data 
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for each condition are shown in Figure 4.6B. As with the numerosity scores, overlap scores were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors of Familiarity 
(Familiar, Unfamiliar) and Measure (Estimated, Actual). This analysis revealed a main effect 
of Familiarity, with higher scores for Familiar faces (M = 9.89, SE = .51) than for Unfamiliar 
faces (M = 4.41, SE = .41) overall [F (1, 29) = 115.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .80]. There was also a 
significant main effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 9.65, SE = .67) exceeding Actual 
scores (M = 4.64, SE = .21) overall [F (1, 29) = 62.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .68]. These main effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction between Familiarity and Measure [F (1, 29) = 10.65, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .27]. 
 
Simple main effects confirmed that Estimated overlap exceeded Actual overlap in both the 
Familiar condition [F (1, 29) = 80.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .74] and the Unfamiliar condition [F (1, 
29) = 24.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .46]. The simple main effect of Familiarity was significant for both 
Estimated score [F (1, 29) = 66.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .70] and Actual score [F (1, 29) = 156.00, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .84]. Once again, participants overestimated the degree of overlap between their 
own associations and those of other participants, this time, for social associations specifically. 
Participants imagined that other viewers would think about the same people that they themselves 
thought about upon seeing a particular face. In fact, the overlap was smaller than they expected. 
 
Order 
As with the free associations in Experiment 5, we analysed the order in which social associations 
were generated as a proxy for association strength. To ensure that our analysis remained 
representative of the participant group as a whole (N = 30), we excluded data beyond list 
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position 5, where the total number of associations across participants fell below 30 (that is, 
below one per participant). Figure 4.7 summarises the resulting ordinal pattern.  
 
Figure 4.7  Ordinal analysis of consensus effects for the person association task in Experiment 
7. Actual and estimated (Estd) number of participants (condition means) who mentioned the 
same name to the same face, plotted separately for familiar (Fam) and unfamiliar (Unfam) faces 
as a function of list position. Consensus was higher for earlier items than for later items. 
 
Spearman’s correlations confirmed that earlier associations were more widely held than later 
associations, for Familiar faces [r (3) = -.90, p < .05] and Unfamiliar faces alike [r (3) = -.90, p 
< .05]. As expected, participants were also more likely to attribute to others associations that 
came to mind early, and less likely to attribute to others associations that came to mind late 
(Familiar faces [r (3) = -.99, p < .001]; Unfamiliar faces [r (3) = -.99, p < .001]). 
 
4.5  General Discussion 
We set out to quantify overlap in face-evoked thoughts, and to compare the actual overlap with 
participants’ expectations. This comparison revealed a consistent egocentric bias: across 
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experiments, viewers overestimated the extent to which other people’s thoughts resembled their 
own. In this respect, we are more isolated than we think. 
 
These findings expand on previous work in a number of ways. First, they take an expansive 
view of face processing that runs from early perceptual stages through to late associative stages. 
In so doing, they shed new light on differences between familiar and unfamiliar face processing, 
contrasting the thoughts that they elicit in the viewer. Second, they encompass cognitive and 
metacognitive measures from the same participants. This approach illuminates the same 
processes from two different perspectives, and extends egocentric bias and false-consensus 
effects to a new area of social cognition. 
 
Our cognitive measures conformed to our initial assumptions, providing a secure basis for 
comparison. For both free associations (Experiment 5) and person associations (Experiment 7), 
we observed large individual differences in the number of thoughts that participants recorded. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, participants generated more responses to familiar faces than to 
unfamiliar faces. In addition, points that participants mentioned early were more likely to be 
mentioned by others. These quantitative differences were accompanied by qualitative 
differences in content. Physical information was especially forthcoming for unfamiliar faces, 
and non-physical information was especially forthcoming for familiar faces (Experiment 5). 
Naive observers were apparently sensitive to these regularities. In Experiment 6, sorters who 
categorised viewers’ responses according to inferred familiarity with the face, and sorters who 




Our metacognitive measures revealed egocentric bias in both numerosity and content of face-
evoked thoughts. For numerosity, participants who generated many responses expected other 
viewers to generate many responses, and vice versa. This egocentric bias tracked not only 
individual differences in participants’ response rates, but also their familiarity with individual 
faces (Ritchie et al., 2015). For content, participants overestimated the number of viewers whose 
face-evoked thoughts matched their own—and by a large margin (cf. Bui, 2012). Peer estimates 
exceeded actual counts by a factor of 3 in Experiment 5, and by at least a factor of 2 in 
Experiment 7. These false-consensus effects gave rise to especially high estimates for thoughts 
that came to mind first. 
 
All of these patterns were evident in a free association task that emphasised the seen person, 
corresponding to an individual node in a social network (Experiment 5). They were also evident 
in a person association task that emphasised related people, corresponding to connections 
between nodes in a social network (Experiment 7). Egocentric bias and false-consensus effects 
at both levels indicate that we overestimate common ground in face-evoked thoughts. 
 
So far, we have discussed these findings in relative terms—estimated overlap exceeded actual 
overlap. However, it is also striking how small actual overlap was in absolute terms. Any given 
point was mentioned by only around 20% of participants (5 out of 30) on average, and even 
those associations that came to mind first did not command a majority. Moreover, 10% of free 
associations in Experiment 5 and 40% of person associations in Experiment 7 were unique, in 
that they were generated by only participant. At the time of writing, there is much speculation 
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about social media and the segmentation of society into bubbles of like-minded people (Nikolov, 
Oliveira, Flammini, & Menczer, 2015; Nguyen, 2020). For this particular aspect of social 
cognition (face-evoked thoughts), false consensus appears so at odds with true consensus, it 
threatens to condemn each of us to a bubble of one. It may seem plausible, or even obvious, that 
communication allows us to escape this fate. After all, the whole purpose of communication is 
to improve insight into the minds of others (Fernbach & Sloman, 2017). However, cognitive 
biases are often deeply engrained and difficult to change (Kahneman, 2011). It is worth noting 
that our participants each brought to the experiment 20 years’ experience in social cognition. 
Evidently, this everyday experience was not enough to quash egocentric bias in the social 
cognition tasks presented here. There is some evidence that egocentric bias diminishes with age 
(Yinon, Mayraz, & Fox, 1994; Hayashi & Nishikawa, 2019). Future experiments could test 
whether older adults become better attuned to those around them following their additional 
exposure. 
 
The observed false consensus effects for face-evoked thoughts raise some interesting questions 
about own-face processing. People tend to be highly selective about photos of themselves 
(Hancock & Toma, 2009). Recent studies of photographic likeness and face identification 
suggest the operation of egocentric bias in selection of own-face photos. Specifically, skewed 
representations of self interfere with our ability to judge which photographs faithfully capture 
our own facial appearance (White, Burton, & Kemp, 2016; White, Sutherland, & Burton, 2017). 
Such findings concern primarily perceptual aspects of own-face processing. In light of the 
current findings, it would be interesting to test whether false consensus effects also emerge in 
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associative aspects of own-face processing. If so, then people should expect their own face to 



















Chapter 5 General Discussion  
5.1  Overview of findings 
The research carried out in this thesis investigated cognition and metacognition in different 
aspects of face processing. Chapter 2 began by exploring whether the same Dunning–Kruger 
effects (DKE) and egocentric bias exist in familiar and unfamiliar face identity by modifying 
the procedure and analysis of the original Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) and the classic 
same/different face matching paradigm (Experiment 1). Self-assessment measures (test score 
and percentile ranking) and peer assessment measures were taken for familiar and unfamiliar 
face matching tasks, separately. Dividing participants into four groups according to their actual 
performance, I found that low performers overestimated their own test score and percentile 
ranking in both familiar and unfamiliar face matching task, while high performers 
underestimated their own performance (except for test score in the familiar face matching task). 
As for peer assessment, top performers expected higher accuracy of other people than did low 
performers. Based on the consist findings of DKE and egocentric bias in face identity tasks, 
Experiment 2 explored whether the same metacognitive illusions also apply to the recognition 
of social signals from faces, and the stability across these tasks under the same paradigm format. 
The classic DKE and egocentric bias also emerged in emotional expression and gaze direction 
tasks (except for high performers’ accurate self-assessment of test score). Participants’ 
metacognitive performance was more stable than their cognitive performance across the three 
face recognition tasks. These findings demonstrate the existence of metacognitive illusions in 
different face perception tasks. The unskilled but unaware phenomenon should be given more 
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attention. The stability of metacognition performance across different face tasks implies that 
there may be a common trait underlying estimates across tasks. 
 
Despite there being no familiarity advantage in metacognition in Chapter 2, participants still 
performed better in familiar face identification than in unfamiliar face identification at the 
cognitive level. Given that familiarity has been widely showed to confer an advantage in face 
identification and recognition memory (Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2004; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 
2019), the focus of the investigation in Chapter 3 next moved to the comparison of familiarity 
effect with another well-known effect in face memory, the other-race effect (ORE)— the finding 
that faces of one’s own race are better remembered than faces of other race. Results of accuracy, 
signal detection analysis and the proportion of participants who answered correctly showed that 
the familiarity effect was at least three times larger than the other-race effect. Recogntion 
memory tasks based on identical images in the learning and test phase (Experiment 3) and 
different images of the same identity in each phase (Experiment 4) were combined with the 
prospective, concurrent and retrospective metacognitive measurements. The finding of the much 
stronger of familiarity effect was in line with participants’ self-assessment. Interestingly, people 
overestimated the ORE when assessing other people’s performance. The findings in this chapter 
demonstrate that the profile of familiarity effects and other-race effects in the face recognition 
literature is not in proportion to their importance as determinants of recognition accuracy. The 
observation that participants attributed more ORE to other people than to themselves is 
reminiscent of Blind Spot Bias (Pronin, 2007), the distinct condition of the egocentric bias as I 
reviewed in the General Introduction. 
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In Chapter 4, I next approached the investigation of egocentric bias from the face association 
angle. The experiments focused on three dimensions at both the cognitive and metacognitive 
level—numerosity (the number of points generated for each face), content (the number of 
participants who generated the same point) and order (the number of participants who generated 
the same point at each position). Clear egocentric bias emerged in each of these measures, 
whether the associations were free (Experiment 5) or were limited to names (Experiment 7). 
Those who generated many points or names expected that others would generate many, and 
those who generated fewer expected that others would generate few. Participants also 
overestimated the overlap between thoughts that occurred to them and thoughts that occurred to 
others. Moreover, they also expect this overlap to a larger extent for the early points then the 
late points they generated. A follow-up study (Experiment 6) about the content of face 
association showed that physical points were more related to unfamiliar faces and those 
abstracted beyond facial appearance were more related to familiar faces. Just by reading the 
person’s associations, people could infer the familiarity of the face to the viewer. 
 
In summary, according to the current findings, face is not a “special” domain in which deficits 
can be naturally intuited. The DKE and egocentric bias emerge in various aspects of face 
processing. These observations merit further attention from both basic and applied researchers. 
 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
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Several theoretical implications follow from my research. In this section I go through each of 
them from the perspective of face perception and the perspective of metacognition separately. 
 
5.2.1 Face perception 
As captured in theoretical models (Bruce & Young, 1986, Burton et al., 1999), familiar face 
recognition has a performance advantage over unfamiliar face recognition. This has been known 
for many years cross a range of tasks (for review see Johnston & Edmonds, 2009, Young & 
Burton, 2017). Results of the current face matching study in Experiment 1 showed that 
identifying familiar faces (M = 95) was much easier than identifying unfamiliar faces (M = 82), 
which is consistent with the previous face matching studies (e.g., Bruce et al., 2001, Bruce et 
al., 1999, Burton et al., 1999, Megreya and Burton, 2006). Results of face memory experiments 
in this thesis showed that familiar faces (M = 94 in Experiment 3; M = 87 in Experiment 4) were 
remembered more accurately than unfamiliar faces (M = 80 in Experiment 3; M = 60 in 
Experiment 4) , which is consistent with previous face memory studies (e.g., Ellis et al., 1979, 
Klatzky and Forrest, 1984, Yarmey, 1971). This familiarity advantage was highlighted 
especially when put the relative magnitudes of race and familiarity effect in context. Based on 
the results in Chapter 3, I argue that previous research of face memory has put a lot of emphasis 
on the other-race effect. The observed three-fold dominance of familiarity effects over race 
effects does not diminish the importance of race, but does call for more attention to the 
importance of familiarity in fundamental research on face memory. Chapter 4 provides an initial 
theoretical account of the familiarity advantage in face-evoked thoughts. Previous research into 
face associations has rarely considered familiarity effects because it has focused on trait 
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inferences in first impressions,  which relate to unfamiliar faces only. The experiments in 
Chapter 4 examined effects of familiarity on anything and anybody that occurred to viewers 
when looking at a face. The results in Experiment 5 revealed no familiarity advantage in how 
many points people came up with (both M = 13) or how many people think about the same point 
(both M = 5). Interestingly, the familiarity advantage arose in the person association task in 
Experiment 7. Participants thought of more people when looking at a familiar face (M = 5) 
compared with an unfamiliar face (M = 3). Also, more participants came up with the same person 
when looking at the familiar face (M = 8) than at the unfamiliar face (M = 2). These findings 
call for future studies to understand the key differences between free association and person 
association in this context. 
 
This present research is among the first to examine all the physical and non-physical information 
that comes to mind when looking at a face. Experiment 5 showed that people are more likely to 
firstly think about physical information to unfamiliar faces than to familiar faces, and that this 
trend reversed in the late points. Experiment 6 showed that if we look at the overall information 
people think about a face, unfamiliar faces were associated with mainly physical information 
while familiar faces were associated with mainly non-physical information. Furthermore, 
decoding whether a person is familiar with a face could rely on the person’s overall associations 
with the face. This is an informative analysis, as the overall number of points was similar for 
familiar faces (M = 14) and unfamiliar faces (M = 13). 
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Along with new findings, the face association study also makes a contribution to the 
methodology of face perception. Unlike standard word association tasks, in which the 
participant is asked to give the first one or two words that come to mind after hearing the target 
word (e.g., Nissen & Henriksen, 2006; McNeill, 1966; Shapiro, 1966), there is no limit to the 
number of points participants could make in the face association task presented here. This makes 
for a much richer data set. The number of points and the order in which they were mentioned 
were both informative in Experiment 5 and Experiment 7. Previous research on first impressions 
(e.g., Penton-Voak et al., 2006) often asked participants to rate at a few given traits of a face. 
The current face association method has no restriction on the content people mention. In 
Sutherland et al.’s (2018) study, participants were allowed to write whatever came to mind when 
looking at a face, and they were also told it was a study about first impressions. Researchers 
analyzed their data by reducing the impressions that participants mentioned to cardinal 
dimensions, which were then used to collect ratings. Based on different aims, sorters in the 
current study (Experiment 5) were asked to sort participants’ responses, but at two levels. One 
concerned general content (physical or non-physical). The other imposed no restriction, but 
required sorters to group the same meanings together, allowing us to count how many people 
mentioned the same point. One advantage of this approach is that the content of the general 
sorting level could be any categories of interest. Another methodological contribution of the 
current thesis is the same/different matching task for the emotional expression and gaze 
direction tasks. Matching has become a common paradigm for testing face identity performance. 
As I reviewed in Chapter 1, previous research on emotion expression and gaze direction often 
ask participants to choose the exact kind of emotion or gaze direction the face image shows. The 
same/different matching approach in the current work (Chapter 2) allows direct comparison of 
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performance across identity, emotional expression and gaze direction in a task that has fixed 
demands, response options, and chance performance rate (50%). Importantly, the mean score 
across the three matching tasks were similar and all three revealed large individual differences 
(Experiment 2). 
 
This method also provides another theoretical contribution, which is the relationship between 
face identity, emotional expression and gaze direction. It remains long-standing controversy in 
whether different aspects of face perception cleave together (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby 
et al. 2000) or interact with each other (e.g., Hadjikhani et al., 2008; Kaufmann & 
Schweinberger, 2004). Based on the same format of measurement in the thesis, the results 
provide more evidence supporting the view that invariant information (i.e., face identity) and 
changeable information (i.e., social signals such as emotional expression and gaze direction) are 
processed separately. Actual scores in the two changeable tasks (expression and gaze direction) 
were moderately correlated with each other, and neither was correlated with the invariant task 
(identity). From the perspective of overall performance, the results suggest that people who are 
good at face identity need not also be good at perception of changeable social signals from faces, 
and vice versa. 
 
5.2.2 Metacognition 
The experiments in this thesis are among the first to systematically examine metacognition in 
face processing. Together, they contribute to the literature in several ways. First and foremost, 
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the current work is the first to explicitly link DKE and egocentric bias to face processing. The 
results in this thesis showed that face processing might not be such a special domain that 
peoplecan naturally realize their bias. The two metacognitive illusions did exist in both familiar 
and unfamiliar face matching tasks (Experiment 1), also in other changeable face perception 
tasks (Experiment 2). The egocentric bias in peer assessment also existed in estimates of the 
salience of one’s own face-evoked thoughts (Chapter 4). The results of Chapter 3 also revealed 
a distinct form of egocentric bias, the bind spot bias, which is driven by an asymmetric 
consideration of evidence when evaluating oneself and others (Scopelliti et al., 2015). 
Specifically, people expected ORE to be stronger in other people than it actually was, but did 
not show this illusion in their own judgement. However, there are still some exceptions among 
top performers. Unlike in the classic DKE, top performers estimated their own test scores 
accurately rather than underestimating them in the familiar face identity, emotional expression 
and gaze direction matching tasks. Interestingly, performers in all four quartiles assessed their 
own performance at ceiling in those three tasks, with no cross over in the two changeable face 
perception tasks. Unlike the actual ceiling performance in the familiar face identity task (M = 
96, see Figure 2.2A), the mean estimated score of participants in each quartile were all above 
the actual scores in the two social signal tasks (see Figure 2.5B,C). One possible reason why 
people were so overconfident in the social tasks is that they seldom receive direct and immediate 
negative feedback from others if they fail to observe others’ emotion or interpret others’ gaze 
direction, compared with their errors in face identity. Future studies could focus on effects of 
feedback effect on overconfidence in these tasks. Given some neuroscience evidence supported 
that the changeable and invariant aspects of face perception are represented in different brain 
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regions (e.g., Bruce &Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000; Breen et al. 2000), it is also worth 
exploring whether this specialized module model also applies to metacognition performance. 
 
The thesis also contributes to research exploring familiarity advantages in metacognition for 
several aspects of face perception. Interestingly, although familiar faces showed great advantage 
at the cognitive level of face identity, poor performers still overestimated their performance in 
a familiar face matching task (Experiment 1). The egocentric bias was also present in familiar 
face identity matching (Experiment 1), and estimates of the salience of face-evoked thoughts 
(Experiments 5 and 7). The strikingly different findings of familiarity advantage at the cognitive 
level and the metacognitive level remains an interesting direction for future study. 
 
This thesis also makes methodological contributions to metacognition research. In Chapter 2, I 
tested perceived test score trial-by-trial instead of retrospectively (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). A 
number of metacognition experiments have used trial-by-trial measures in studies of emotional 
face recognition (Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011), other-race effect in face memory (Hourihan, 
Benjamin, & Liu, 2012; Rhodes, Sitzman, & Rowland, 2013) and movement memory (McIntosh 
et al., 2019). I used a 2-alternative force-choice (2AFC) question in the current trial-by-trial 
measure. Importantly, I did not directly ask participants whether they thought they got the 
answer right or wrong, such as asking whether they think they hit or missed the target in the 
movement and spatial memory task (McIntosh et al., 2019). Instead, I asked participants to judge 
whether they were sure or unsure with their answer, which was more in line with our actual 
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situation when being asked to estimate our own performance. The DKE still emerged in this 
context (Chapter 2), which also to some extent verified the stability of DKE. However, the 
benefits of this measurement technique only apply to studies that aim to gain a specific estimated 
score to compare with the actual score. As introduced in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.2), confidence 
can also be a useful measure across different domains. In Chapter 3, a scale from 50% to 100% 
was used in both learning and testing phases of the face memory task, with a low point of 50% 
given that chance responding would result in 50% accuracy on the old/new 2AFC recognition 
test (see Rhodes et al., 2013, for a similar procedure in the field of metacognition in ORE). 
Besides the concurrent measure in Chapter 3, the prospective and retrospective measures were 
also used. Consistent results across multiple metacognitive measures provides stronger evidence 
in  support of the conclusions. However, as I insisted in the General introduction, the 
corresponding measurement should be selected according to the research purpose. The 
prospective and concurrent measures are not suitable in the face association task. In Chapter 4, 
participants were encouraged to write as many face-evoked thoughts as they could, and were 
asked to make peer assessments only after completing this association phase. If they had known 
that each point they made required a peer estimate, that could potentially influence the number 
of points they wrote to some extent. They may also try to generate some more popular or 
common points and dismiss some special points. The retrospective measure I used in the current 
tasks avoids these concerns. The measurements on metacognition in face association still need 
to be further explored but the three dimensions used in the current work (numerosity, content 
and order) provide a useful precedent. 
 
5.3 Practical implications 
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The practical implications of the cognition and metacognition findings are deeply 
interconnected for several application contexts. Here, I discuss each implication according to 
the contexts of social interaction, clinical treatments and security and forensic settings. 
 
5.3.1 Social interaction 
Chapter 2 revealed large individual differences in different aspects of face perception. High 
performers presumed that others also performed well, according to their own excellent ability. 
If they could understand that others may be unskilled but unaware, misunderstandings may be 
reduced accordingly. On the other hand, those who perform well in one face task do not 
necessarily perform well in other face tasks (Experiment 2). Once people know this fact, they 
may better understand how someone could recognize them rapidly even they only met once 
before yet could not read their emotions correctly.  In the field of face memory, Chapter 3 
showed that people over-attributed the ORE in other people. This misjudgement could also be 
somewhat eliminated if they realize the fact that the accuracy of other people's face memory is 
determined more strongly by knowing the person’s face than by sharing the person’s race. 
Another phenomenon of concern is that people tend to overestimate the overlap between face-
evoked thoughts that are salient to them, and face-evoked thoughts that are salient to other 
people. This was the finding for both familiar and unfamiliar faces (Chapter 4). This finding 
provides evidence of false consensus effects (Ross et al., 1977), which refers to the tendency to 
assume that one’s own opinions and beliefs are relatively widespread through the general 
population. It is perhaps understandable that people tend to seek approval from others and would 
like to make friends with those who share the same opinions and beliefs with themselves. 
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Nevertheless, in other research (Dean, 2007), a companion bias emerged in people’s attitudes 
to those who did not share their choice. They assumed those who don’t agree with them are 
defective in some way, which is detrimental to social interaction.  
 
5.3.2  Clinical treatments 
Chapter 2 showed a significant “unskilled but unaware” pattern in low performers in multiple 
face perception tasks including familiar and unfamiliar face identity, emotional expression 
recognition and gaze direction recognition. This is in line with the previous research in 
prosopagnosia showing that people with developmental prosopagnosia sometimes have little 
knowledge of their impaired facial recognition abilities (e.g., Fine, 2012). Similarly, people with 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may not realize their lack of skills in reading social signals 
from faces (e.g., Bishop & Seltzer, 2012). As I mentioned in the General Introduction chapter, 
knowledge of knowledge can be as important as knowledge itself. If people can not be aware 
when they have more trouble than others in face perception, it is unlikely that they will seek for 
help (Yardley et al., 2008). The severe impact of social interaction could also lead to 
psychological consequences, such as the increased level of anxiety (Diaz, 2008). Thus, the 
current work suggests that a lack of awareness of the disorder is the premise of the disorder, 
which should be emphasised in clinical treatments for face perception deficits. 
 
5.3.3  Security and forensic settings 
Given that face perception plays an important role in security and forensic settings, this work 
also has some practical implications in these areas.  Eyewitness testimony is known to be 
 152 
unreliable, especially when the witness and suspect are of different races. In fact, eyewitness 
misidentification is the leading reason that innocent people are convicted (Scheck et al., 2000, 
Wells et al., 2006). In this context, the other-race effect plays a role that cannot be neglected. 
According to the meta-analysis of Meissner and Brigham (2001), eyewitnesses were 1.56 times 
more likely to misidentify in the other-race condition than in the same-race condition. Increased 
misidentification caused by race was also evident in the current thesis, both in an easy task with 
the same image in the learning and testing phases (Experiment 4) and in a hard task with 
different images in each phase (Experiment 5). However, the current work also revealed that 
when comparing the relative magnitude of ORE and familiarity effects, familiarity showed at 
least a three-fold dominance over race (Chapter 3). In other words, when witnessing a crime 
committed by someone with whom one is familiar (e.g., neighbors, colleagues and friends), an 
eyewitness identification could be somewhat reliable, even if the suspect and the eyewitness are 
of different races. Conversely, if the suspect is unfamiliar to the witness, identification is less 
likely to be reliable, irrespective of race. Until now, the relative impact of these two factors on 
face recognition performance has not been clear. People tend to over-attribute ORE, according 
to the peer assessment results in Chapter 3. Certainly, much more reality factors should be 
considered in the real-world eyewitness identifications, such as the decision time (Grabman et 
al., 2019), high stress (Deffenbacher et al. 2004) and individual differences in face identification 
ability (Bindemann et al., 2012). Therefore, this remains an interesting avenue for further field 
studies and the analysis of real cases if it is also possible to put the relative magnitude of the 
two factors in context. 
 
5.4  Future directions 
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This thesis extends research on metacognition into face processing and has discussed the 
relationship between the face processing level and the metacognition level in several aspects. 
However, there is still a lot more to learn in this field based on the evidence from this thesis. 
Besides what I have mentioned in this chapter, the first interesting question is what leads to the 
consistency of metacognition performance across different face matching tasks, despite the 
inconsistency of the performance at the cognition level. One possible direction is to explore 
whether this is a phenomenon that is specific to the face domain, or whether it is a domain 
general pattern. That is, to compare performance in face and non-face domains using a within-
subject design. My pilot work showed some potential evidence supporting the domain-general 
possibility. Participants were asked to complete both an unfamiliar face matching task (similar 
to the task in Chapter 2) and a flag and country matching task that used the same 2AFC paradigm. 
The results showed no correlation in actual performance across the two tasks, but a moderate 
correlation in their estimated performance [r (44) = .39, p < .01]. However, previous 
metacognitive research on intelligence has found that metacognitive skills are domain specific 
(Veenman & Spaans, 2005). Additional work concerning more detailed comparisons are needed 
to clarify the domain specificity or domain generality of metacognitive estimates. Another 
interesting perspective is whether there is any identifiable traits that underlie consistent 
performance estimates across different tasks. The effect of traits on self-assessments has been 
reported in other non-face domains (e.g., Ames & Kammrath, 2004; Soh & Jacobs, 2013). It is 
possible that underlying traits also play an important role in self-assessment across different 
aspects of face perception. Some related personality measures could be combined with face 
tasks in the future studies to see whether the same trait would predict metacognitive performance 
across several aspects in face perception. Furthermore, if consistency of metacognitive 
 154 
performance emerges across face tasks and non-face tasks, it would be interesting to test whether 
the same traits also predict metacognitive performance across face perception and other 
cognitive domains. 
 
Another unanswered question that emerges from the current work is how to improve 
metacognitive performance. How to avoid adverse consequences arising from the DKE and 
egocentric bias is a topic worth discussing. Are metacognitive biases in face processing 
amenable to training? Top performers underestimate their own performance relative to that of 
others. This misperception could potentially be corrected by simply showing them the responses 
of other people. The same intervention has no effect on poor performers, whose error is to 
overestimate their own skill (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In pilot work, I found a similar pattern 
for both low and high performers in a matching task for unfamiliar faces. For familiar face 
recognition, I expect that training may improve estimates of a particular person’s performance 
(for example, a person who is seen to recognize footballers but not musicians). However, such 
training effects should not generalize because different people know different faces. Perhaps 
more importantly, how can we improve the metacognitive performance of low performers who 
are unskilled but unaware? Different studies have examined improvement of metacognition, but 
so far, there is no general consensus. Some researchers put the emphasis on the importance of 
the cognition level. For example, in a logical reasoning task, Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
showed that training low performers’ cognition skills to a competitive level (to make them high 
performers) could improve their metacognition skills. However, no related evidence has been 
found in the improvement of metacognition in face identity research. For example, Alenezi and 
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Bindemann (2013) found no significant effect of trial-by-trial feedback. Conversely, by giving 
the feedback while the face remained onscreen, White et al. (2014) found that accuracy 
increased by 10%. As for professional training courses, Towler et al. (2019) found that 
professional facial image comparison training courses did not improve identification accuracy. 
Towler, White and Kemp (2020) found very little evidence that training the core face 
recognition system (e.g., the holistic perception processing) could improve face recognition or 
face matching accuracy based on evidence from training for facial image comparison 
practitioners, prosopagnosia patients and the general population. However, they encouraged 
researchers to further explore training methods from the feature-based route, that is, to promote 
feature-based strategies for extracting identity information from faces. These strategies are 
related to the cognition of cognition which is at the meta-level. Some researchers in non-face 
fields also stressed the importance of improving the metacognition level. They found that errors 
of overconfidence occurred at the metacognition level, instead of the memory level in a 
metamemory study (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). In addition, Butler, Karpicke & Roediger 
(2008) suggested that giving feedback could help correct metacognitive error based on two 
experiments of testing general knowledge facts. Further research is necessary to explore whether 
it can also apply to the domain of face perception. In addition to investigating solutions for 
debiasing self-assessments from both cognitive and metacognitive perspectives, ways to 
improve peer assessments also remain unknown. Krueger and Clement (1994) noted that 
egocentric bias was ineradicable even after standard debiasing strategies such as feedback and 
education. Since the egocentric bias refers to the fact that people would estimate other people’s 
performance according to their own, if people also made false judgement of their own 
performance, how would they estimate others’ performance correctly? Thus, whether peer 
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assessment could be debiased by improving self-assessment could be an interesting direction 
for future research. 
 
Another interesting question based on the findings from the current work is whether 
metacognitive judgement influences subsequent behavior. For example, if those who make 
higher self-assessments pay less attention to face perception or have less desire to improve 
relevant strategies in their daily life, compared with those with low confidence in their own face 
perception ability. Once low performers are aware of their incompetence in face perception, will 
they ask for help or spend more time on learning related strategies? When people feel low 
confidence in assessing other people’s social signals, will they ask for interpretation directly or 
remain silent? According to Nelson and Narens (1990), regulating some aspect of cognitive 
activity (metacognitive control) follows from assessing its current state (metacognitive monitor; 
see Table 1.1). Metacognitive control has been widely explored in learning and education (e.g., 
Azevedo, 2005; Anderson et al., 2006; Roebers et al., 2009).  There is now an opportunity for 
researchers to address the significant knowledge gap in the domain of face processing, not just 
to reveal the current assessment accuracy, but to improve our understanding of the way it can 
influence subsequent behavior. 
 
The current work also provide some points for research on face recognition algorithms. Studies 
of how humans perceive faces have been used to help design machine-based face recognition 
systems, which have already been deployed in many practical systems, e.g., at ports of entry at 
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international airports in Australia and Portugal (see the review of face recognition by computers 
and humans at Chellappa, Sinha & Philips, 2010).  With the rapid development of face 
recognition algorithms, more and more evidence shows that computers surpass humans on face 
matching in several conditions (e.g., Phillips et al. 2007; O'Toole et al. 2007; Tang & Wang, 
2004), and fusing humans and algorithms can lead to near-perfect accuracy (O'Toole et al. 2007). 
According to Towler, Kemp and White (2017), unfamiliar face matching in applied settings, 
such as photo ID issuance and forensic investigation, are made by chains of humans and 
computers together. For example, the investigator will firstly submit facial imagery of a suspect. 
Face matching algorithms then search the database and return highly similar identities to a facial 
reviewer, who then sends several potential matches to the investigator. Importantly, the step 
where a human checks the output of the algorithms’ database search can also lead to 
identification errors, even up to a 50% error rate, according to the results of the real-world task 
from White et al. (2015). On the other hand, face recognition algorithms also make errors. Given 
that humans show an ORE for face recognition, recent research also revealed a race bias in the 
face recognition algorithms (see Cavazos et al., 2020, for the review). For example, Phillips et 
al. (2011) found that algorithms developed in Western countries perform more accurately for 
Caucasian faces, whereas algorithms developed in East Asia perform more accurately for East 
Asian faces. The current work puts forward new directions for these phenomena from the 
perspective of metacognition, specifically, whether there is some bias when facial reviewers 
check the output from algorithms. For example, Chapter 3 revealed that people over-attribute 
the ORE in the performance of their peers. This raises the question of whether facial reviewers 




In sum, the current thesis has introduced metacognition to the field of face processing. It has not 
only enriched our psychological understanding of metacognition in different aspects of face 
processing, but also brought new insights into social interaction, forensic and other application 
settings. For the future, it would be good to see more developments start with these 
















Appendix A.  List of Celebrities in Chapter 3 
Black Celebrities 
Counterbalancing Version A. Alicia Keys, Beyoncé, Cardi B, Jada Pinkett Smith, Mel B, 
Oprah Winfrey, Serena Williams, Zendaya, Barack Obama, Drake, Dwayne Johnson, Idris 
Elba, Kendrick Lamar, Morgan Freeman, The Weeknd, will.i.am. 
 
Counterbalancing Version B. Ariana Grande, Jennifer Hudson, Kelly Rowland, Mariah Carey, 
Michelle Obama, Nicki Minaj, Rihanna, Whitney Houston, Eddie Murphy, Jay-Z, Kanye 
West, Kevin Hart, Michael B. Jordan, Samuel L. Jackson, Travis Scott, Will Smith. 
 
White Celebrities 
Counterbalancing Version A. Angelina Jolie, Ellen DeGeneres, Emma Watson, Hillary 
Clinton, Julia Roberts, Katy Perry, Kristen Stewart, Miley Cyrus, Benedict Cumberbatch, 
Chris Hemsworth, David Beckham, Harry Styles, Justin Bieber, Leonardo DiCaprio, Rowan 
Atkinson, Rupert Grint. 
 
Counterbalancing Version B. Theresa May, Emma Stone, Scarlett Johansson, Selena Gomez, 
Anne Hathaway, Adele, Lady Gaga, Taylor Swift, Brad Pitt, Daniel Radcliffe, Donald Trump, 
Ed Sheeran, Gary Barlow, Martin Freeman, Robert Downey Jr., Ryan Reynolds. 
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Appendix B.  List of Celebrities in Chapter 4 
Familiar celebrities. Andrew Lincoln, Avril Lavigne, David Beckham, Hillary Clinton, Mark 
Zuckerberg, Rupert Grint, Taylor Swift, Theresa May. 
 
Unfamiliar celebrities. Alexander Becht, Daniele Pecci, Helen Dalley, Mathias Lauridsen, 
























Achtziger, A., Martiny, S. E., Oettingen, G., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2012). Meta-cognitive 
processes in the self-regulation of goal pursuit. In P. B. & K. DeMarree. (Eds.), Social 
Meta-cognition. frontier of social psychology series (pp. 121–139). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press 
Alenezi, H. M., & Bindemann, M. (2013). The Effect of Feedback on Face-Matching 
Accuracy. In Applied Cognitive Psychology (Vol. 27, Issue 6, pp. 735–753).  
Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D. L., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. (1995). 
Personal contact, individuation, and the better-than-average effect. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 68(5), 804–825. 
Ames, D. R., & Kammrath, L. K. (2004). Mind-Reading and Metacognition: Narcissism, not 
Actual Competence, Predicts Self-Estimated Ability. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 
28(3), 187–209.  
Anderson, M. L., Oates, T., Chong, W., & Perlis, D. (2006). The metacognitive loop I: 
Enhancing reinforcement learning with metacognitive monitoring and control for 
improved perturbation tolerance. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial 
Intelligence: JETAI, 18(3), 387–411. 
Andrews, T. J., & Ewbank, M. P. (2004). Distinct representations for facial identity and 
changeable aspects of faces in the human temporal lobe. NeuroImage, 23(3), 905–913.  
 162 
Anson, I. G. (2018). Partisanship, political knowledge, and the Dunning-Kruger effect. 
Political Psychology, 39(5), 1173–1192.  
Arizpe, J. M., Saad, E., Douglas, A. O., Germine, L., Wilmer, J. B., & DeGutis, J. M. (2019). 
Self-reported face recognition is highly valid, but alone is not highly discriminative of 
prosopagnosia-level performance on objective assessments. Behavior Research Methods, 
51(3), 1102-1116.  
Aylward, E. H., Park, J. E., Field, K. M., Parsons, A. C., Richards, T. L., Cramer, S. C., & 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). Brain activation during face perception: evidence of a 
developmental change. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17(2), 308–319. 
Azevedo, R. (2005). Using Hypermedia as a Metacognitive Tool for Enhancing Student 
Learning? The Role of Self-Regulated Learning. Educational Psychologist, 40(4), 199–
209. 
Azevedo, R., Moos, D. C., Johnson, A. M., & Chauncey, A. D. (2010). Measuring Cognitive 
and Metacognitive Regulatory Processes During Hypermedia Learning: Issues and 
Challenges. Educational Psychologist, 45(4), 210–223. 
Bachmann, T., & Nurmoja, M. (2006). Are there affordances of suggestibility in facial 
appearance? Journal of Nonverbal Behavior.  
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997a). How to build a baby that can read minds: Cognitive mechanisms in 
mindreading. The Maladapted Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology, 
207–239. 
 163 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997b). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. MIT 
Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The “Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes” Test Revised Version: A Study with Normal Adults, and Adults with 
Asperger Syndrome or High-functioning Autism. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, 42(2), 241–251. 
Barragan-Jason, G., Lachat, F., & Barbeau, E. J. (2012). How Fast is Famous Face 
Recognition? Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 454. 
Banaji, M. R., & Dasgupta, N. (1998). The consciousness of social beliefs: A program of 
research on stereotyping and prejudice. In V. Y. Yzerbyt (Ed.), Metacognition: Cognitive 
and social dimensions , (pp (Vol. 253, pp. 157–170). 
Bartlett, M., & Whitehill, J. (2010). Automated facial expression measurement: Recent 
applications to basic research in human behavior, learning, and education. Handbook of 
Face Perception.  
Barzut, V., Markovic, S., & Zdravkovic, S. (2013). Face perception between race, gender and 
familiarity. Perception ECVP Abstract. 
Beaudoin, M., & Desrichard, O. (2011). Are memory self-efficacy and memory performance 
related? A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137(2), 211–241.  
Benton, T. R., Ross, D. F., Bradshaw, E., Thomas, W. N., & Bradshaw, G. S. (2006). 
 164 
Eyewitness memory is still not common sense: comparing jurors, judges and law 
enforcement to eyewitness experts. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(1), 115–129. 
Berry, D. S. (1991). Accuracy in social perception: contributions of facial and vocal 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(2), 298–307. 
Berry, D. S., & Brownlow, S. (1989). Were the physiognomists right? Personality correlates of 
facial babyishness. Personality and Social Psychology Review: An Official Journal of the 
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.  
Bindemann, M., Attard, J., & Johnston, R. A. (2014). Perceived ability and actual recognition 
accuracy for unfamiliar and famous faces. Cogent Psychology, 1(1), 986903.  
Bindemann, M., Brown, C., Koyas, T., & Russ, A. (2012). Individual differences in face 
identification postdict eyewitness accuracy. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 1(2), 96–103. 
Bishop, S. L., & Seltzer, M. M. (2012). Self-reported autism symptoms in adults with autism 
spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 42(11), 2354–2363. 
Blauch, N. M., Behrmann, M., & Plaut, D. C. (2020). Computational insights into human 
perceptual expertise for familiar and unfamiliar face recognition. Cognition, 104341. 
Bobak, A. K., Mileva, V. R., & Hancock, P. J. B. (2019). Facing the facts: Naive participants 
have only moderate insight into their face recognition and face perception abilities. In 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (Vol. 72, Issue 4, pp. 872–881).   
 165 
Bonnen, K., Klare, B. F., & Jain, A. K. (2013). Component-Based Representation in 
Automated Face Recognition. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 
8(1), 239–253. 
Botwin, M. D., Buss, D. M., & Shackelford, T. K. (1997). Personality and mate preferences: 
five factors in mate selection and marital satisfaction. Journal of Personality, 65(1), 107–
136. 
Bower, G. H., & Karlin, M. B. (1974). Depth of processing pictures of faces and recognition 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 103(4), 751–757. 
Breen, N., Caine, D., & Coltheart, M. (2000). Models of face recognition and delusional 
misidentification: a critical review. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17(1), 55–71. 
Brewer, N., & Wells, G. L. (2011). Eyewitness identification. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 20(1), 24–27. 
Brewer, W. F., & Sampaio, C. (2012). The metamemory approach to confidence: A test using 
semantic memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 67(1), 59–77. 
Brown, A. L. (1977). Development, schooling and the acquisition of knowing about 
knowledge. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E. Montague (Eds.), Schooling and the 
acquisition of knowledge (pp. 241-253). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum A 
 166 
Brown, A. L. (1978). Knowing when, where and, how to remember: A problem of 
metacognition. Advances in Instructional Psychology, 1. 
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/10012502747/ 
Brown, A. S. (1991). A review of the tip-of-the-tongue experience. Psychological Bulletin, 
109(2), 204–223. 
Bruce, V. (1982). Changing faces: Visual and non‐visual coding processes in face recognition. 
British Journal of Psychology, 73(1), 105–116. 
Bruce, V., Burton, A. M., Hanna, E., Healey, P., Mason, O., Coombes, A., Fright, R. & 
Linney, A. (1993). Sex discrimination: how do we tell the difference between male and 
female faces? Perception, 22(2), 131–152. 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., Greenwood, K., Hancock, P. J. B., Burton, A. M., & Miller, P. 
(1999). Verification of face identities from images captured on video. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Applied, 5(4), 339. 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., & Newman, C. (2001). Matching identities of familiar and 
unfamiliar faces caught on CCTV images. Journal of Experimental, 7(3), 207–18. 
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of 
Psychology , 77 (3), 305–327. 
Bui, N. H. (2012). False consensus in attitudes toward celebrities. Psychology of Popular 
Media Culture, 1(4), 236–243. 
 167 
Burton, A. M., Bruce, V., & Dench, N. (1993). What's the difference between men and 
women? Evidence from facial measurement. Perception, 22(2), 153–176. 
Burton, A. M., Bruce, V., & Hancock, P. J. B. (1999). From pixels to people: A model of 
familiar face recognition. Cognitive Science. 23(1), 1–31. 
Burton, A. M., White, D., & McNeill, A. (2010). The Glasgow Face Matching Test. Behavior 
Research Methods, 42(1), 286–291.  
Burton, A. M., Jenkins, R., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2011). Mental representations of familiar 
faces. British Journal of Psychology, 102(4), 943–958. 
Burton, A. M., Wilson, S., Cowan, M., & Bruce, V. (1999). Face Recognition in Poor-Quality 
Video: Evidence from Security Surveillance. Psychological Science, 10(3), 243–248.  
Butler, A. C., Karpicke, J. D., & Roediger, H. L. (2008). Correcting a metacognitive error: 
feedback increases retention of low-confidence correct responses. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34(4), 918–928. 
Calder, A. J., Lawrence, A. D., Keane, J., Scott, S. K., Owen, A. M., Christoffels, I., & Young, 
A. W. (2002). Reading the mind from eye gaze. Neuropsychologia, 40(8), 1129–1138.  
Calder, A., Rhodes, G., Johnson, M., & Haxby, J. (2011). Oxford Handbook of Face 
Perception. OUP Oxford. 
Calvo, M. G., & Lundqvist, D. (2008). Facial expressions of emotion (KDEF): identification 
 168 
under different display-duration conditions. Behavior Research Methods, 40(1), 109–115.  
Campanella, S., & Belin, P. (2007). Integrating face and voice in person perception. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(12), 535–543. 
Cavanaugh, J. C., & Perlmutter, M. (1982). Metamemory: A Critical Examination. Child 
Development, 53(1), 11–28. 
Cavazos, J. G., Phillips, P. J., Castillo, C. D., & O’Toole, A. J. (2020). Accuracy comparison 
across face recognition algorithms: Where are we on measuring race bias? 
arXiv:1912.07398, 12 2019. 
Chellappa, R., Sinha, P., & Phillips, P. J. (2010). Face Recognition by Computers and 
Humans. Computer, 43(2), 46–55. 
Clutterbuck, R., & Johnston, R. A. (2004). Matching as an index of face familiarity. In Visual 
Cognition (Vol. 11, Issue 7, pp. 857–869).  
Corrow, S. L., Davies-Thompson, J., Fletcher, K., Hills, C., Corrow, J. C., & Barton, J. J. S. 
(2019). Training face perception in developmental prosopagnosia through perceptual 
learning. Neuropsychologia, 134, 107196. 
Davies, S., Bishop, D., Manstead, A. S., & Tantam, D. (1994). Face perception in children 
with autism and Asperger’s syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and 
Allied Disciplines, 35(6), 1033–1057. 
 169 
Dahl, C. D., Rasch, M. J., Tomonaga, M., & Adachi, I. (2013). Developmental processes in 
face perception. Scientific Reports, 3, 1044. 
Dalrymple, K. A., Garrido, L., & Duchaine, B. (2014). Dissociation between face perception 
and face memory in adults, but not children, with developmental prosopagnosia. 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 10–20. 
Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Van Hoesen, G. W. (1982). Prosopagnosia: anatomic basis 
and behavioral mechanisms. Neurology, 32(4), 331–341. 
Dean, J. (2007). Why we all stink as intuitive psychologists: The False Consensus Bias". 
PsyBlog. Retrieved 2007-11-13. 
Deffenbacher, K. A., Bornstein, B. H., Penrod, S. D., & McGorty, E. K. (2004). A meta-
analytic review of the effects of high stress on eyewitness memory. Law and Human 
Behavior, 28(6), 687–706. 
DeGutis, J. M., Chiu, C., Grosso, M. E., & Cohan, S. (2014). Face processing improvements 
in prosopagnosia: successes and failures over the last 50 years. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 8, 561. 
De Deyne, S., Navarro, D. J., Perfors, A., Brysbaert, M., & Storms, G. (2019). The “Small 
World of Words” English word association norms for over 12,000 cue words. Behavior 
Research Methods, 51(3), 987–1006. 
 170 
De Heering, A., Rossion, B., Maurer, D. (2012). Developmental changes in face recognition 
during childhood: Evidence from upright and inverted faces. Cognitive Development, 27, 
17–27. 
Desimone, R. (1991). Face-selective cells in the temporal cortex of monkeys. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 3(1), 1–8. 
Diaz, A. L. (2008). Do I know you? A case study of prosopagnosia (face blindness). The 
Journal of School Nursing: The Official Publication of the National Association of 
School Nurses, 24(5), 284–289. 
Dimaggio, G., Lysaker, P. H., Carcione, A., Nicolò, G., & Semerari, A. (2008). Know yourself 
and you shall know the other… to a certain extent: Multiple paths of influence of self-
reflection on mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(3), 778–789.  
Dimaggio, G., Semerari, A., Falcone, M., Nicolo, G., Carcione, A., & Procacci, M. (2002). 
Metacognition, states of mind, cognitive biases, and interpersonal cycles: Proposal for an 
integrated narcissism model. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 12(4), 421. 
Duchaine, B., Jenkins, R., Germine, L., & Calder, A. J. (2009). Normal gaze discrimination 
and adaptation in seven prosopagnosics. Neuropsychologia, 47(10), 2029–2036.  
Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2006). The Cambridge Face Memory Test: results for 
neurologically intact individuals and an investigation of its validity using inverted face 
stimuli and prosopagnosic participants. Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 576–585. 
 171 
Dunning, D., Johnson, K., Ehrlinger, J., & Kruger, J. (2003). Why People Fail to Recognize 
Their Own Incompetence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(3), 83–87.  
Dunn, J. D., Summersby, S., Towler, A., Davis, J. P., & White, D. (2020). UNSW Face Test: 
A screening tool for super-recognizers. PloS One, 15(11), e0241747. 
Edens, K., & Potter, E. (2007). The Relationship of Drawing and Mathematical Problem 
Solving: Draw for Math Tasks. Studies in Art Education, 48(3), 282–298. 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1976). Pictures of Facial Affect. Consulting psychologists Press. 
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Ellsworth, P. (1972). CHAPTER II - How Do We Determine 
whether Judgments of Emotion Are Accurate? In P. Ekman, W. V. Friesen, & P. 
Ellsworth (Eds.), Emotion in the Human Face (Vol. 11, pp. 15–19). Pergamon.  
Ellis, H. D., Shepherd, J. W., & Davies, G. M. (1979). Identification of familiar and unfamiliar 
faces from internal and external features: Some implications for theories of face 
recognition. Perception, 8(4), 431–9. 
Ellis, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1992). Self as an Epistemic Authority: Effects on Experiential 
and Instructional Learning. Social Cognition, 10(4), 357–375. 
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, M., & Tanaka, J. N. (1998). What is“ special” about face 
perception? Psychological Review. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/105/3/482/ 
Farroni, T., Johnson, M. H., Menon, E., Zulian, L., Faraguna, D., & Csibra, G. (2005). 
 172 
Newborns’ preference for face-relevant stimuli: effects of contrast polarity. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102(47), 17245–
17250.  
Feld, J., Sauermann, J., & de Grip, A. (2017). Estimating the relationship between skill and 
overconfidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 68, 18–24.  
Fernbach, P., & Sloman, S. (2017). The knowledge illusion. Penguin. 
Fine, D. R. (2012). A life with prosopagnosia. Cognitive neuropsychology, 29(5-6), 354-359.  
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive--
developmental inquiry. The American Psychologist, 34(10), 906. 
Fleming, S. M., & Lau, H. C. (2014). How to measure metacognition. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 8, 443. 
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2012). Metacognition: computation, biology and 
function. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 367(1594), 1280–1286.  
Freeman, J. B., & Ambady, N. (2011). When two become one: Temporally dynamic 
integration of the face and voice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(1), 259–
263. 
Friesen, C. K., & Kingstone, A. (1998). The eyes have it! Reflexive orienting is triggered by 
 173 
nonpredictive gaze. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5(3), 490–495.  
Frith, C. D. (2012). The role of metacognition in human social interactions. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 367(1599), 
2213–2223. 
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (1999). Interacting minds--a biological basis. Science, 286(5445), 
1692–1695. 
Fuocco, M. A. (1996, March 21). Trial and error: They had larceny in their hearts, but little in 
their heads. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, p. Dl. 
Furnham, A., & Boo, H. C. (2011). A literature review of the anchoring effect. The Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 40(1), 35–42. 
Fussell, S. R., & Krauss, R. M. (1989). The effects of intended audience on message 
production and comprehension: Reference in a common ground framework. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 25(3), 203–219. 
Gage, N. M., & Baars, B. (2018). Fundamentals of Cognitive Neuroscience: A Beginner’s 
Guide.  
Ge, L., Luo, J., Nishimura, M., & Lee, K. (2003). The lasting impression of chairman Mao: 
hyperfidelity of familiar-face memory. Perception, 32(5), 601–614. 
 174 
Germine, L., Russell, R., Bronstad, P. M., Blokland, G. A., Smoller, J. W., Kwok, H., 
Anthony, S. E., Nakayama, K., Rhodes, G., & Wilmer, J. B. (2015). Individual aesthetic 
preferences for faces are shaped mostly by environments, not genes. Current Biology, 
25(20), 2684–2689. 
Gignac, G. E., & Zajenkowski, M. (2020). The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical 
artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data. 
Intelligence, 80, 101449.  
Gilovich, T., Medvec, V. H., & Savitsky, K. (2000). The spotlight effect in social judgment: 
an egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one's own actions and appearance. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(2), 211–222. 
Goodman, L. A., & Kruskal, W. H. (1979). Measures of Association for Cross Classifications. 
In L. A. Goodman & W. H. Kruskal (Eds.), Measures of Association for Cross 
Classifications (pp. 2–34). Springer New York. 
Goren, C. C., Sarty, M., & Wu, P. Y. (1975). Visual following and pattern discrimination of 
face-like stimuli by newborn infants. Pediatrics, 56(4), 544–549. 
Couchman, J. J., Coutinho, M. V. C., Beran, M. J., & David Smith, J. (2009). Metacognition is 
prior. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2), 142–142. 
Grabman, J. H., Dobolyi, D. G., & Berelovich, N. L. (2019). Predicting high confidence errors 
in eyewitness memory: The role of face recognition ability, decision-time, and 
justifications. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 8, 233–243. 
 175 
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. 
The American Psychologist, 35(7), 603.  
Gross, C. G., Rocha-Miranda, C. E., & Bender, D. B. (1972). Visual properties of neurons in 
inferotemporal cortex of the Macaque. Journal of Neurophysiology, 35(1), 96–111. 
Haan, E. H. F., Young, A., & Newcombe, F. (1987). Face recognition without awareness. 
Cognitive Neuropsychology. 
Hacker, D. J., Dunlosky, J., & Graesser, A. C. (2009). Handbook of Metacognition in 
Education. Routledge. 
Hadjikhani, N., Hoge, R., Snyder, J., & de Gelder, B. (2008). Pointing with the eyes: the role 
of gaze in communicating danger. Brain and Cognition, 68(1), 1–8. 
Hancock, P. J., Bruce, V., V., & Burton, A. M. (2000). Recognition of unfamiliar faces. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(9), 330–337. 
Hancock, J. T., & Toma, C. L. (2009). Putting your best face forward: The accuracy of online 
dating photographs. Journal of Communication, 59(2), 367–386. 
Hanley, J. R., Pearson, N. A., & Young, A. W. (1990). Impaired memory for new visual 
forms. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 113 ( Pt 4), 1131–1148. 
 176 
Hardin, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social verification makes the 
subjective objective. In R. M. Sorrentino (Ed.), Handbook of motivation and cognition, 
Vol (Vol. 3, pp. 28–84). The Guilford Press, xxvi. 
Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 56(4), 208–216. 
Hart, A. J., Whalen, P. J., Shin, L. M., McInerney, S. C., Fischer, H., & Rauch, S. L. (2000). 
Differential response in the human amygdala to racial outgroup vs ingroup face stimuli. 
Neuroreport, 11(11), 2351–2355. 
Haugtvedt, C. P., & Wegener, D. T. (1994). Message Order Effects in Persuasion: An Attitude 
Strength Perspective. The Journal of Consumer Research, 21(1), 205–218.  
Haxby, J. V., & Gobbini, M. (2007). The perception of emotion and social cues in faces. 
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-22475-001 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human neural system 
for face perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 223–233. 
Hay, D. C., Young, A. W., & Ellis, A. W. (1991). Routes through the face recognition system. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 43(4), 761–791. 
Hayashi, H., & Nishikawa, M. (2019). Egocentric bias in emotional understanding of children 
and adults. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 185, 224–235. 
 177 
Hegarty, M., & Kozhevnikov, M. (1999). Types of visual–spatial representations and 
mathematical problem solving. Journal of Educational Psychology, 91(4), 684–689. 
Hehman, E., Sutherland, C. A., Flake, J. K., & Slepian, M. L. (2017). The unique 
contributions of perceiver and target characteristics in person perception. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 113(4), 513–529. 
Herlitz, A., & Yonker, J. E. (2002). Sex differences in episodic memory: the influence of 
intelligence. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 24(1), 107–114. 
Heyes, C. M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. The Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 21(1), 101–114; discussion 115–148. 
Hills, P. J. (2012). A developmental study of the own-age face recognition bias in children. 
Developmental Psychology, 48(2), 499–508. 
Hinds, P. J. (1999). The curse of expertise: The effects of expertise and debiasing methods on 
prediction of novice performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Applied, 5(2), 
205–221.  
Hole, G., & Bourne, V. (2010). Face Processing: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and 
Applied Perspectives. OUP Oxford. 
Hoffman, E. A., & Haxby, J. V. (2000). Distinct representations of eye gaze and identity in the 
distributed human neural system for face perception. Nature Neuroscience, 3(1), 80–84.  
 178 
Hollingworth, H. L. (1922). Judging human character. 
Hönekopp, J. (2006). Once more: is beauty in the eye of the beholder? Relative contributions 
of private and shared taste to judgments of facial attractiveness. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32(2), 199–209. 
Ho, S., Foulsham, T., & Kingstone, A. (2015). Speaking and Listening with the Eyes: Gaze 
Signaling during Dyadic Interactions. PloS One, 10(8), e0136905. 
Hourihan, K. L., Benjamin, A. S., & Liu, X. (2012). A cross-race effect in metamemory: 
Predictions of face recognition are more accurate for members of our own race. Journal 
of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1(3), 158–162. 
Hu, X., Liu, Z., Li, T., & Luo, L. (2016). Influence of cue word perceptual information on 
metamemory accuracy in judgement of learning. Memory , 24(3), 383–398. 
Ickes, W., Stinson, L., Bissonnette, V., & Garcia, S. (1990). Naturalistic social cognition: 
Empathic accuracy in mixed-sex dyads. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
59(4), 730–742. 
Jenkins, R., Beaver, J. D., & Calder, A. J. (2006). I thought you were looking at me: direction-
specific aftereffects in gaze perception. Psychological Science, 17(6), 506–513.  
Jenkins, R., & Burton, A. M. (2008). 100% accuracy in automatic face recognition. Science, 
319(5862), 435–435. 
 179 
Jenkins, R., Dowsett, A. J., & Burton, A. M. (2018). How many faces do people know? 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 285(1888), 20181319. 
Jenkins, R., & Kerr, C. (2013). Identifiable images of bystanders extracted from corneal 
reflections. PloS One, 8(12), e83325.  
Jenkins, R., White, D., Van Montfort, X., & Mike Burton, A. (2011). Variability in photos of 
the same face. Cognition, 121(3), 313–323. 
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches 
between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310(5745), 116–119.  
John, D., & Janet, M. (2009). Metacognition. Sage Publications, Amerika. 
Johnson, M. H., Dziurawiec, S., Ellis, H., & Morton, J. (1991). Newborns’ preferential 
tracking of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline. Cognition, 40(1-2), 1–19. 
Johnson, M. H. (2005). Subcortical face processing. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 6(10), 
766–774.  
Johnston, R. A., & Edmonds, A. J. (2009). Familiar and unfamiliar face recognition: a review. 
Memory , 17(5), 577–596. 
Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Nelson, T. O. (1998). Social Metacognition: An Expansionist 
Review. In Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2(2), 137–154.  
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. 
 180 
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: a module in 
human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. The Journal of Neuroscience: 
The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 17(11), 4302–4311. 
Kanwisher, N., & Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: a cortical region specialized for 
the perception of faces. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series 
B, Biological Sciences, 361(1476), 2109–2128.  
Kaufmann, J. M., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2004). Expression influences the recognition of 
familiar faces. Perception, 33(4), 399–408. 
Kelley, C. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (1996). Adult Egocentrism: Subjective Experience versus 
Analytic Bases for Judgment. Journal of Memory and Language, 35(2), 157–175.  
Kelly, K. J., & Metcalfe, J. (2011). Metacognition of emotional face recognition. Emotion , 
11(4), 896–906. 
Kemp, R., Pike, G., White, P., & Musselman, A. (1996). Perception and recognition of normal 
and negative faces: the role of shape from shading and pigmentation cues. Perception, 
25(1), 37–52.  
Keysar B, Lin S, Barr DJ. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition. 89(1), 
25-41. 
Klatzky, R. L., & Forrest, F. H. (1984). Recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces. Memory & 
Cognition, 12, 60–70. 
 181 
Kleitman, S., & Stankov, L. (2001). Response selection strategies, metacognitive beliefs, and 
Confidence: An individual differences perspective. Published Proceedings of the 
Inaugural International Conference: Self-Concept Theory, Research and Practice: 
Advances for the New Millennium, Sydney, Blue Mountains, 5--6 October, Australia. 
Krueger, J., & Clement, R. W. (1994). The truly false consensus effect: an ineradicable and 
egocentric bias in social perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
67(4), 596–610. 
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing 
one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121–1134.  
Kuhn, D. (1983). On the Dual Executive and Its Significance in the Development of 
Developmental Psychology. In On the Development of Developmental Psychology (Vol. 
8, pp. 81–110). Karger Publishers. 
Kuhn, D. (2000). Theory of mind, metacognition, and reasoning: A life-span perspective. 
Children’s Reasoning and the Mind, 301–326. 
Kunimoto, C., Miller, J., & Pashler, H. (2001). Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold 
discrimination responses. Consciousness and Cognition, 10(3), 294–340. 
Laidlaw, K. E. W., & Kingstone, A. (2017). Fixations to the eyes aids in facial encoding; 
covertly attending to the eyes does not. Acta Psychologica, 173, 55–65. 
 182 
Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009). What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical 
review of neuroimaging results. Psychological Review, 116(1), 252–282. 
Leopold, D. A., & Rhodes, G. (2010). A comparative view of face perception. Journal of 
Comparative Psychology. https://psycnet.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/a0019460 
Lindsay, R. C. L., Mansour, J. K., Bertrand, M. I. Kalmet, N. & Melsom, E. I. (2011). Face 
recognition in eyewitness memory. In A. J. Calder, G. Rhodes, M. H. Johnson, & J. V. 
Haxby (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Face Perception (pp. 307–328). Oxford 
University Press. 
Livingston, L. A., & Shah, P. (2018). People with and without prosopagnosia have insight into 
their face recognition ability. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , 71(5), 
1260–1262.  
MacLin, O. H., & Malpass, R. S. (2001). Racial categorization of faces: The ambiguous race 
face effect. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7(1), 98–118.  
Mahmood, K. (2016). Do people overestimate their information literacy skills? A systematic 
review of empirical evidence on the Dunning-Kruger effect. Communications in 
Information Literacy, 10(2), 3. 
Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2012). A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating 
metacognitive sensitivity from confidence ratings. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 
422–430. 
 183 
Mason, S. E. (1986). Age and gender as factors in facial recognition and identification. 
Experimental Aging Research, 12(3), 151–154. 
Martinez, A. M. (2017). Computational Models of Face Perception. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 26(3), 263–269. 
Martinez, M. E. (2006). What is metacognition? Phi Delta Kappan, 87(9), 696–699. 
Mazancieux, A., Fleming, S. M., Souchay, C., & Moulin, C. (2018). Retrospective confidence 
judgments across tasks: domain-general processes underlying metacognitive accuracy. 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/dr7ba 
Metcalfe, J., & Dunlosky, J. (2009). Metacognition: A textbook for cognitive, educational, life 
span & applied psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
McKone, E., & Robbins, R. (2011). Are Faces Special? In Calder, A., Rhodes, G., Johnson, 
M., & Haxby, J. (Eds.). (2011). Oxford handbook of face perception. Oxford University 
Press. (pp. 149–176).   
McIntosh, R. D., Fowler, E. A., Lyu, T., & Della Sala, S. (2019). Wise up: Clarifying the role 
of metacognition in the Dunning-Kruger effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
General, 148(11), 1882–1897.  
McNeill, D. (1966). A study of word association. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 5, 548–557.  
 184 
Megreya, A. M., & Burton, A. M. (2006). Unfamiliar faces are not faces: Evidence from a 
matching task. Memory & Cognition, 34, 865–876. 
Meichenbaum, D., & Asarnow, J. (1979). Cognitive-behavioral modification and 
metacognitive development: Implications for the classroom. Cognitive-Behavioral 
Interventions: Theory, Research, and Procedures, 11–35. 
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001). Thirty years of investigating the own-race bias in 
memory for faces: A meta-analytic review. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7(1), 3–
35. 
Merluzzi, T. V., Rudy, T. E., & Glass, C. R. (1981). The information processing paradigm: 
Implications for clinical science. Cognitive Assessment, 77–124. 
Minear, M., & Park, D. C. (2004). A lifespan database of adult facial stimuli. Behavior 
Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers: A Journal of the Psychonomic Society, 
Inc, 36(4), 630–633. 
Moon, H., & Phillips, P. J. (2001). Computational and performance aspects of PCA-based 
face-recognition algorithms. Perception, 30(3), 303–321. 
Morton, J., & Johnson, M. H. (1991). CONSPEC and CONLERN: a two-process theory of 
infant face recognition. Psychological Review, 98(2), 164–181.  
Motta, M., Callaghan, T., & Sylvester, S. (2018). Knowing less but presuming more: 
Dunning-Kruger effects and the endorsement of anti-vaccine policy attitudes. Social 
 185 
Science & Medicine, 211, 274–281.  
Mouchetant-Rostaing, Y., Giard, M. H., Bentin, S., Aguera, P. E., & Pernier, J. (2000). 
Neurophysiological correlates of face gender processing in humans. European Journal 
of Neuroscience, 12, 303–310. 
Nakashima, S. F., Langton, S. R. H., & Yoshikawa, S. (2012). The effect of facial expression 
and gaze direction on memory for unfamiliar faces. Cognition & Emotion, 26(7), 1316–
1325. 
Natu, V., & O’Toole, A. J. (2011). The neural processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces: A 
review and synopsis. British Journal of Psychology, 102(4), 726–747. 
Neil v. Biggers (1972). 409 U.S. 188. 
Nelson, T. and Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: a theoretical framework and new findings. 
The psychology of learning and motivation, 26:125–173. 
Nelson, T. O., Kruglanski, A. W., & Jost, J. T. (1998). Knowing thyself and others: Progress 
in metacognitive social psychology. In V. Y. Yzerbyt (Ed.), Metacognition: Cognitive 
and social dimensions , (pp (Vol. 253, pp. 69–89). 
Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141–161. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220. 
 186 
Nikolov, D., Oliveira, D. F., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2015). Measuring online social 
bubbles. PeerJ Computer Science, 1, e38. 
Nissen, H. B., & Henriksen, B. (2006). Word class influence on word association test results. 
International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 16, 389–408. 
Njemanze, P. (2004). Transcranial doppler spectroscopy for assessment of brain cognitive 
functions (USPTO Patent No. 20040158155:A1). In US Patent (No. 20040158155:A1).  
Noyes, E., & Jenkins, R. (2017). Camera-to-subject distance affects face configuration and 
perceived identity. Cognition, 165, 97–104.  
Noyes, E., & Jenkins, R. (2019). Deliberate disguise in face identification. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Applied, 25(2), 280–290.  
Olivola, C. Y., & Todorov, A. (2010). Elected in 100 milliseconds: Appearance-based trait 
inferences and voting. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 34(2), 83–110. 
Oosterhof, N. N., & Todorov, A. (2008). The functional basis of face evaluation. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(32), 11087–11092. 
Oruc, I., Balas, B., & Landy, M. S. (2019). Face perception: A brief journey through recent 
discoveries and current directions. Vision Research, 157, 1–9. 
 187 
O’Toole, A. J. (2011). Cognitive and computational approaches to face recognition. In A. J. 
Calder, G. Rhodes, M. H. Johnson, & J. V. Haxby (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of face 
perception (pp. 15–30). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
O’Toole, A. J., Deffenbacher, K. A., Valentin, D., & Abdi, H. (1994). Structural aspects of 
face recognition and the other-race effect. Memory & Cognition, 22(2), 208–224. 
Palermo, R., Rossion, B., Rhodes, G., Laguesse, R., Tez, T., Hall, B., Albonico, A., 
Malaspina, M., Daini, R., Irons, J., Al-Janabi, S., Taylor, L. C., Rivolta, D., & McKone, 
E. (2017). Do people have insight into their face recognition abilities? Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology , 70(2), 218–233.  
Peirce, J. W. (2007). PsychoPy—Psychophysics software in Python. Journal of Neuroscience 
Methods, 162(1–2), 8–13.  
Peirce, J. W. (2008). Generating Stimuli for Neuroscience Using PsychoPy. Frontiers in 
Neuroinformatics, 2, 10.  
Peirce, J., Gray, J. R., Simpson, S., MacAskill, M., Höchenberger, R., Sogo, H., Kastman, E., 
& Lindeløv, J. K. (2019). PsychoPy2: Experiments in behavior made easy. Behavior 
Research Methods, 51(1), 195–203. 
Peirce, C. S., & Jastrow, J. (1884). On small differences in sensation. 
https://philarchive.org/archive/PEIOSD 
Pennycook, G., Ross, R. M., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2017). Dunning–Kruger 
 188 
effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(6), 1774–1784.  
Penton-Voak, I. S., Pound, N., Little, A. C., & Perrett, D. I. (2006). Personality judgments 
from natural and composite facial images: More evidence for a “kernel of truth” in social 
perception. Social Cognition, 24(5), 607–640. 
Persaud, N., McLeod, P., & Cowey, A. (2007). Post-decision wagering objectively measures 
awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 10(2), 257–261. 
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Tormala, Z. L., & Wegener, D. T. (2007). The role of meta-cognition 
in social judgment. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: 
Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 254– 284). New York, NY: Guilford. 
Phelps, E.A., O'Connor, K.J., Cunningham, W.A., Funayama, E.S., Gatenby, J.C., Gore, J.C., 
Banaji, M.R. (2000). Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts 
Amygdala Activation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 729–738. 
Phillips, P. J., Boyer, K. W., Flynn, P. J., O’Toole, A. J., Phillips, P. J., Schott, C. L., Scruggs, 
W. T., & Sharpe, M. (2007). FRVT 2006 and ICE 2006 large-scale results. Technical 
Report NISTIR 7408, NIST, 2007. 
Phillips, P. J., Jiang, F., Narvekar, A., Ayyad, J., & O’Toole, A. J. (2011). An other-race effect 
for face recognition algorithms. ACM Transactions on Applied Perception, 8(2), 1–11. 
Phillips, P. J., Jonathon Phillips, P., Yates, A. N., Hu, Y., Hahn, C. A., Noyes, E., Jackson, K., 
 189 
Cavazos, J. G., Jeckeln, G., Ranjan, R., Sankaranarayanan, S., Chen, J.-C., Castillo, C. D., 
Chellappa, R., White, D., & O’Toole, A. J. (2018). Face recognition accuracy of forensic 
examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms. In Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (Vol. 115, Issue 24, pp. 6171–6176).  
Phillips, P. J., Yates, A. N , Hu, Y., Hahn, C. A., Noyes, E., Jackson, K., Cavazos J. G., 
Jeckeln, G., Ranjan, R., Sankaranarayanan, S., Chen, J, Castillo, C. D., Chellappa, R., 
White, D., & O’Toole, A. J. (2018). Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, 
superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 115(24), 6171–6176. 
Pitcher, D., Walsh, V., & Duchaine, B. (2011). The role of the occipital face area in the 
cortical face perception network. Experimental Brain Research. Experimentelle 
Hirnforschung. Experimentation Cerebrale, 209(4), 481–493. 
Pound, N., Penton-Voak, I. S., & Brown, W. M. (2007). Facial symmetry is positively 
associated with self-reported extraversion. Personality and Individual Differences, 
43(6), 1572–1582. 
Pronin, E. (2007). Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences.11(1), 37–43. 
Ramon, M., Caharel, S., & Rossion, B. (2011). The speed of recognition of personally familiar 
faces. Perception, 40(4), 437–449. 
 190 
Ramon, M., Sokhn, N., & Caldara, R. (2019). Decisional space modulates visual 
categorization–Evidence from saccadic reaction times. Cognition, 186, 42–49. 
Ranjan, R., Sankaranarayanan, S., Bansal, A., Bodla, N., Chen, J., Patel, V. M., Castillo, C. 
D., & Chellappa, R. (2018). Deep Learning for Understanding Faces: Machines May Be 
Just as Good, or Better, than Humans. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 35(1), 66–83.  
Rausch, M., Müller, H. J., & Zehetleitner, M. (2015). Metacognitive sensitivity of subjective 
reports of decisional confidence and visual experience. Consciousness and Cognition, 35, 
192–205. 
Rhodes, M. G., & Anastasi, J. S. (2012). The own-age bias in face recognition: a meta-analytic 
and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin, 138(1), 146–174. 
Rhodes, M. G., Sitzman, D. M., & Rowland, C. A. (2013). Monitoring and control of learning 
own-race and other-race faces. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(5), 553–563. 
Riddoch, M. J., Johnston, R. A., Martyn Bracewell, R., Boutsen, L., & Humphreys, G. W. 
(2008). Are faces special? A case of pure prosopagnosia. In Cognitive Neuropsychology 
(Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 3–26).  
Ritchie, K. L., Kramer, R. S., & Burton, A. M. (2018). What makes a face photo a ‘good 
likeness’? Cognition, 170, 1–8. 
Ritchie, K. L., Smith, F. G., Jenkins, R., Bindemann, M., White, D., & Burton, A. M. (2015). 
Viewers base estimates of face matching accuracy on their own familiarity: Explaining 
 191 
the photo-ID paradox. Cognition, 141, 161–169.  
Robertson, D. J., Noyes, E., Dowsett, A. J., Jenkins, R., & Burton, A. M. (2016). Face 
Recognition by Metropolitan Police Super-Recognisers. PloS One, 11(2), e0150036. 
Roebers, C. M., Schmid, C., & Roderer, T. (2009). Metacognitive monitoring and control 
processes involved in primary school children’s test performance. The British Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 79(4), 749–767. 
Rossion, B. (2008). Picture-plane inversion leads to qualitative changes of face perception. 
Acta Psychologica, 128(2), 274–289.  
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in 
social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
13(3), 279–301. 
Sangrigoli, S., Pallier, C., Argenti, A. M., Ventureyra, V. A. G., & de Schonen, S. (2005). 
Reversibility of the other-race effect in face recognition during childhood. Psychological 
Science, 16(6), 440–444. 
Saraç, S., & Karakelle, S. (2017). On-line and off-line assessment of metacognition. 
International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education, 4(2), 301–315.  
Sauerland, M., Sagana, A., Siegmann, K., Heiligers, D., Merckelbach, H., & Jenkins, R. 
(2016). These two are different. Yes, they’re the same: Choice blindness for facial 
identity. Consciousness and Cognition, 40, 93–104.  
 192 
Scheck, B., Neufeld, P., & Dwyer, J. (2000). Actual innocence: Five days to execution, and 
other dispatches from the wrongly convicted. New York: Random House. 
Schellings, G. (2011). Applying learning strategy questionnaires: problems and possibilities. 
Metacognition and Learning, 6(2), 91–109. 
Schnitzspahn, K. M., Zeintl, M., Jäger, T., & Kliegel, M. (2011). Metacognition in prospective 
memory: are performance predictions accurate? Canadian Journal of Experimental 
Psychology = Revue Canadienne de Psychologie Experimentale, 65(1), 19–26. 
Schraw, G., & Dennison, R. S. (1994). Assessing Metacognitive Awareness. Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 19(4), 460–475. 
Schriber, R. A., Robins, R. W., & Solomon, M. (2014). Personality and self-insight in 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
106(1), 112–130.  
Schultz, R. T. (2005). Developmental deficits in social perception in autism: the role of the 
amygdala and fusiform face area. International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 
23(2-3), 125–141. 
Schwartz, B. L. (2002). The phenomenology of naturally-occurring tip-of-the-tongue states: A 
diary study. Advances in Psychology Research, 8, 71–84. 
 193 
Scopelliti, I., Morewedge, C. K., McCormick, E., Min, H. L., Lebrecht, S., & Kassam, K. S. 
(2015). Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences. Management 
Science, 61(10), 2468–2486. 
Shah, P., Gaule, A., Sowden, S., Bird, G., & Cook, R. (2015). The 20-item prosopagnosia 
index (PI20): a self-report instrument for identifying developmental prosopagnosia. Royal 
Society Open Science, 2(6), 140343.  
Shapiro, S. S. (1966). Word association norms: Stability of response and chains of 
association. Psychonomic Science, 4(6), 233–234. 
Shriver, E.R., Young, S.G., Hugenberg, K., Bernstein, M.J., Lanter, J.R. (2008). Class, Race, 
and the Face: Social Context Modulates the Cross-Race Effect in Face Recognition. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 260–274. 
Simons, D. J. (2013). Unskilled and optimistic: overconfident predictions despite calibrated 
knowledge of relative skill. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(3), 601–607.  
Simion, F., & Giorgio, E. D. (2015). Face perception and processing in early infancy: inborn 
predispositions and developmental changes. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 969. 
Simpson, W. E., & Crandall, S. J. (1972). The perception of smiles. Psychonomic Science, 
29(4), 197–200.  
Smith, S. M., Stinson, V., & Prosser, M. A. (2004). Do they all look alike? An exploration of 
decision-making strategies in cross-race facial identifications. Canadian Journal of 
 194 
Behavioural Science/Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement, 36(2), 146. 
Smith, A. D., Hood, B. M., & Hector, K. (2006). Eye remember you two: gaze direction 
modulates face recognition in a developmental study. Developmental Science, 9(5), 465–
472. 
Soh, L., & Jacobs, K. E. (2013). The biasing effect of personality on self-estimates of 
cognitive abilities in males and females. Personality and Individual Differences, 55(2), 
141–146.  
Sperling, R. A., Howard, B. C., Staley, R., & DuBois, N. (2004). Metacognition and Self-
Regulated Learning Constructs. Educational Research and Evaluation: An International 
Journal on Theory and Practice, 10(2), 117–139. 
Stanovich, K. E. (2012). On the distinction between rationality and intelligence: Implications 
for understanding individual differences in reasoning. The Oxford Handbook of Thinking 
and Reasoning, 343–365. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for 
the Rationality Debate? In Heuristics and Biases (pp. 421–440). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511808098.026 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. General, 127(2), 161. 
Susilo, T., & Duchaine, B. (2013). Advances in developmental prosopagnosia research. 
 195 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23(3), 423–429. 
Sutherland, C. A., Burton, N. S., Wilmer, J. B., Blokland, G. A., Germine, L., Palermo, R., 
Collova, J. R., & Rhodes, G. (2020). Individual differences in trust evaluations are 
shaped mostly by environments, not genes. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 117(19), 10218–10224. 
Sutherland, C. A., Liu, X., Zhang, L., Chu, Y., Oldmeadow, J. A., & Young, A. W. (2018). 
Facial first impressions across culture: Data-driven modeling of Chinese and British 
perceivers’ unconstrained facial impressions. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 44(4), 521–537. 
Sutherland, C. A. M., Oldmeadow, J. A., Santos, I. M., Towler, J., Michael Burt, D., & 
Young, A. W. (2013). Social inferences from faces: ambient images generate a three-
dimensional model. Cognition, 127(1), 105–118. 
Sutherland, C. A., Rhodes, G., Burton, N. S., & Young, A. W. (2020). Do facial first 
impressions reflect a shared social reality? British Journal of Psychology, 111(2), 215–
232. 
Tanaka, K. ’ichiro. (1993). Egocentric bias in perceived fairness: Is it observed in Japan? 
Social Justice Research, 6(3), 273–285. 
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. A, Human Experimental Psychology, 46(2), 225–
245. 
 196 
Tanaka, J. W., Kiefer, M., & Bukach, C. M. (2004). A holistic account of the own-race effect 
in face recognition: Evidence from a cross-cultural study. Cognition, 93(1), B1–B9. 
Tang, X., Wang, X., 2004. Face Sketch Recognition. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and 
Systems for Video Technology, 14, 50–57. 
Tauber, S. K., Dunlosky, J., Rawson, K. A., Rhodes, M. G., & Sitzman, D. M. (2013). General 
knowledge norms: updated and expanded from the Nelson and Narens (1980) norms. 
Behavior Research Methods, 45(4), 1115–1143. 
Taubert, J., Apthorp, D., Aagten-Murphy, D., & Alais, D. (2011). The role of holistic 
processing in face perception: evidence from the face inversion effect. Vision Research, 
51(11), 1273–1278. 
Tenenberg, J., & Murphy, L. (2005). Knowing what I know: An investigation of 
undergraduate knowledge and self-knowledge of data structures. Computer Science 
Education, 15(4), 297–315.  
Thorpe, S., Fize, D., & Marlot, C. (1996). Speed of processing in the human visual system. 
Nature, 381(6582), 520–522. 
Tobias, S., & Everson, H. (1996). Assessing Metacognitive Knowledge Monitoring. Report 
No. 96-01. College Entrance Examination Board. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED562584 
Todorov, A. T., Said, C. C., & Verosky, S. C. (2011). Personality Impressions from Facial 
Appearance. In G. Rhodes, A. Calder, M. Johnson, & J. V. Haxby (Eds.), Oxford 
 197 
Handbook of Face Perception. Oxford University Press. 
Tokuhama-Espinosa, T. (2014). Making Classrooms Better: 50 Practical Applications of 
Mind, Brain, and Education Science. W. W. Norton & Company. 
Towler, A., Kemp, R. I., Burton, A. M., Dunn, J. D., Wayne, T., Moreton, R., & White, D. 
(2019). Do professional facial image comparison training courses work? PloS One, 14(2), 
e0211037.  
Towler, A., Kemp, R. I., & White, D. (2017). Unfamiliar face matching systems in applied 
settings. In Face Processing: Systems, Disorders and Cultural Difference,. Bindemann, 
M. & Megreya, A.M. (Eds.), Nova Science. 
Towler, A., White, D., & Kemp, R. I. (2014). Evaluating training methods for facial image 
comparison: The face shape strategy does not work. Perception, 43(2-3), 214–218. 
Towler, A., White, D., & Kemp, R. (2020). Can face identification ability be trained? 
Evidence for two routes to expertise. . https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/g7qfd 
Tullis, J. G., & Fraundorf, S. H. (2017). Predicting others’ memory performance: The 
accuracy and bases of social metacognition. Journal of Memory and Language, 95, 124–
137.  
Tüttenberg, S. C., & Wiese, H. (2019). Learning own- and other-race facial identities from 
natural variability. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , 72(12), 2788–2800. 
 198 
Ueda, S., & Koyama, T. (2011). Influence of eye make-up on the perception of gaze direction. 
International Journal of Cosmetic Science, 33(6), 514–518. 
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion, and race in 
face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 43(2), 
161–204. 
Van Essen, G., & Hamaker, C. (1990). Using Self-Generated Drawings to Solve Arithmetic 
Word Problems. The Journal of Educational Research, 83(6), 301–312. 
Van Garderen, D., & Montague, M. (2003). Visual-spatial representation, mathematical 
problem solving, and students of varying abilities. Learning Disabilities Research & 
Practice: A Publication of the Division for Learning Disabilities, Council for Exceptional 
Children, 18(4), 246–254. 
Veenman, M. V. J., & Spaans, M. A. (2005). Relation between intellectual and metacognitive 
skills: Age and task differences. Learning and Individual Differences, 15(2), 159–176. 
Vickers, D. (2014). Decision Processes in Visual Perception. Academic Press. 
Wells, G. L., Memon, A., & Penrod, S. D. (2006). Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its 
Probative Value. Psychological Science in the Public Interest: A Journal of the American 
Psychological Society, 7(2), 45–75. 
Wheeler, F. W., Liu, X., & Tu, P. H. (2011). Face recognition at a distance. Handbook of Face 
Recognition. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-85729-932-1_14 
 199 
Wheeler, F. W., Weiss, R. L., & Tu, P. H. (2010). Face recognition at a distance system for 
surveillance applications. 2010 Fourth IEEE International Conference on Biometrics: 
Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 1–8. 
White, D., Burton, A. L., & Kemp, R. I. (2016). Not looking yourself: The cost of self‐
selecting photographs for identity verification. British Journal of Psychology, 107(2), 
359–373. 
White, D., Dunn, J. D., Schmid, A. C., & Kemp, R. I. (2015). Error Rates in Users of 
Automatic Face Recognition Software. PloS One, 10(10), e0139827. 
White, D., Kemp, R. I., Jenkins, R., & Burton, A. M. (2014). Feedback training for facial 
image comparison. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21(1), 100–106. 
White, D., Kemp, R. I., Jenkins, R., Matheson, M., & Burton, A. M. (2014). Passport officers’ 
errors in face matching. PloS One, 9(8), e103510.  
White, D., Sutherland, C. A., & Burton, A. L. (2017). Choosing face: The curse of self in 
profile image selection. Cognitive research: principles and implications, 2(1), 1–9. 
Wiese, H., Tüttenberg, S. C., Ingram, B. T., Chan, C. Y., Gurbuz, Z., Burton, A. M., & Young, 
A. W. (2019). A robust neural index of high face familiarity. Psychological Science, 
30(2), 261–272. 
Willis, J., & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions: Making up your mind after a 100-ms 
exposure to a face. Psychological Science, 17(7), 592–598. 
 200 
Wilmer, J. B., Germine, L., Chabris, C. F., Chatterjee, G., Williams, M., Loken, E., 
Nakayama, K., & Duchaine, B. (2010). Human face recognition ability is specific and 
highly heritable. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(11), 5238-5241.  
Wilmer, J. B. (2017). Individual differences in face recognition: A decade of 
discovery. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(3), 225-230.  
Winston, J. S., Henson, R. N. A., Fine-Goulden, M. R., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). fMRI-
adaptation reveals dissociable neural representations of identity and expression in face 
perception. Journal of Neurophysiology, 92(3), 1830–1839.  
Wirth, B. E., & Carbon, C.-C. (2017). An easy game for frauds? Effects of professional 
experience and time pressure on passport-matching performance. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Applied, 23(2), 138–157. 
Wolfson, S. (2000). Students' estimates of the prevalence of drug use: Evidence for a false 
consensus effect. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 14(3), 295–298. 
Wright, P. (2002). Marketplace Metacognition and Social Intelligence. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 28(4), 677–682. 
Yardley, L., McDermott, L., Pisarski, S., Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2008). Psychosocial 
consequences of developmental prosopagnosia: a problem of recognition. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 65(5), 445–451.  
Yarmey, A. D. (1971). Recognition memory for familiar “public” faces: Effects of orientation 
 201 
and delay. Psychonomic Science, 24, 286–288. 
Yeung, N., & Summerfield, C. (2012). Metacognition in human decision-making: confidence 
and error monitoring. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series 
B, Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1310–1321. 
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 81(1), 
141.  
Yinon, Y., Mayraz, A., & Fox, S. (1994). Age and the false-consensus effect. The Journal of 
Social Psychology, 134(6), 717–725. 
Young, A. W., & Burton, A. M. (2017). Recognizing faces. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science. 26(3), 212–217. 
Young, A. W., Newcombe, F., de Haan, E. H. F., Small, M., & Hay, D. C. (1993). Face 
perception after brain injury. In Brain (Vol. 116, Issue 4, pp. 941–959).  
Young, A. W., Frühholz, S., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2020). Face and Voice Perception: 
Understanding Commonalities and Differences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 24(5), 398–
410. 
Young, A. W., Perrett, D., Calder, A., Sprengelmeyer, R., & Ekman, P. (2002). Facial 
expressions of emotion: Stimuli and tests (FEEST). Bury St. Edmunds: Thames Valley 
Test Company. 
 202 
Zaki, S. R., & Johnson, S. A. (2013). The role of gaze direction in face memory in autism 
spectrum disorder. Autism Research: Official Journal of the International Society for 
Autism Research, 6(4), 280–287. 
Zebrowitz, L. A., & Montepare, J. M. (2008). Social Psychological Face Perception: Why 
Appearance Matters. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(3), 1497. 
Zhou, X., & Jenkins, R. (2020). Dunning–Kruger effects in face perception. Cognition, 203, 
104345. 
Zhou, X., Mondloch, C.J. (2016). Recognizing “Bella Swan” and “Hermione Granger”: No 
Own-Race Advantage in Recognizing Photos of Famous Faces. Perception, 45, 1426–
1429. 
 
 
 
